The very fact that you feel that the approch requires something which is not done is a message that you shouldn't be landing there. Short runway, limit tail wind which could easily go over the limit, heavy rain can make the braking action poorer than imagined and control of flight path difficult these are too many variables which can prevent a successful outcome. Not a safe decision to continue the landing.

Different type of operation, but when operating turboprops on short, snow covered remote airstrips years ago, we would almost always intentionally go below the Papi's on short final. No doing so was the higher risk decision.

For exercising airmanship? In limiting conditions, many ppl will go 3 red on the PAPI at LGA or DCA for example (where your final approach is over water) to get a few extra feet of runway.

At LGA if I did that in the 1011, I'd be risking leaving the main gear with the end of the pier.

That's where airmenship comes into play. Long body/heavy perhaps not, narrow body perhaps yes.

Alive and still in posession of licence and job.

I've seen Air Canada go to LGA with a 767-300. Not an assignment I'd be hurrying to take. In a narrowbody though, it's quite safe.

There is no short landing technique on a jet this size. Arriving on a decreased angle (3 red) carries higher pitch, more thrust, flatter sink and in general results in a longer touchdown and a higher speed at wheel spin-up. After that, exactly the same sort of people who use the A word to cover gaps in competency or understanding, will immediately claim: see how tight this was? Lucky my skygod decision to go 3 reds, it saved us. Yeah.

Aiming closer to the threshold, steepening the angle in the last stages is more consistent with the intention. Why not, if you know how not to try too hard. Still, reducing geometrical margins on purpose, creating ad-hoc flying techniques, is not the road to a happy retirement.

Land it consistently, as much identical as your everyday approach. Consistency brings predictable results. The touchdown is usually decided between 150 and 50 feet above the ground. If a runway below 2000 m requires a different skill-set, then the one you have on the longer runways is not a correct one. (Placement of PAPI at 400 or 450 m beyond the THR, as opposed to 291 m where the G/S geometric intercept is, WILL create a wrong skill set for those who follow PAPI through to the landing).

The above is a comment to the discussion here, not the incident itself. We will see what the investigation reveals, however, "no landings beyond TDZ markings" is a sound principle. I am curious to see if it did not work in BUR?

One last note: the (lack of) friction over THR markers at the far end, when wet/snowed, is what makes this man uneasy. The last 60 m you might critically need, and as if they did not exist. I suppose everyone had a NW skid during line up once, for no apparent reason.

Not in any book that I've seen, but when landing on a short, wet runway as described above, most of the people I fly with decide against leaving the first thousand feet of the runway behind.

This boils down to how much runway should be behind the touchdown point. When I were a lad, many moons ago, there were no piano keys and we were taught to aim for the numbers. The piano keys were introduced to reduce the incidence of landing short of the paved surface, thus "wasting" part of the runway. All modern aids such as ILS and PAPI are calibrated for the piano keys so the actual landing distance available is less than the runway length which can become an issue for shorter runways in poor weather conditions.
Should we aim shorter for the numbers in these cases ? - I will leave that can of worms for others to chew, the risks have not changed.
Aiming for a firm contact, avoiding greasers, is probably a better idea getting good weight on the wheels ASAP to improve braking.

Absolutely spot on.

Are you calling the 1000 foot markers the piano keys?

Before I flew the 1011 into LGA I briefly flew the DC9-10 into there and many years flew the 727 into there. I wouldn't have considered a duck-under with the 727. The only difference the company touchdown zone for the narrow bodies was 500 feet closer to the threshold then with the 1011.

Apart from the mixup with Piano Keys and the Fixed Distance markings at 1000ft in, this statement isn't right. The LDR takes into account an air-run distance from 50ft to touchdown. In my aeroplane the air-run distance is 455m, almost 1500ft. "Duck under" and use part of that 455m to roll along on if you wish, but the LDR figures assume you will take 455m/1500ft to get the wheels on the ground.

I think those effects are overstated. But more importantly, flying three reds allow you to plant it with almost no flare. In my experience, it is the type of flare that is the thing that most-affects the touchdown point. Not that I am suggesting you routinely fly three reds! ;)

No aircraft manufacturer or Company SOP suggests duck under technique nor does certified landing performance expects a pilot to do that. So there is simply no justification narrow body, wide body, turbo prop all included. If there is a runway which requires that then that type of aircraft should not be operating there. It is not proper to suggest unsafe alternate techniques to increase landing run for the present SWA case. If the touchdown was at proper distance then it will prove that the landing should not have been affected with so many limiting variable environmental and RW lenth factors.