Think everyone should read the report on the crash in the USA. It is clear from this report that there was a lot of 'non-compliance' , complacency and lack of oversight involved from everyone. http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.av...0-4dde27bccefb

I think that there is a big difference between access to video evidence or wreckage - those ultimately are bland facts. Witness statements are different, in that they contain elements of selection, interpretation and opinion, and have been given with an understanding of the use that will be made of them.

G

I assume one consequence might be people will now think twice about having their own recording devices (such as go-pro's) installed/used in flight?

The judges were very clear that their ruling did not create a precident for the release of any data from factory installed/mandatory video recording devices.

Why are we surprised at the release of the Go-Pro footage? Regardless of the utility of the footage it would surely be very bizarre if personal media was restricted when its found on an aircraft that has crashed but not in (for example) a motorbike or car. In any event haven't we seen the release of similar footage before - RAF Chinook, Catterick?

TBH I'm not sure anyone is surprised...

Read the thread...

Greater clarity is required over the classification of personal recorded media such that it doesn't require the involvement of the High Court. If the DoT are not surprised that access has been granted to so called 'Go-Pro' footage why on earth defend that element?

I am presuming the police already of the amateur footage taken by the many spotters watching the show. Therefore the amateur footage taken from inside the aircraft has to be deemed as the effectively the same and was not installed by the manufacturer/legal requirement for safety reasons. Hence why they have agreed to its release.




As the AAIB have completed their investigation and are now finalising the report, which I hope for the sake of all those involved isn't too much longer in being made public. However, there are a great many people/organisations/groups that need to check the factual information before it is made public so this make take a few more months.

So - will the police 'go it alone now'?

Surely the camera on board the Hunter is no different to the camera in this story.

A34 crash lorry driver jailed for killing family while on phone

It is but the big difference is that the police in the case of air accidents do not have access to it whilst in road accidents they do. They have to ask the AAIB for the item but the agreement between the AAIB and the police/CPS is that they are not permitted to have it and must ask a crown court for it.


This is where I think a review of sharing info needs to be addressed. The police investigation has been delayed because of red tape. I agree with the earlier poster who is happy to provide such info and hence why I do not see why anyone involved would not have provided the police a copy of the transcript of their question and answer session with the AAIB.


The outcome of aircraft inspections and testing should be made available to the police, at the earliest opportunity, as this is a major consideration too. There could be other factors that they need to consider, after all it is an old aircraft and like old cars probably has some funny quirks and like anything mechanical things can go wrong. Therefore, the police have only been able to follow one lead which is the pilot at this stage.


Still no lift of the ban regarding Hunters flying by the CAA, all they had to do was just ensure that the authorisation for a Hunter pilot was more hours on type, more experience of fast jets and regular checks with still the proviso to disallow display flying or low level flying, if the sole issue was the pilots experience and capability. Although the new issue with engines could stop them anyway if they haven't been stored correctly.

I can't vouch for recency issues, if indeed there are any, or comment on AH's flying of the Hunter or comment on Shoreham but if it's pure experience and capability that's worrying you I'd point out AH certainly was/is in general regarded as a highly capable pilot with a fair amount of fast jet experience on a demanding FJ type....

I'd agree that might certainly been of relevance to the Gnat accident, but in the Shoreham case you'll need to define "more experience of fast jets...", as in more than who? AH? What are you suggesting as a minimum?

Quote from Wiggy :

"...but in the Shoreham case you'll need to define "more experience of fast jets...", as in more than who? AH? What are you suggesting as a minimum?"

The case in question is a public display of a vintage military jet fighter. I would have thought the purpose of its display routine should have been a demonstration of its combat role within it`s designed performance envelope and not the pilot`s skills nor the aircraft`s aerobatic manoeuvring capabilities. The sort of pilot required for the role would be best suited to a serving military pilot current on type. Consider Farnborough and Le Bourget air shows. All high performance military fast jets are demonstrated by serving military or test pilots. Not airline pilots who do a bit of aeros and things on the side.
Accordingly in my view it is not something to be measured by number of hours, it is more a question of what you do for a living. If you spend every day sitting, straight and level in a comfy chair and not worrying about things like G Lock, then should you strap yourself in a F16 and thrill the crowds.

That is my idea of the minimum when it comes to demonstrating fighter jets. Different kettle of fish to competition aerobatics in little Pitts Specials and all manner of single piston jobs, I`d have thought.

Chronus

I'm sure you are aware that you can't just whistle up a "serving military pilot current on type" since they don't grow on trees :ooh:.... especially in the UK these days.

By demanding the services of a current military FJ pilot willing to volunteer to spend some of their precious spare time practising and displaying the likes of the Hunter or Gnat you would very much reducing the pool of those available to perfom such as task ....now whether that's a good thing or a bad thing, well it's your call/the authorities call...we will see.

In any event the records show that sadly whilst being a current military fast jet (FJ) pilot might give you an edge over non FJ types it certainly doesn't make you immune from accidents... I can name (but I won't) several former FJ colleagues who perished display flying, or practising for displays. A couple were very much current on FJs at the time of their accidents and crashed on the military type they were operational and current on, and at least one other of my other colleagues was killed displaying a vintage type...

I was not querying this particular pilots credentials and capabilities, although others have previously. I was just asking why the CAA slapped the ban on flying Hunters in the 1st place and why it hasn't as yet been removed.

Hebog perhaps they too are waiting for the verdict from AAIB .

Just confused about why as I can see no logical reason by the CAA at this stage. It can't be because of age or all other 'vintage' aircraft would be grounded too. It can't be type or all other ex-military fast jets would be grounded too. As previously stated if it was pilot they only had to revoke his licence. The airshows have been over-hauled with new rules and procedures etc. So this makes me think they are not happy with the make of aircraft for some reason. After all they didn't wait for the CAA report on the Gnat did they.

Hebog, I would suggest the RAS publication of 8 March 2016 gives a valuable insight into the question you have raised. It can be accessed at:

Royal Aeronautical Society | Insight Blog | Dogfight over UK airshows intensifies

My question is, what price for nostalgia.

have we thought it might not be the jet but currency on the same??

In my youth, I was an immense airshow enthusiast. I attended all kinds, from the grass roots fly ins, to Farnborough and Paris. The more I came to understand the range of approach to the piloting during the displays, the more I realized that at the fringes, some types of piloting included risk out of proportion to benefit. Some pilots were really trying hard. On the surface, trying hard seems great, but it is possible to try too hard, and increase risk, where the possible benefit is not there to balance it - it is just an airshow! If an aircraft has to maneuver close to the ground, over a crowd, for life saving, our society has a higher tolerance for risk (like fire bombers low over town for harbour water pick ups, or an air ambulance landing in an intersection). But for nothing more than simple entertainment value, risks must be minimized. During the Farnborough Airshow, as one example, aircraft are being displayed to promote large sales. okay a very slight reason to accept greater risk, but really not much.

I was a jump seat passenger onboard an aircraft during the Farnborough flying display decades back. The immensely skilled pilot (a retired Red Arrows team leader) was giving the display his all, I was a qualified witness, there in the cockpit. Two days later, that aircraft was destroyed doing that same routine. Happily, injuries were minor, but there had been huge potential for things to be much worse, noting that there had been considerable debris damage behind the standing crowd. I wonder if they understood the risk they were taking standing at the display line fence.

One of my mentors and a retired airshow performer used to tell me: "No one ever died flying a normal circuit". Though I'm not certain this is factual, I get his point. I think that we the aviation industry must educate our audience that their expecting magnificent displays of low altitude maneuvering may be asking too much. They should be pleased to attend an airshow, and watch aircraft fly, where there remains (by either pilot discipline, or regulation) a suitable Ooops zone between the maneuvering aircraft, (including its projected path) and anyone. If they will need telephoto lenses, or binoculars, so be it.

Doing that does not rule out well planned low passes, but, in my opinion, should rule out high energy direction changes anywhere close to the ground. We are the informed professionals, (along with the regulator "helping" us), we know what the right thing to do is. It is not always giving the audience what they are asking for.....

I sort of agree Step, but it depends on what those direction changes are. Some are high risk (downward vertical manoeuvres) and others less so (a simple aileron roll). The key is having a really deep understanding of how to safely manage the jet's energy - tied in of course with good display discipline.

We've all messed up at some stage of a display, but good discipline means not pushing it. Ending the display and calling a 'technical problem' is a perfectly acceptable face-saver.

Shoreham air crash: Inquest delayed until 'late 2017' - BBC News


latest news.

So we will see the AAIB report next month.

STEPTURN! Good post. Only a low time PPL myself, but with much Airshow viewing experience. Like you, lots of Oshkosh's, Farnboro's, Daytons etc.,. I always felt that pushing limits was very unnecessary, resulting in myself witnessing 11 crashes and 9 lives lost. Rather see the aircraft flying safely, and families living happily.

It depends how we are defining "pushing the limits". Flying a 1/4 clover isn't of itself something most would put in that box. However they might start to think it so with a lower starting height, minimal practice, minimal currency on type, time pressure, different conditions, different sequence so energy has changed, overfly constraints making positioning a focus....

None of that however should be solely on the pilots shoulders, he didn't go into that display alone and he shouldn't be abandoned after the fact.

Well, he was flying alone, he could say no any time if he was not very confident about a safe outcome. The solo pilot is the last, and most vital link in the chain of safety. All the regulation, planning and supervision in the world won't help, if the piloting of the aircraft is "at the edge" and something does not go as planned at that edge.

What we're going to see is the regulators/supervisors making the edge farther from the ground and the crowd, because it is the pilot flying close to the edge, and by the time the pilot is flying, its too late for the regulation/supervision to affect change to assure safety.

I think that view has too narrow a focus as at its core is the premise that the pilot can't make a mistake when of course they can and do.

That was the irritation at the outset of this where some posting on this forum can't see the wood for the trees when any accident involves highly qualified pilots in reasonably complex aircraft [which if nothing else stifled debate]. How much of that view existed in the mechanism of regulation prior to this accident who knows but certainly some commentary from the AAIB doesn't seem kind as far as elements of the process are concerned.

Certainly the regulator kept no data upon those events that didn't end in outright disaster but were never the less sub optimal. So the learning process has little historical context beyond the anecdotal.

However it hardly seems fair to then push any failure solely upon the shoulders of the pilot if the general environment wasn't what it might be or is now.

The remedy is going to be complex not least because actually the reality of the matter is that those best able to find effective solutions are those more than likely doing it already and therefore potentially part of any failures in the past.

To say:-

Just means being able to crash into open ground because, for instance, if you haven't achieved enough height at the apex of a figure and pull through you hit the ground. However with the bald assumption that the pilot wants to live then reasons for doing such a thing is probably quite complex, and if it isn't then that raises more questions than it answers.

Perhaps the greatest pity is not having the debate a year ago.

Yes, I certainly assume that pilots want to live. However, "live", can mean different things to different people, pilots included. "Live" can be "on the edge", "adding 5 knots for the wife and kids" (on a long final), or anywhere in between.

Some pilots are comfortable with more risk than others. I've known pilots who will accept more risk to present a good show - performance pressure. It's like the "get home itis" which will tempt a pilot to push the weather.....

I have to agree with your line of thinking Step Turn. Reminds me of the old pilot/bold pilot saying.

In the race to throw someone under the bus you missed the point.

Adding 5 knots for the wife and kids, living on the edge, grubbing around in bad weather is not the same as the example I gave of pulling through with insufficient height. The former could indeed be viewed as being on the edge and taking a punt. The later certainly leads to hitting the ground.

Insufficient height at the apex of (say) a loop is insufficient height - unless somebody excavates the ground it isn't going to change. Of course you do understand that, and it is certain that any display pilot more than understands that.

So in my example why would any pilot of great experience put himself in a position that guarantees he hits the ground?

As I said its probably quite complex, maybe elements within post 1051 could be possibly included?

Can we just wait for the AAIB report before reverting back to comments about pilots taking risks, flying on the edge and pushing aircraft.
The AAIB have known since July what the outcome of their investigation was. They have I presume waited for other parties (CAA, maintenance, airshow, pilot) to make any comments/statements before publication and double checking of all the facts. The families will be among the 1st to know the outcome along with the owner and pilot and the their lawyer/s which is correct in the circumstances. Followed closely by the CAA and the Police/CPS and the airshow organisers and maintenance companies. Then the general public.

[QUOTE FROM HEBOG "The AAIB have known since July what the outcome of their investigation was.

Is that a certainty ? It is well known that AAIB does not sit in judgement on guilt and blame. They will not be influenced in any way by other parties who have any form of interest in the matter.
In reminding us, Step Turn has well described a pilot`s crucial role in the circumstances of any causal chain of events that conspire to a catastrophe. How many times and in how many different ways has this been demonstrated.
So far as this particular catastrophe is concerned we now wait to see what sort of a role was played by the pilot. Where did he fit in the causal chain. That I believe is the single most crucially important item that is of interest to any pilot. So far as any pilot`s wish to live is concerned, their have been exceptions, mercifully few and only in the category of unhinged. So again I must agree with Step, it is as he says a matter of risk taking.

Pittsextra poses a rhetorical question, "So in my example why would any pilot of great experience put himself in a position that guarantees he hits the ground? "
The answer is, only because he simply overlooked the small print.

In most tragic events such as this one word springs to mind.....complacency.

I could post dozens of examples but this is typical.

Colin McRae blamed for fatal helicopter crash - BBC News

Generally, it's pretty difficult for an accident to occur, without a human error/oversight, somewhere in the chain. It is a certainty, that there have been aircraft accidents, where the unfortunate pilot was along for the ride, in an accident they had not caused, and could not prevent - hopefully, their role then becomes one of making the outcome better than it otherwise might have been. The pilot landing the Airbus in the Hudson river comes to mind.

But, for as much as I think about accidents during performances, for my observation, the pilot's choice as to how (and in what space) to maneuver the aircraft become more central to the outcome. In this case, it is very likely that had the pilot chosen to not fly a "G" maneuver, which included recovery from downward flight, The outcome of any break in the chain of causes would have been less severe. He would simply have more choice as to where to go with the plane, and at closer to one G flight, have more control of the plane.

As I flew today over Toronto in my 150, along a route directed by ATC, I spent much of my time thinking as to where I could tuck it in, doing as little harm to "the public" as possible, if something went wrong. I look at the sports fields, and shudder at the imagined headlines "pilot narrowly misses kids on sports field during crash". So I looked into ravines I could select. Much more messy for me, but no "public" visible either. However, through this, my circle of "could make it to..." was fairly large, and a forced landing, however messy the terrain might make it, would still be controlled.

Were I to have chosen a "G" maneuver during my flying there - even a tight turn, my choice as to where to go if something went wrong, would be reduced. In that location (over a built up area), a risk I refuse to take - I'm already at the limit of my comfort zone for handling an unplanned event just flying straight and level there. But that's me, other pilots might have a different threshold of risk in such a situation. We pilots are entitled to have differing levels of acceptance of risk, and discussing that in a accidents forum, seems okay to me.

Re final report


Sussex Police v Secretary of State for Transport & Anor [2016] EWHC 2280 (QB) (28 September 2016)


Section 8


Originally, the AAIB also said in July that the final report would be out at the end of the Summer, this has then moved to the Autumn, which has now moved to the Winter (December) as this is when the families have been invited to Farnborough to hear the outcome.

Shoreham air disaster final report delayed - BBC News


Latest update from the media.

With but two days to go to the end of 2016 I wonder if AAIB will make good one of their several deadlines. The post-season airshow review by the CAA, in consultation with the industry, really does need it badly and the 2017 season is only a few months away.

Still no news
 

Looks like it won't be February either looking at the AAIB website. Still in consultation and not scheduled for February reports as yet.

Pittsextra
Agree with all your points - especially the one about currency. What if, due to lack of currency, an absolute note of the altitude at the top of the loop wasn't actually noted but just afterwards it "looked OK" (it nearly was)? We all know you can aileron roll out of that loop and recover until you're pointing straight down. Then you just have to pull as hard as you can without stalling-setting some flap if you remember. Wings were "waggling" just pre impact.
By the way - some of us from the 'Military " site have been invited to talk to Sussex Police about Pprune comments we made so be careful what you write. I will not be contacting them out of loyalty to a fellow airman.

AAIB to publish the report 12:00 Noon on Friday 3 March.

There is a journalistic maxim: "if you want to bury/ minimise the impact of something, launch it on a Friday" (smaller Saturday papers due to more limited advertising; lower circulations as fewer commuters; a Friday is too early for the Sundays as the Saturday papers will have got there first; etc...).

While this is less relevant in today's internet age, and the report has zero risk of being ignored given its profile, the same principles apply.

So rather odd, given that (after more than a year) they had a choice of any time.

...Or maybe not.