Many thanks for the link Cgb.

The Daily Mail??

Likened to spending four months in a lunatic asylum. :rolleyes:

Listen only to expert opinions, not the tabloid press.

Looks fine. Over regulate and increase the paperwork to the extent that most, other than the largest commercially run airshows, become unviable.
One requirement being discussed apparently, is to require all display pilots to possess a valid Class 1 medical. That would remove a number of experienced warbirds pilots off the scene.
I suppose thats the object, restrict most displays, more safety, no displays absolute safety. Noticeably absent on the various CAA review panels are practicing display pilots, only one.
The rest appear to be Health and Safety and desk bound "experts,"
To illustrate the " must be seen to do something mentality". At one of the displays after the Shoreham event last year, despite the completely random nature of where the accident aircraft would impact, pilots display gate perameters were changed mid display according to the traffic density on an adjacent road!
I still don't understand how you 'mitigate or risk assess' for example, bits falling onto random passers by, if for example, a military jet aerobatic team during "high energy manoeuvres" make an error, and collide over the outskirts of say Aldershot during a Farnborough display.

^^^^
Exactly Pete, you can't mitigate against the absolute certainty of bits falling off aircraft or a full blown accident. If it's going to happen, it will - and does. Today in the UK, X number of people will be killed on the roads, X number of people will be killed in their houses doing DIY, etc, etc.....That's life unfortunately.

All I will say is that this event will be a complete gamechanger for displays in the UK.

This is a better link http://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/...ons%20eval.pdf

SGC

Do you really see it as so restrictive?? You don't see it as a formalisation of some items already within 403 either implied or explicit?

Interestingly given what prompted the review are elements surrounding the venue seem secondary to those focusing upon the people. For example I am surprised the need to explicitly mention that the FDD should know what elements are within a display... I'm not sure how he fulfils his current 403 requirements without knowing.

If it would have been 5°C cooler that day, we would not have this discussion at all.

Sometimes, "things" are in very little corners.
=> 5°C was all it took to run out of power, lift and ultimately altitude.

"If" a lot of things, we'd not be having this discussion. 5C could make the difference, as could 5 more knots over the top of the loop, 5/10 of a second later to accelerate before building up a lot of G in the recovery, or 5 tens of feet higher entry and recovery altitude. Or, 5 more minutes thinking about where an out of control aircraft could hit the ground.

Unhappily, airshow planners failed to imagine what would happen if a pilot lost control during a loop recovery, Regulators failed to consider an abnormal event that the planners did not plan for, and the pilot failed to maintain the needed margin for his loop. The sum of that ended in disaster. If any one of them had gone better, the consequences would have been much less severe.

Now, we are all reminded that our part in aviation, as it relates to public safety, requires an extra bit of thought. The AAIB will remind us again later.

The difference between 200ft and 500ft would have made this a non event whatever the temperature.

sky9,

In the accident manoeuvre the aircraft was 200+ ft lower on completion than on entry. Therefore, from a 500 ft entry it would still have been less than 300 ft agl on completion if flown in the same manner ; do you really think that would still have been a 'non event'?

300 agl sounds like a better outcome to me.
The comment has been made earlier about entry heights and gates, and that it matters not what the entry height was so long as the gate was made. However, those that make this comment do not then comment whether the gate was indeed made.
And if the gate was not made, I would not be surprised if a contributory factor to the gate not being made was the low entry height.
Certainly an entry at 500 ft gives more margin for error if a problem occurs.

But does making the gate on speed and altitude still assure a safe outcome of the maneuver?

Does failure to make the gate ensure an unsafe outcome?

When you're pulling out of a looping maneuver over a crowded highway... well, you shouldn't EVER be pulling out of a looping maneuver over a crowded highway. Or a crowded anything. Note the consequences. Airshows are optional, public safety is not. I love airshows, we have a lot of them in Northern California and Reno is nearby. Support safety, and you're supporting airshows.

:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D

Many of us still appear to be ignoring the elephant in the room.

Which is? Sometimes when you are so close to an elephant, all you can see is the tail.
There is a very interesting parallel thread in Military about currency to display standard on different types.

If the gate is established as the minimum safe entry point, then yes, failure to make it ensures an unsafe outcome, in the context of the original intent. Does it ensure a crash? Not so certain, but it sure should be a wake up call.

Elephant in the room? I would only be speculating, as I do not have a full set of facts about the event. I speculate that a low altitude entry left less than comfortable margin for completion of the loop. I'm sure that the pilot intended diligence with respect to not overflying crowd lines. Perhaps a factor (prevailing wind?) resulted in unexpected displacement of the maneuver toward the crowd, and the pilot pulled harder through the loop in an attempt to correct for that factor.

The reports state a speed over the top which sounds slow to me for that type of aircraft (though I am not type familiar). If I loop my plane too hard, it may be slow over the top. I'm sure that this is not aircraft type specific to my plane. I have learned from experience (at happily high altitudes) that slow and less than 1G over the top, and you'll have to recover that speed on the way back down, in addition to just finishing the loop - more pulling harder than planned. Pull hard to recover will result in drag building up, and a delay in the desired acceleration. Pilots practiced in stalls would recognize this as a "secondary stall".

When you secondary stall an aircraft, you're going to use up a lot more altitude than you planned for the original stall recovery. As a very new pilot, I was told about the perils of low altitude loops in jet fighters by a friend retired as a Wing Commander from the RAAF. He described to me his flying a low altitude loop, and getting it wrong at the top, recognizing that, and rolling out over the top to prevent following through an unrecoverable loop. He lived, I learned.

Imperfect vertical downward maneuvers have opportunity to consume a lot more altitude than intended. That must always factor into display flying planning.

So that's the elephant I think I see, but that's just my opinion, that facts will come out in time....

Cockpit discipline ?
 

Could some display pilots (esp. jets) tell us if they "speak" out loud to themself about the gate height/speed targets to achieve during the demo ? Does anyone knows if this pilot used this technique ? I'm still trying to understand why an experienced pilot could get trapped in such basic error. (insufficient height)

There may be more to it than just insufficient height. The entry height could have been okay, and indeed probably was, in accordance with the rehearsed routine. It's the changes or inaccuracies which can occur once you're established in the loop which can have a greater affect, and very little room to fix it. A friend of mine crashed at Farnborough, while making a maximum effort to not allow the aircraft to be blown into the crown protected area. He kept the plane out of the protected zone, but bits were thrown in that direction.

I imagine a conscientious pilot who tried to adjust or correct for a variation after entry, and ran out of energy and then altitude. The failing lies equally with organizers and overseers who failed to consider where an out of control aircraft could end up.

The word 'gate' means exactly that; if your parameters are met, you go through, if not you leave it well closed and go to Plan B.

Maybe a physics whiz could work out a hypothetical gate based on WV372's weight and thrust:

Weight at time of manoeuvre 17 386 lbs (Empty 13420, pilot 160, fuel 3381*, pylon and drop tank 425) *fuel assume 500 lbs used start,taxi, accelerate to cruise, 15 minutes transit at 52 lbs/min and 200 lbs used in manoeuvre.

So at a weight of 17 386 lbs, assume height at apex 3000ft agl, speed over top 105 knots IAS, ground temperature 25 C, thrust (at max intermediate 7950 rpm) = 7410 lbs.

Anybody?

The 'top gate' is irrelevant if you fail to start with correct parameters for entry. with a 380kt run-up and full power, then I would expect 7-8000ft over the top with a sensitive pull . Use a bit more G and you get a pleasing 5000ft.

Use less power and it's not so simple.

The Black Arrows looped a lot of hunters.

wets

118.9 - you'd also need stall speed, profile and induced drag coefficients & g-limit to do that calculation (and a computer - but you could do that in Excel easily enough).

G

wing performance you need to know....and how they perform with different flap settings.
The equation is really one of working out the acceleration as the hunter descends inverted and assuming that max possible g is maintained until straight and level.

PPRT wrote:
+1

Has anyone seen a copy of the CAA's risk assessment for this event, or did they delegate that task when authorising the air show?

How do these things work? Does anyone do a proper EASA/ICAO risk assessment, or is it just a nod and a wink from one good old boy to another?

With respect to theoretical height loss from apex to completion of a loop, the minimum radius will be achieved by maintaining the maximum usable angle of attack. Therefore, what is needed is knowledge of the lift coefficient that can be achieved. The lift curve slope of the wing will vary as a function of both Mach number and Reynold's number although below about 0.5M the predominant effect will be from Reynold's number. Therefore, the maximum angle of attack and, de facto, lift coefficient will probably vary throughout the manoeuvre. Unless the aircraft is above corner speed, the normal acceleration achieved is irrelevant although its value will be used for any height loss calculation. Drag will indeed affect the speed profile through the second half of a loop but thrust will also have an effect; it is thrust - drag that will determine the actual speed profile and thus the radius.

When pulling through at maximum angle of attack with a maximum speed that is below 0.5M and is below corner speed, the height loss variation as a function of the speed profile is actually less than many may intuitively think.

How do these things work? Does anyone do a proper EASA/ICAO risk assessment, or is it just a nod and a wink from one good old boy to another?

Appendix A, CAP403.

There isn't an EASA/ICAO risk assessment matrix for airshows, but the CAP 403 covers the requirements. The EASA/ICAO SMS matrix is sometimes overkill for some requirements and not inclusive enough for others, it isn't a one size fits all RA. I have no doubt that an airport like Shoreham has an SMS integral with their core business, which would be used and enhanced for 'display' events adding the requirements of CAP403 and CAA Doc.743.

I know first hand of a work up to DA by a crew last year, prior to Shoreham, and I can assure you that SMS/CAP403/Doc743 and even H&S at work (snore) were all covered in the planning.

Petition
Ask Civil Aviation Authority to rethink their charges to the 2016 Airshow season

6,438 signatures at time of this posting

60 degrees of pitch
 

Rough rule of thumb.
It's when your feet are on the horizon

Liability etc
 

The aviation insurers on behalf of the owner of the Hunter, admitted civil liability under Section 76 (2) to various families whom lost loved ones last year. That Statute means what is says, and the facts of the accident as known, are more than sufficient for the admission to be given. There will now be no High Court trial on the civil liability of the operator of the Hunter to the families whom lost loved ones, as that issue has been dealt with.

That should not be confused with the roles of the Inquest, and the current criminal investigation by the Sussex Police.

Well there may still be a civil action if the insurers decide that someone or some organisation was not complying with the T&C's of their insurance document.

Therefore the insurer may decide to issue civil proceedings to claim back their full 'expenses' incurred in meeting their obligations under 76(2).

Dsc810
+1
👍🏻

Swiss Cheese


Yes the facts are 'G-BXFI crashed killing several people' therefore, the insurers for G-BXFI have paid out under the policy.


Agree with DSC810
The reason for the crash has not been established, thereby it can't be ascertained at present if the insurance company will make a counter claim on another insurance policy such as the maintenance organisations or airshow organisers.


I believe that this is standard practice in the insurance world, after all they are a business and wish to make money, like any other business. It is not being mean, stingy etc


Does anyone else still find it odd that the cartridges made in 2008 were not fitted until November 2012. Considering that previously there had been long wait times for them and I would imagine they are very expensive. Although, I expect the AAIB have checked with the sole supplier in the UK and all other Hunters and are able to trace them through records held by the supplier, MB and maintenance organisation records.


I think it maybe a long wait for the final report, but there will be several interim reports as the investigation progresses.

liability etc part 2
 

Interestingly, the aviation insurers of the Agusta 109 Vauxhall crash tried to claim against the CAA in the High Court, and they recently lost. That may be a straw in the wind here. In many ways it all comes down to the proximate cause of the loss, which as a famous US Chief Justice once described as trying to nail jelly to the wall.

Aviation insurers do not automatically pay out of course, as there may be invalidation of the insurance itself (breach of ANO etc), or there may be more complex matters to consider (e.g. Malaysian Airlines 370 and 17).

So the insurers are 100% certain that the aircraft complied with the ANO then and was fully serviceable at the time.


Even though the AAIB have queried that the aircraft had out of date cartridges fitted and therefore doesn't meet the ANO which in turn raised the question that should the PtF been applied for and granted.


If it is discovered the aircraft was flying and shouldn't have been. Does this mean it is the fault of the CAA who issued the PtF for not undertaking through checks or the person/organisation applying for the PtF and declaring the aircraft had complied with the ANO etc.


I am presuming that the CAA when a request is received undertake a check of the aircraft itself and the books to confirm all is in order.


Think the insurance company have paid interim payments whilst they await further information as to cause and therefore liability, they will make a counter claim against another policy if there are other factors I am sure. As I would have thought non-compliance with the ANO would invalidate the insurance.

CAA statement on the AAIB special bulletin on the Shoreham Air Show accident | UK Civil Aviation Authority

Shoreham crash: Air show 'unaware' of pilot's display plan - BBC News

BBC report:

Well the loss of cars is reported in earnest, the reporting of the human loss was relegated to about an appendix to the article!

Like a recent report in our local rag: "a BMW was badly damaged after it collided with a tree" instead of "a **** used his BMW to destroy a publicly owned tree".

"Even though the AAIB have queried that the aircraft had out of date cartridges fitted and therefore doesn't meet the ANO which in turn raised the question that should the PtF been applied for and granted.

If it is discovered the aircraft was flying and shouldn't have been. Does this mean it is the fault of the CAA who issued the PtF for not undertaking through checks or the person/organisation applying for the PtF and declaring the aircraft had complied with the ANO etc. "




While I understand that the legalistic approach inevitably starts down that road at some point, what on earth would having out of date ejection seat cartridges have to do with the cause of an accident such as this?


I struggle to see how anyone can view this accident as in any serious way the direct responsibility of the CAA. Surely they set the rules for the aircraft operators - us - to follow. It is our job to show that we are complying as reasonably well as we can, or to justify any deviations. They have a duty to check on us to see we are doing as required, but surely the responsibility stops with us?


If the notion that the CAA is responsible was to gain ground, I see a future nightmare for private aviation at least in the UK.

It is quite astonishing that the FDD 'was not provided with or was not aware of the display sequence.' Marry this up with what CAP 403 states about not doing ad-hoc and unrehearsed manoeuvres. The FDD would therefore not have known, could not have known, if he was or wasn't witnessing an impromptu manoeuvre or two. Granted, G-BXFI's routine may have been to script, perhaps a flawed script, but how can a FDD manage aerial safety if he doesn't know what the pilot is going to do?

Although Canada, Australia, USA and other display regimes are stated, South Africa has a rather onerous but simple system. Full written display sequences (entry height, speed, direction, linking manoeuvres and the whole nine yards) must reach the FDD well before the show. Then, all aircraft doing aerobatics must do a validation in front of the FDD - no validation, no display. And finally, all display pilots must personally attend a safety briefing by the FDD (often multiple briefings are held to accommodate those far away).

And finally, my hobbyhorse again: Ban downward vertical pull-through manoeuvres in high inertia jets. Had these been banned, this Thread wouldn't exist.

So reading through that report and the others from the AAIB so far. My understanding is as follows:-
The aircraft shouldn't have been flying at all (airshow or otherwise) as the maintenance organisation had effectively mis-declared that the aircraft was fit to fly as it had out of date items and therefore should not have had a renewed permit.
The Pilot should not have been given a DA by his mate in the team. As both broke the PtF by displaying/flying over congested areas and the conflict in interest.
The FDD had not complied with CAP403 correctly either as no risk assessment for this aircraft had been carried out.
But until the final report is made we are still non the wiser as to cause of the crash, just that there were at least 3 reasons the jet shouldn't have been there.