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-   -   Communicate, Navigate, Aviate and crash... (https://www.pprune.org/accidents-close-calls/563785-communicate-navigate-aviate-crash.html)

CISTRS 30th Jun 2015 08:35

Communicate, Navigate, Aviate and crash...
 
Joseph Kalister told air traffic controller before Plainville crash he had no power | Daily Mail Online

A tragically unnecessary outcome. He should have picked a field....

9 lives 30th Jun 2015 10:03

Thanks for the link... Practice forced approaches all the way to a successful landing!

Maoraigh1 30th Jun 2015 21:52

Engine failure in IMC on final approach? Could he see a field? At what height did he break cloud?

Big Pistons Forever 30th Jun 2015 23:29

There are plenty of accidents where poor prioritization of tasks and placing talking on the radio above flying the aircraft are contributing factors, but I am not sure this is one of them.

Low altitude, in IMC, with a sick engine, ATC can be a huge resource. From the audio tape he started by using ATC to point him at the nearest airport, at what appeared to be the first sign of trouble. That airport was behind him so any delay in talking to ATC would have put him farther away.

When the engine failed he said exactly the right thing " The engine just failed, I am IMC and I need help". ATC then pointed him at a nearby highway, which was likely the best option. This was IMO an entirely appropriate use of available resources to increase the odds of a successful outcome.

Obviously when he broke out of the clouds he was not able to maneuver to a landable area with tragic results.

To imply that this was a tragedy only because the pilot had the aviate, navigate,communicate thing backwards and then failed to properly handle the airplane is IMO a gross over simplification of how a desperately diffcult situation was handled

Too bad he was not a Cirrus. This is the poster child accident for demonstrating the value of an airframe parachute system.

If you really want an example of talking on the radio, instead of flying the aircraft, then I suggest you look at the Bournemouth Tomahawk EFATO crash about 4 years ago

The engine failed on takeoff at about 300 feet. The nose was never lowered and the aircraft stalled and spun in. It appears the only action the pilot took in response to the engine failing was to make a mayday call on the radio. Now That is getting the priorities wrong :ugh:

Finally I remember reading about a successful PA 28 forced landing in the accident section of Pilot magazine. The aircraft lost power at relatively low altitude when returning to the airport. The pilot executed a forced approach into the only open area, a small field with poor approaches. No one was hurt although the aircraft was wrecked. The AAIB reported that the pilot attributed the success of his forced approach to the fact that he regularly practiced forced approaches.

The cause of the engine failure ? Carb icing :rolleyes: , one of the most preventable causes of engine failure there is :*

Seems like if he spent a bit more time practicing how to manage the engine instead of practicing forced approaches, there would be one less wrecked PA 28 in the UK.....

CISTRS 1st Jul 2015 03:22

Big Pistons Forever:

Thank you for your cool analysis. On re-listening to the ATC tape, I agree with you. It's clear he broke cloud too late to have any workable options.

It should remind us about the discipline of flying a single.

piperboy84 1st Jul 2015 23:22

BPF,

Are you sure the Tomahawk EFATO was in Bournemouth and not Manchester Barton ?

Big Pistons Forever 2nd Jul 2015 04:11


Originally Posted by piperboy84 (Post 9031288)
BPF,

Are you sure the Tomahawk EFATO was in Bournemouth and not Manchester Barton ?

Yes, you are correct. The Manchester crash is the one I was thinking of.

Pace 2nd Jul 2015 11:10

for me this highlights the risk flying especially piston singles at night, in bad weather, over fog, long stretches of water. cities or low cloud.

How many pilots leave airport A in CAVOK climb on top to a destination hundreds of miles away also in CAVOK but ignore the weather enroute?

i have flown a twin where enroute all the west coast of France airports were giving overcast 200 with RVR 800 meters and heard piston singles flying in the blue above.

Really if any airports are reporting less than 600 agl minimum over flat land don't do it! Over mountains even worse.

It does come down to Russian roulette and the level of risk your prepared to take?

This guy pulled the trigger on the wrong chamber sadly for him.
Do we know whether he stalled in or flew in as its always better to fly into something than to stall into the ground

Pace

bingofuel 2nd Jul 2015 11:17

Pace,
I take it that your minima for making an approach if asymetric, should you have an engine failure, were the same as the all engines operating, single pilot ops minima?

If not were you not making a similar decision re risk?

maxred 2nd Jul 2015 13:33


Really if any airports are reporting less than 600 agl minimum over flat land don't do it! Over mountains even worse.
His destination field was OVC 800. His engine after severe vibration, imploded, 200 hrs after major O/H. He was set up on his approach. His wife and kid, and he died. He hit a house. Major discussion on a lot of forums on this one. Suggest all facts reviewed prior to posting..

Pace 2nd Jul 2015 16:37

Bingo Fuel Maxred


does come down to Russian roulette and the level of risk your prepared to take?
It is the level of risk? Nothing is risk free. If you have a single turbine upfront your risk levels drop over a piston single and the same with a piston twin.

All the twin does is give you extra options as I always say with 3000 hrs in a variety of piston twins with extra options come extra choices and with extra choices the option to make the wrong choice.

But with a current and good twin pilot they are safer than piston singles

Pace

Maoraigh1 2nd Jul 2015 21:39

With that kind of engine problem, he might have oil on windscreen. If engine seized, he'd lose vacuum instruments. If it didn't seize, vibration could affect instrument readability. Much worse situation

piperboy84 2nd Jul 2015 22:01

Interesting thoughts on what kind of clearance between the mountains and the cloud base is a personal minimum for VFR on top. I had a flight this past weekend from Dundee up to the Inverness area, approaching the Cairngorm Mountains I could see a good distance through that there was a 1500 to 2000 foot clearance from the top of the highest peak to the cloud base which topped out at 9k. My choices? fly between the hilltops and the base and get thrown around a bit with mountain waive etc. as it was blustery or get up over the top for a smooth ride but knowing that in the unlikely event the engine quit I have at least 1500 feet vfr after I glide or fall out the bottom. I choose over the top, but would not have had it been any less than 1500. On a side note, cruising along at FL 90 just a few feet above the fluffy stuff zipping by I feel like an airline pilot and makes me ponder just maybe my little Maule is called a Strata Rocket for a reason! :ok:

RatherBeFlying 2nd Jul 2015 23:11

Fatal forced landings in piston singles in IFR are extremely rare.

To properly evaluate the risk, we'd need to compare single engine fatalities in light piston twins.

Pull what 6th Jul 2015 02:35


Really if any airports are reporting less than 600 agl minimum over flat land don't do it! Over mountains even worse.
Very good advice-anyone considered the people below the aircraft too!


Fatal forced landings in piston singles in IFR are extremely rare.
Even rarer are two 747s colliding on the runway at Tenerife. Rarity doesnt negate risk


The engine failed on takeoff at about 300 feet. The nose was never lowered and the aircraft stalled and spun in. It appears the only action the pilot took in response to the engine failing was to make a mayday call on the radio. Now That is getting the priorities wrong
Why is making a mayday call getting priorities wrong? In fact the prompt mayday call may well have saved the life of the passenger who survived, Aviate Navigate Communicate is in fact what you call

another stupid flight schoolism mindlessly passed down from instructor to instructor.
Seconds count in a fire and every second lost can be the difference between life and death if you are not too sure about that have a look at the Bradford Stadium disaster on U tube.


The fuel selector is a pretty simple, very accessible handle. If a student needs to continually practice rotating it from the 12 o'lock position to the 6 o'clock position in either direction, than in order to get it right then he/she is not smart neough to be a pilot.
In tbne same way if a student cannot press the tit and say "mayday mayday mayday" while pushing the nose over with an EFATO he is not smart enough to realise that folklore teaching from the days of speaking tubes is a bit dated.

If you teach HP&L its called divided attention, if you dont, try a simple statement to the student that goes like this. "When you fxxk up the off airfield landing(as most do) the person you most want to see will probably be a paramedic or fireman, not the instructor who told you to leave the mayday call till the last moment.

Big Pistons Forever 6th Jul 2015 04:33


Originally Posted by Pull what (Post 9035864)

In the same way if a student cannot press the tit and say "mayday mayday mayday" while pushing the nose over with an EFATO he is not smart enough to realise that folklore teaching from the days of speaking tubes is a bit dated.

.

The problem here was the Tomahawk pilot didn't push the nose over so the aircraft did not stall and spin, the only action he did was push the transmit button. Yes alerting airport services is a good idea but it has to happen after you fly the airplane. In this case what could have been a simple forced landing ahead turned into a stall spin tragedy.:ugh:

I have to wonder if this is not a result of instruction that placed more emphasis on talking on the radio instead of the imperative of lowering the nose after an EFATO and flying the aircraft to a controlled touchdown....

chillindan 7th Jul 2015 14:49

Heres the AAIB report.

https://assets.digital.cabinet-offic...RVRF_04-12.pdf

Pull what 8th Jul 2015 07:30

Seconds count, getting assistance is paramount and a priority. Beware of not questioning the logic of folklore instruction, that's why GA instruction never moves forward and and is still stuck in the Tiger Moth era

Seconds count
Quick actions save lives of two people as light aircraft crashes at Shifnal airfield | shropshirelive.com


Pressing the tit and saying Mayday shouldnt stop anybody flying the aircraft, if it did we would have to land and then call 'final'!

Divided attention is required to fly and manage emergencies and should be taught and practiced.

Centaurus 21st Jul 2015 02:14

I recall a story published many years ago in the RAF flight safety journal Air Clues. A DH Vampire was on radar vectors for final approach when the pilot called ATC to say his engine was vibrating badly and he needed a priority landing.
Shortly afterwards ATC asked the pilot if the vibration had ceased. The pilot said it had. At the subsequent Court of Inquiry the ATC officer was asked to explain why he didn't immediately notify the crash rescue people about the incident.

The ATC replied that when the pilot told him the vibration had ceased, he didn't add it was because the engine had stopped operating altogether :ok:

Above The Clouds 21st Jul 2015 09:34

I would say the pilot remained remarkably cool considering the situation he was presented with, listening to the audio I suspect the final right turn from ATC to a heading of 360 was the killer.
I suggest that because he was given an approx. range of 1.5 miles to the highway then the transmissions end, looking at the crash site suggests the aircraft came down very steeply into the house rather than any form of controlled forced landing, has it been reported or shown how far from the highway the crash site was.
The old adage of aviate, navigate, communicate is all well and good as a fall back procedure but in this particuliar situation it seems the pilot did everything he could and used what resources he could to help the situation with a low altitude engine failure in IMC coupled with failing instruments due to lack of vacuum.


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