Thanks Roland, I've seen lighter vehicles (Land Rovers and the like) loaded onto a palletised flat floor, but as the pallet restraint itself is (IIRC) rated to only 10k lbs in most a/c, that doesn't sound like the "belt and braces" restraint you would see applied to these types of heavy items on a mil. freighter (at least one operated by a NATO air arm).

Guam, your reply left me somewhat puzzled.
Your Reply: Absolutely!

OK, I'll ask a different way: what operational limit is the standard departure?

Your explanation that you use a standard departure is understood.

EDIT: I got a few insights in this thread at tech log. I also noted from someone above that there's ample room on departure.

Lonewolf, what's your question and point?

I commented on plenty of area to depart normally without any special maneuvers.
your curiosities and questions must have all been met here from all the excellent posts by all that have added to this thread.
we operate NADP 2 and 1. 2 being standard. 1 would be a good choice in OAIX.


The loading issues are never rule of thumb, the MRAPS require a minimum of 70 straps per unit, the pallet config is standard military, adjusted from a civilian config.

The crew did follow the recommend procedure on that flight. They were alternating between spiralling and straight ahead arrivals/departures. In this case they performed a straight ahead departure, basically a max. thrust V2+10 climb to 10K. Sods law had the insurgents at the right time at the right place.

*Corrected from A330

A factory built 744F has a restraint system on the main-deck capable of securing 20ft pallets weighing up to 28.757kg (63.400lbs) each. This is using the locks installed on the floor only; no additional restraints required. Depending on the operator and their willingness to adopt a somewhat creative interpretation of the Boeing WBM, it is possible to do floating positions, whereby additional weight may be carried provided additional restraints are used (e.g. straps).

When following such a procedure, there are two different schools of thought. One will have you using additional straps only to secure any weight above published max, e.g. you're loading 15 tons on a position rated for 10 and use additional straps for the extra 5 tons only. The other thought, which is the one I've been brought up on and have always followed, tells you to use straps to secure the full load of the cargo (i.e. all 15 tons in the previous example), and to consider any fixed restraints (locks) as "nice to have" only.

If, however, you are placing your load without using ULDs, the WBM manual will provide you with very detailed, and also quite complicated, instructions on how to place straps, at what angle to the floor, and at which floor stations. That section of the WBM manual alone cover some 50-odd pages, and it's very difficult to access unless you have a lot of time on your hand - and time is a precious commodity in the airfreight business.

Regardless, straps and locks can fail - particularly if not engaged/installed correctly.

From post No.9

A perfect example of an apparently aviation aware eyewitness report that is utterly devoid of meaning...

Do all swept wing aircraft "pitch" left at 1200ft in a stall? I didn't know that.
But they can apparently "pitch" right too. Fascinating!
It seemed like the pilot tried, did it? Funny thing for him to do but without being on the flight deck how could you possibly know?
It headed for the ground just before impact! Crikey! What was it doing until then? Stalling horizontally while "pitching" left and right?

No wonder the meeja write such nonsense if they have to base it on incoherent drivel like this!

Don't know if the video footage has been posted before...

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=c32_1367332518

You can fit 6 MRAPs on a -400BDSF (same as aircraft involved in accident) with clever use of available floor space. Some operators will load 5 others 6.

Considering a MRAP weighs upwards of 25000lbs / 12000kgs one breaking loose and sliding aft on its pallet could result in a disastrous CG aft of limit condition.

Look closely at the video, 22 second mark. Landing gear is definitely extended.

Latest info is that the aircraft was loaded with 5 MRAPS and crew reported possible load **** after takeoff.

Agaricus...
 

I think the "poster" in question did a great job in bringing us an "eyewitness" account of what (he/she) saw.
I think we can all agree that it wasn't a perfect example of analytical observation, devoid of injecture. ( is that a new word?). He brought us just an eye-witness account. I am grateful. How many accidents have to be pieced together from fields of scattered parts and recorders?. Without him we would be filling post after post with conjecture about Taliban involvement, ect.
I guess what I am saying is that I ( maybe it is an acquired skill ) can read past part of his post on "see" what he was seeing, and not have to condemn him or his post.
Service member, or contractor, He is over "there", and I am safe here in Miami ;). I am grateful for him AND his post.

Nicely said Firststep :ok:

watching the rather pronounced yaw to the right, one wonders if they were trying to induce a roll to lower the nose as is taught in nose high upset recovery training...

Guam
After digging a bit more, the answer to my question looks to be "no, you don't use an operational limit." No big deal. As I mulled over the standard procedures you replied with, I better understand the typical departure under discussion for this mission.
Not sure who "we" is but it doesn't matter. Thanks to our brief discussion, I dug up some standard Boeing procedures that look to be universally applicable. Learned something new today. :ok: Thank you for your patience. :ok:
Thanks for that as well. :)
EDIT: SMT, thank you for the explanation on the loading. :ok:

As a fellow skipper my heart goes out to these guys.

In the same position I would be VERY keen to get out of SAM engagement territory. It is just possible they were rather too enthusiastic with the pitch and precipitated a situation that was irrecoverable.

Fellow skipper of what? Do you seriously think a professional crew in a 747 pitched up too far, in VMC, and stalled because they were too eager to get away from the ground? So you are claiming these guys, who you do not know, were absolutely incompetent? Please think before you post about something you obviously know nothing about, operating large aircraft.

I see the gear was still down at impact. That could mean that they experienced the problem early, (shortly after rotation) and were concentrating on control.

A DC8 out of MIA experienced a load shift and crashed shortly after take off. Seems like that crash would have prevented a crash like this. There is not much data yet on this crash so hopefully the cause will not be repeated.

agree pj2 sorry i was posting as you did
 

the landing gear is still down at impact.

just my own obs below...

whatever event(s) that caused the extremely high AOA bringing on the subsequent stall would likely to have occurred very soon after leaving the ground giving no time for the crew to make the normal timely retraction of the gear after a pos rate of climb call.

by impact point the gear would have normally started to clearly retract had everything been OK straight after leaving the ground...

yes/no?

the other scenario for gear down still was planning for cooling the brakes of course

edit pj2 posted same as me above

On some types, lowering the gear has an effect on your pitch. Is this the case on B744? Could the crew have lowered the gear again in an attempt to lower the nose and aoa?

Perhaps both pilots were both trying so hard to push the yoke through the instrument panel to stop the nose rising they didn't have a spare hand to raise the gear.

Brilliant observation.

Are there any actual flight crewmembers left on this forum?