Gotcha.

Here's the source for those photos (the first one at least), and if you look at the complete series, it shows pretty clearly that it is an Atlas jet:

437 APS tackles first M-ATV load on 747

Cargo Crash at Bagram
 

Any news about the flight recorders state ?

The video from the dash-cam was technically interesting. Right wing dropping first or attempts to level wings before impact are far less relevant than the cause of the gross pitch-up which sealed the fate of the crew.

The simplest straightforward cause of the pitch-up is going to be the primary cause of this loss. In the likely event that it was due to cargo shift, all aspects of the restraints including original system design, associated procedures and compliance will be under the microscope, as will be the decision in 2009 to use wooden planks to partially distribute the load and prevent the pallets from hinging upwards under each vehicle.

Probably every chain and strap tension is not checked on a fuel stop. I think the original tensions should be good for one take-off and one landing and that they need to be checked before every subsequent take-off.

The Roll Excursions and Departure From Controlled flight
 

Watching the sequence of roll excursions, what struck me was the rapid yaw to starboard that initiated the nose falling through.

I suspect that the only means available of picking up the initial low left wing (to avoid rolling off to the left) was with a bit of rudder and that it was held a little too long.

Typically the ailerons/spoilers on swept wing aircraft are not particularly effective at stall angles of attack.(But if you cannot reduce your AOA, what do you have left to control roll?) I base this statement on significant exposure to low speed scissors fighter tactics wherein there is a significant advantage to being the second one to fall out of the sky.

The problem with a massive aircraft is that it can be difficult to stop a yaw/pitch/roll rate once you have started such a rate, thus the caution about staying off the rudder in the first quote.

This is not to fault the crew's performance. Once the aircraft began to stall and drop wings, the likelihood of a successful recovery became remote. The only thing that then might have been hoped for was a much lower angle of descent to possibly regain flying speed. This would have required a much slower roll to a lesser bank angle. The finesse required to control the aircraft would require extreme luck and extensive experience maneuvering that type aircraft in the high AOA/post stall environment. Where are you going to get that experience?

autoflight
In total agreement with you since I had mentioned the same in post #373. I would prefer a wooden block rather than loose planks under such a vehicule as if the planks shud move for some odd reason, security problems may arise.

Outside of being a test pilot, probably nowhere. There are probably good reasons for the training emphasis on stall prevention. Ouch, it's almost a Catch-22, isn't it?

FWIW, low altitude stall won't just kill the folks in the big jets. Lost a classmate to ATS in a T-2, NAS Meridian IIRC. 80's. A few years ago a T-34C was lost with both pilots in a landing pattern stall: either skidded turn stall, or ATS, I never got to see the final report. Both stalled below 1000 feet. Even being in a responsive and comparatively nimble trainer, unable to overcome surprise and recover in either case.

Which takes me back to this mishap: I suspect that crew surprise hurt any chance at recovery. :( Some one up there said they turned into test pilots with no notice. Seems to be the case.

Apologies if this has been covered, but does Bastion require Tactical departures too?

The slats don't retract on a 747-400 takeoff for a long time after the acceleration height. At the Accel Ht, then the flap retraction process begins. You take off with Flaps 20 or Flaps 10. Then Flaps 5, then Flaps 1, then Flaps Up. In this accident, they never got the speed needed to even start the flap/slat retraction process.

@BOAC
 

More so than Bagram, but I think tactical departure is a little misleading as descriptor. All the regulars that fly there have mentioned that they generally fly NADP. Which, in all reality is about as close to a 'tactical' departure as what you can get with this class of aircraft.

Thanks. Since I assume the only noise you are trying to 'avoid' is that of a SAM striking your aircraft, I think 'Tactical' is a better description, however you programme the box.

I hear you.

It just conjures up all sorts of wild yank and bank imagery in the less familiar. Way off the mark in reality.

The threat is really only small arms fire and a very lucky RPG.

Nice to see that a lack of facts, definition or even an iota of knowledge regarding the matter doesn't stop the armchair experts dazzling us with their brilliance.

Please keep going - 20 odd pages of guff is never enough!

minigundiplomat,

I totally agree with you. Only the freight dogs that operate B747's into Bagram will have any idea of this.

The rest are just full of dribbling rubbish and legends in their own lunch boxes. Sad to see that the death of hard working honourable freight dogs has been degraded to such a level by pilots.

This industry really has changed for the worst.

Welcome to pprune . . . :rolleyes:

Since there's been some discussion of the use of wooden pallets, and since it seems to have escaped everyone that "wood" is just a word embracing a wide range of very different materials, may I ask what wood is used for pallet construction, what the spec is, and what controls are applied to bought-in pallets ?

I think we should ditch the whole "wooden pallets" line of inquiry... it is disrespectful to the experts who lost their lives last week; and it's the height of leading the jury up the garden path!

A few realities:

• Those photographs involving the use of wooden pallets are photographs of a different load in a different aircraft belonging to a different airline some years ago. We have no information whether wood was even used in this aircraft, let alone its orientation. People who are in the know have already quelled the hysteria over the wood, yet people still imagine they are looking at a 12 ton truck balancing on a few blocks of balsa.
  
• The people who decide whether this is acceptable are actual experts working in the actual field, not a collection of pilots (different expertise altogether), enthusiasts, or journalists all chipping into a forum. We cannot do anything with the wooden pallets line from the sofa command centre so lets let it drop, Wikipedia wont help you there either. Wood is good for a great many things so lets not feed the Daily Dross with excuses to write headlines like "Plane falls from sky because it was built of wood in cost cutting exercise" (sic).
  
• Anyone who says "the plane would have been loaded by the military" is just plain making it up. the plane would have been loaded by the airline's own loadmasters to the exacting standards they use every day, knowing they were going to be on the aircraft too. The local ramp staff might have helped push, but that's about it, they would be under the scrutiny of the loadsheet signatory.

If this load shifted, we should assume it shifted because of unforeseen and unevaluated reasons, not because they were dumb enough to wedge the trucks in place with chocolate and string. These guys aren't around to defend themselves so lets at least have the respect to assume they did their job right until somebody with access to actual facts can demonstrate otherwise?

Not a load shift
 

The crew at KMIA did not experience a load shift. I just read the accident report and the cause was that the airplane had been loaded out of limits and the crew was given incorrect weight and balance information, and set the stab incorrectly. Even though a number of locks were determined to have not been properly secured, the investigation determined that the load had not shifted prior to impact. The NTSB report is available on line.

Microburst Escape Procedure
 

Since it's been almost 20 years since there was an accident attributed to microburst, I don't know how much its emphasized in training now, but the escape procedure developed after the New Orleans crash is to leave everything where it is and raise the nose as high as it takes to get the airplane to climb. If this crew had encountered a wind shear and had initiated the procedure, they would have left the gear where it was. As a simulator instructor and professional pilot myself, it's my observation that about half or more of those who try it the first time either don't get the nose high enough and crash or get it too high and stall and crash. I'm speaking from personal experience in simulators both as the instructor and as the PF.

Tiedown Tensile Strength
 

All Mil-Spec tiedown devices, chains and straps are tested to 1.5 times their rated strength. For example, a 5,000 pound strap will break at 7,500 pounds, a 10,000 pound chain at 15,000, etc.

mikkojuha post @451. Yes, thanks, I am well aware of what load restraints do under deceleration - try watching the minimum restraints on 7 tonne vehicles during an assault landing. :hmm: As for the pictures of the loading in post 352 I assume from your criticism you are qualified in loading and restraining heavy wheeled vehicles? If so I'd be very interested in what was wrong with the tie-down scheme. If not, wind your neck in.

Anyway, I was responding to the previous cretinous posters who were dim wittedly suggesting that the folk involved were making it up as they went along :rolleyes:

Not sure why I'm bothering to reply; had told myself not to reopen this thread due to it's chronically low signal to noise ratio.....