Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Flight Deck Forums > Accidents and Close Calls
Reload this Page >

NTSB to probe Fedex/Southwest close encounter at Austin

Accidents and Close Calls Discussion on accidents, close calls, and other unplanned aviation events, so we can learn from them, and be better pilots ourselves.

NTSB to probe Fedex/Southwest close encounter at Austin

Old 11th Jun 2024, 20:21
  #541 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: Wherever it is this month
Posts: 1,820
Received 116 Likes on 49 Posts
Originally Posted by waito
Many thank for all these answers!

Regarding decision altitude height(?) in CATIII ldg, I didn't really know that. So what was the DH in this case?

In fact that should have made a difference.
Do you mean, what was the DH in the Austin case? I don't know. However, in European style ops, FedEx would have been limited to Cat I minima due to encroachment of the ILS protected area until SWA reported airborne, at which point ATC would swiftly pass a landing clearance (probably before acknowledging SWA or directing its frequency change) which would then permit FedEx to adopt Cat II or III minima. To the best of my knowledge, Cat I minima are never less than 200ft agl, so FedEx would have been forced to go around no later than half a mile short of the threshold in the absence of a landing clearance.

---

After thinking about this some more, I do not see how installing ground surveillance equipment would do much to mitigate the risk of a collision in circumstances where the departing aircraft aborts takeoff. Relying on a timely radio call from a crew performing a stop would seem to me unwise. Presumably the local controller would be expected to monitor and manage ground separation in real time, as per any other radar controller. However, the potential for sudden, rapid and potentially unannounced speed changes by aircraft on the ground makes that a radically different prospect from radar controllers' more usual business of separating aircraft in the air, where they have the advantage of knowing that all the contacts will keep moving.

Forget the expensive tech. There is a simple, cheap and proven way of controlling safely in these conditions. It needs the airport operator to provide nothing more than a magnetic board and tiles for the local controller to keep ahold of which single aircraft is cleared onto the runway at any given moment. That aircraft is then assumed to remain on the runway, preventing any further clearances being issued, until positive confirmation is received that it is no longer on the runway. A fail-safe system.

Last edited by Easy Street; 11th Jun 2024 at 21:00.
Easy Street is offline  
Old 11th Jun 2024, 21:06
  #542 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2020
Location: Far East
Posts: 315
Received 108 Likes on 76 Posts
First CAT I and consequently a much earlier g/a seems helpful.
Originally Posted by Easy Street
After thinking about this some more, I do not see how installing ground surveillance equipment would do much to mitigate the risk of a collision in circumstances where the departing aircraft aborts takeoff.
Yeah, not in that situation. But clearly in the moment of takeoff clearance. The controller would have seen the SWA NOT at the HP, as he assumed, being blind. Seeing the a/c being 550 feet away from HP on his display, I bet he wouldn't have given the clearance.
waito is offline  
Old 11th Jun 2024, 22:13
  #543 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 1999
Location: the dark side
Posts: 1,122
Received 3 Likes on 3 Posts
Originally Posted by Easy Street

Forget the expensive tech. There is a simple, cheap and proven way of controlling safely in these conditions. It needs the airport operator to provide nothing more than a magnetic board and tiles for the local controller to keep ahold of which single aircraft is cleared onto the runway at any given moment. That aircraft is then assumed to remain on the runway, preventing any further clearances being issued, until positive confirmation is received that it is no longer on the runway. A fail-safe system.
That happens at some airports with tower giving “report rolling” and “report airborne” instructions. Report rolling obviously lets the controller know the departure is moving, and airborne means just that. There is a delay though, immediately after rotating both crew members are busy managing the immediate positive climb, gear up etc. This means that confirmation of the runway being “available” with the “ABC123 airborne” call often doesn’t occur until the departure is passing 2-300ft AGL at earliest. With the actual flight strips that’s also a visual and physical prompt, I’ve not had the opportunity to try electronic strips, but I’m pretty certain the screen displays and software will replicate that protocol.
jumpseater is offline  

Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

BB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is On
HTML code is Off
Trackbacks are Off
Pingbacks are Off
Refbacks are Off


Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us - Archive - Advertising - Cookie Policy - Privacy Statement - Terms of Service

Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.