NTSB to probe Fedex/Southwest close encounter at Austin

[waito]

Another one 1 month ago:

American B738 and Canada A321 at Sarasota (FL) on Feb 16th 2023, loss of separation on runway

one on takeoff, the other went around

[BFSGrad]

Originally Posted by waito

Another one 1 month ago:

American B738 and Canada A321 at Sarasota (FL) on Feb 16th 2023, loss of separation on runway

one on takeoff, the other went around

Discussed here:

Air Canada A321, American B737 At Sarasota Feb 16

[Equivocal]

The attendees discussed how to effectively implement Safety Management Systems (SMS) at more than 200 of America’s busiest commercial airports. The FAA recently published a final rule that requires those airports to develop and adopt SMS programs within five years.

This is the one that worries me - how are airports managed today in a way that tries to make certain an acceptable degree of safety is assured.

[ATC Watcher]

Originally Posted by Equivocal

This is the one that worries me - how are airports managed today in a way that tries to make certain an acceptable degree of safety is assured.

This is excatly the first thing that stroke me iwhen reading this Document ( and thanks a lot to WillowRun for sharing it with us) , ICAO SMS has been discused since 25 years and the ICAO Inplementation manual ( Doc 9859) was first published in 2006, 17 years ago, I fulfills SARPs of Annex 1 so a reuirement , EASA hissued guidance implementation material and today most all major Airports and ATC facilities in Europe are using SMS ( but not all , espacially in eth East part of our region)

The other important point is that these recommendations in this FAA text are promoting tools for curing symtoms, but not the root cause of these runway incidents. ASDE , multilateration , ground-ADS. etc..are wonderful tools to catch up errors and prevent collsions , but it is the initial errors we need and have to cprevent in the first place,
Then : "Re-examine runway incursion data to identify underlying factors that led to these incidents and identify remedies" . That is one of the normal tasks the FAA should have been doing for years, Highlighting it today as a recommendation, to re-examine it , meaning it was not yet done or not working , is a bit astonishing I would say

Not mentioning standard phraseology, ( which would definitively help in curing the first errors layer) , is not mentioned , probably because it would be extremely difficult and met with fierce resistance by both pilots and controllers , who have been trained to "expedite" and got accustomised to this slang over the years.to allow these "expeditious operations" Once you allow yourself to expedite too much and go beyong the pre-defined satndard , there is no limit , and you can extend it until reality bite you. Maybe we are getting to that point. .

[WillowRun 6-3]

On the FAA's "read-out" -
I'm relieved to see that I'm not alone in thinking, 'aren't some of these steps ones that FAA presumably has already been taking adequate care of all along?' (or thought process to same effect).

CNN aired a 1-hour program Thursday evening on the recent spate of issues and concerns. One "explanation" heard at least once if not more times is that various workforce segments of the overall aviation sector became "rusty" over the course of the pandemic and now with resumed levels of operations and activities. But wait. European aviation sector last summer was intensely active, and encountered problems and concerns - so much so that no less than EUROCONTROL convened a 1-day program in early October to address anticipating Summer 2023 and (proverbially) "planning ahead" so as to avoid any repeats of difficulties of last summer. This SLF/attorney attended. And I don't recall any discussion of a raft, a "spate", of incursion incidents. I don't recall news items last summer from Brussels Zaventem or Frankfurt or CDG or anywhere EUROCONTROL's members' flags fly about incursions. Maybe they occurred in an expected, that is to say, typical summer-season cadence and number but didn't generate news items...(?)

But the larger point is, we're now talking about end of 2022 and almost a full first quarter of this year. And the go-to explanation is workforce segments are shakin' off the rust - still?? Something's not adding up.

FAA and NTSB worthies want not only talk, they want action. (NTSB Chair Homendy emphasized this on CNN Thursday evening). Okay, so... let the action start with drilling into this Austin incident. How and why did the controller mishandle the situation? The follow-ups must start - in earnest - someplace, do they not? And admittedly, I'm not neutral, having focused on employment and labor law for a good many years. The airlines and their workforce segments have the RLA, but the air traffic control segment(s) have nothing quite the same, do they? Whereas when you want to start a fistfight amongst United pilots, current and retired, walk into a gathering and say, "you know, Richard Ferris was right" - but for an equivalent bad-guy heavy, Reagan fired the PATCO strikers and the ATC workforce segment(s) still do not have legislated collective bargaining - or did I miss this somehow? I'm only suggesting that if it's "rust" you're after, look for it at the system (or systemic) level, not at the level of individual members of the workforce. [Hey Hey, My My......]

For some later scene, rails and airways, cats and dogs living together? I'd volunteer to work on a new, all-stakeholders process to devise an Airline Labor Act, lifted out from the RLA, sufficient to undergird the sector for some length of a technologically well-informed future. I'm not holding any breaths.

[ATC Watcher]

I don't recall news items last summer from Brussels Zaventem or Frankfurt or CDG or anywhere EUROCONTROL's members' flags fly about incursions. Maybe they occurred in an expected, that is to say, typical summer-season cadence and number but didn't generate news items...(?)

Good discussion . Yes there were incidents in Europe , but not much more than before, just different kind., The errors made could indeed be post COVID related. Too early to say, investigations are still in progress.. In Paris CDG for instance you had this famous mispelled QNH that led to a A320 going down to 6 feet above ground on approach which made the news but briefly, or another one in Bordeaux, an 'Austin" type , where the controller forgot he lined up a small GA aircraft instructed to wait for wake turbulence and cleared a A320 to land,, Go around, nothing dramatic but similar to the US one. The controller was alone ( not supposed to ) working ground. APP, TWR and FIS at the same time. It did not make the news but seriously woke up safety managers. Just 2 examples.

It is not only "rust " as you call it , we are in 2023 , that effect is now past, what is the problem is staffing numbers and quality , in ATC at least and in Europe,. Here, unlike in the US, the revenue of ANSPs depends on the traffic numbers ,no traffic. = no revenue . During the pandemic In order to reduce costs measures were taken , encouraged by management, to let go some of the very experienced and expensive staff go, retired or leaving early. But the other main issue was the training of the new ones in 2020-21 , they were trained and certified in low traffic. Now that it has restarted , ( and the traffic peaks are the same or even worse than in 2019) you have today a lack of staff and the staff you have is less experienced ,and because you are short on staff , they have to work alone , even in high traffic. so you get these kinds of basic errors..

A bit like learning to drive on quiet country roads, get you licence and get thown into rush hour alone on the peripherique in Paris or the Ring road in Brusels. . Some will learn the tricks quickly, some others may need more time .
My analysis at least , we'll know and see if I am right or wrong in a year or so when the first incidents reports are out.