Nine killed in plane crash in northern Sweden
Loss of control after inadvertent or otherwise entry into IMC with a subsequent overstress on attempted recovery. It's so easy to find yourself in a spiral dive after being distracted by the jumpers. Don't ask me how I know.
(Ice)
A stall, spin on the run in is possible but most likely a few people would have got out in that case. Besides the Airvan has a docile stall even with everyone crowding the exit.
(Ice)
A stall, spin on the run in is possible but most likely a few people would have got out in that case. Besides the Airvan has a docile stall even with everyone crowding the exit.
WX is not 100% sure about cloud layers but FEW at around 5K feet, BKN at around 8K feet and OVC at 10K. A METAR close after says Towering Cumulus.
From the accident videos a solid layer can be seen.
The webtrak data converted to airspeeds via winds and TAS shows IAS around 60knots for quite some time before departure from controlled flight. During the last 30s before it went south the aircraft climbed further despite being on what seems to be a drop final @ altitude and being cleared for drop and descend.
After this there is a very sharp around 150 degree course change to the left and simultanous steep descend and speed increase. The dive angle is around 60 degrees( horisontal distance / vertical distance) and after the sharp 150 degree left there is a vide left turn( almost straight) still with 60 degree dive angle and speed increasing. The ROD is 16000fpm or more.
This aircraft had Mode S and at around 2300m altitude( webtrak shows altitude in meters) all horisontal speed disapears and the heading starts rotating until data is lost. There is also a loss in vertical speed and forward speed.
This, together with the withdrawal of the AD groundning the Ga-8 points in the direction of stalling, inadvertant IMC, high speed dive and overstressing the aircraft when getting visual with ground beneath clouds.
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Thanks for that AAKEE, it does paint a picture, a rather grim one. Suddenly finding yourself in a spiral dive in cloud with spatial disorientation for the first time is quite a moment. The temptation to pull must be resisted.
It's still speculative but it does fit.
It's still speculative but it does fit.
Swedish Airvan Crash
A possibility.
Given a stall scenario one can see all the jumpers crowding around the door. The aircraft stalls and the nose pitches down. All the jumpers fall into the forward cabin in a mass of humanity. They are all over the pilot. He is unable to raise the nose because the CG is far too far forward. The jumpers are all unrestrained as they crowd towards or are at the door.
The aircraft accelerates beyond its VNE and a wing fails followed by the tail. It then is held in place by the control cables as was seen in the before impact photos.
A possibility.
Given a stall scenario one can see all the jumpers crowding around the door. The aircraft stalls and the nose pitches down. All the jumpers fall into the forward cabin in a mass of humanity. They are all over the pilot. He is unable to raise the nose because the CG is far too far forward. The jumpers are all unrestrained as they crowd towards or are at the door.
The aircraft accelerates beyond its VNE and a wing fails followed by the tail. It then is held in place by the control cables as was seen in the before impact photos.
A possibility.
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.....hmm. I have done many stalls in the Airvan. It is benign, often there is no nose drop at all and it will just mush down. It can be quite difficult on a check ride or a C of A to be sure it has stalled until a noticeable rate of descent is indicated. Also it is very hard to get the cg out of forward limit and a pile of pax behind the two front seats would not do it. Furthermore, the seat backs are pretty substantial. They are higher than ie a 206. Of course it would still be possible in extremis for a pax to come over the top of one at shoulder level and there is also a gap between the seats that a person can climb through. However I really don't think the above scenario is at all likely to be caused by the non-event that is a stall in an Airvan.
I spoke briefly to a sky-diving instructor mate of mine this morning. He mentioned devices called AAD's . Automatic Activation Devices (I think that was what he said). Basically an unconscious sky-diver in free fall passes a threshold altitude without popping his canopy and the AAD pops the reserve automatically. He has seen the video and suggests that the rate of descent would trigger these on the packs of the occupants. This might explain what looks like a candled canopy and the eyewitness reports of the skydivers attempting to get out of the aircraft. I don't know enough about these bits of kit but assume that they can be de-activated or the pilot ensures a reduced decent rate close to the the trigger altitudes to prevent them going off unintentionally when returning to land with pax still on board. In this tragic accident, I doubt anyone on board had chance to deactivate them if that is the case.
Anyone know any more about parachuting safety gadgets?
Anyone know any more about parachuting safety gadgets?
Preliminary out
The preliminary report is out.
Preliminary report
There was no chute outside but all of the Cypresses/AAD did deploy the chutes.
The aircraft did loose one wing ( also complete tailplane was lost) and was ”spinning” with the wing still attached upwards and fuselage horizontal.
The airspeed was very low before the departure and aircraft was climbing while loosing speed. The pilot did ask for higher altitude to clear clouds shortly before.
There was clouds from around 7-8000feet and appearently up to drop altitude(4000m).
The engine did have power on during the accident and did reach 3100rpm. VNE was exceeded.
There was some kind of missmatch with Swedish CAA, MTOW was registered as 1814 kg but the owners say tjey had the STC for 1905 kg incorporated.
The weight at accident time is cslculated to 1904 kg so they must have had some overweight until just before accident even if 1905 is valid. ’Havkom’ also calculated CG to be around 15-20mm aft of CG limit.
Preliminary report
There was no chute outside but all of the Cypresses/AAD did deploy the chutes.
The aircraft did loose one wing ( also complete tailplane was lost) and was ”spinning” with the wing still attached upwards and fuselage horizontal.
The airspeed was very low before the departure and aircraft was climbing while loosing speed. The pilot did ask for higher altitude to clear clouds shortly before.
There was clouds from around 7-8000feet and appearently up to drop altitude(4000m).
The engine did have power on during the accident and did reach 3100rpm. VNE was exceeded.
There was some kind of missmatch with Swedish CAA, MTOW was registered as 1814 kg but the owners say tjey had the STC for 1905 kg incorporated.
The weight at accident time is cslculated to 1904 kg so they must have had some overweight until just before accident even if 1905 is valid. ’Havkom’ also calculated CG to be around 15-20mm aft of CG limit.
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I'm out of touch with the allowed MTOW of the Airvan but 1814 I seem to remember was the original MTOW. That has been increased since. So it's unlikely a factor in the accident. In terms of CofG. When empty or light in Airvan you'd run out trim and have to hold back pressure on approach. To me that implied it was designed to be slightly nose heavy. Further confirmation of that was the fact we always asked one of skydivers to sit on the step at the rear because it helped stability.
As oggers said the stall is benign and the warning horn comes on much too early. I was only caught out once when all the skydivers rushed the door simultaneously without briefing me. But it was easy to recover from and also remember ailerons can be used right through the stall. It essentially mushes downward.
While a botched stall recovery is a possible cause. I return to the idea of a spiral dive through VNE possibly because of a distraction or spatial disorientation. It happened to me. I turned to talk to a skydiver. When I looked back the airspeed was in the yellow and the VSI was pegged at it's limit. Instant disorientation. I reduced power, levelled the wings and eased very gently out of the dive having now entered cloud. Then I started breathing again. The crew in the back noticed nothing. Boy did I feel stupid. A panicked pull and the story might have been quite different.
Someone asked about the AADs. They will fire at a predetermined rate of descent below a set altitude. That can vary, student rigs have a more conservative setting. In fact I was in the back wearing a student rig on a ferry flight when the pilot forgot and dived off the altitude. There was a bang and I was surrounded by canopy. He was mortally embarrassed. But I could have deactivated it if I'd known he was about to play fighter pilot.
The skydivers were probably pinned to the floor or ceiling by the time the AADs fired. No chance.
The pilot I note had only 12 hours on type and 214 in total. No mention of an instrument rating. Maybe it was the first time he found himself in the conditions he encountered that day.
An odd comment in the report. It mentions standard procedure is to close the cowl flaps before the descent. The Airvan doesn't have cowl flaps.
Also no mention of cameras, no GoPros? That would be a surprise.
As oggers said the stall is benign and the warning horn comes on much too early. I was only caught out once when all the skydivers rushed the door simultaneously without briefing me. But it was easy to recover from and also remember ailerons can be used right through the stall. It essentially mushes downward.
While a botched stall recovery is a possible cause. I return to the idea of a spiral dive through VNE possibly because of a distraction or spatial disorientation. It happened to me. I turned to talk to a skydiver. When I looked back the airspeed was in the yellow and the VSI was pegged at it's limit. Instant disorientation. I reduced power, levelled the wings and eased very gently out of the dive having now entered cloud. Then I started breathing again. The crew in the back noticed nothing. Boy did I feel stupid. A panicked pull and the story might have been quite different.
Someone asked about the AADs. They will fire at a predetermined rate of descent below a set altitude. That can vary, student rigs have a more conservative setting. In fact I was in the back wearing a student rig on a ferry flight when the pilot forgot and dived off the altitude. There was a bang and I was surrounded by canopy. He was mortally embarrassed. But I could have deactivated it if I'd known he was about to play fighter pilot.
The skydivers were probably pinned to the floor or ceiling by the time the AADs fired. No chance.
The pilot I note had only 12 hours on type and 214 in total. No mention of an instrument rating. Maybe it was the first time he found himself in the conditions he encountered that day.
An odd comment in the report. It mentions standard procedure is to close the cowl flaps before the descent. The Airvan doesn't have cowl flaps.
Also no mention of cameras, no GoPros? That would be a surprise.
Last edited by Steepclimb; 7th Oct 2019 at 18:52.
The cowl flap thing might be some kind of relic text from another aircraft I guess. I dont remember what they had before but maybe a C206?
Pilot, as far as I read he had no IR-rating and it seems from other forums like most of the pilots flight time was some years back, not much recent. He was new on the diverdriver thing.
How would the Airvan handle in a power on stall ?
The pilot asked for higher climb ( due to clouds) and the data shows a climb with speed decreasing(down to or below stall speed) before the abrupt dive and change in direction.
There seems to be no recording available. The departure from controlled flight was somewhere around 1.25Nm before overhead and probably above clouds so they pergaps hadnt turned the cams on?
Pilot, as far as I read he had no IR-rating and it seems from other forums like most of the pilots flight time was some years back, not much recent. He was new on the diverdriver thing.
How would the Airvan handle in a power on stall ?
The pilot asked for higher climb ( due to clouds) and the data shows a climb with speed decreasing(down to or below stall speed) before the abrupt dive and change in direction.
There seems to be no recording available. The departure from controlled flight was somewhere around 1.25Nm before overhead and probably above clouds so they pergaps hadnt turned the cams on?
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My experience of a power on stall in the Airvan with a full load was essentially a non event. But a mishandled recovery and a low time non IR pilot.......
As I said it went from situation normal to a spiral dive very quickly. My training was good and I simply recovered.
Perhaps he didn't have that luxury.
As I said it went from situation normal to a spiral dive very quickly. My training was good and I simply recovered.
Perhaps he didn't have that luxury.
Last edited by Steepclimb; 26th Oct 2019 at 13:44.
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Final report has been published. Overweight, out of envelope, stall in to the cloud (IMC). Broke up midair. Low time pilot, 215 total time.
I am not allowed to post a link but Swedish state accident board has a video (in Swedish) explaining things and report in English and Swedish.
SHK =statens haverikommision and You should be able to find it.
MJH
I am not allowed to post a link but Swedish state accident board has a video (in Swedish) explaining things and report in English and Swedish.
SHK =statens haverikommision and You should be able to find it.
MJH
Final report has been published. Overweight, out of envelope, stall in to the cloud (IMC). Broke up midair. Low time pilot, 215 total time.
I am not allowed to post a link but Swedish state accident board has a video (in Swedish) explaining things and report in English and Swedish.
SHK =statens haverikommision and You should be able to find it.
MJH
I am not allowed to post a link but Swedish state accident board has a video (in Swedish) explaining things and report in English and Swedish.
SHK =statens haverikommision and You should be able to find it.
MJH
Moderator
Overweight, out of envelope, stall in to the cloud (IMC). Broke up midair. Low time pilot, 215 total time.
To those pilots eager to fly jumpers: (a) follow the rules you know, (b) look up the rules you don't know, then back to (a), and (c) get some good mentoring!
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He had a CPL with NO instrument rating and the airplane was maintained for VFR only.
However, he had what EASA calls nowadays the "basic instrument flying module", enabling you to climb, descent, turn in IMC / under the hood, and also recover from unusual attitudes under simulated IMC. In short, you are able to keep or recover control in IMC, but it doesn't make you capable to do any instrument departure or approach procedures yet.
I had a thorough "torturing" with power-on/departure stalls and unusual attitude recoveries in simulated IMC from my CPL instructor recently, so unfortunately I think I can see how this happened
.
With low-time experience, he didn't feel having the authority to call of the drop or drop from lower altitude.
As the clouds grew taller during the day, they gave him a false horizon. As he tried to get higher with the heavy load, his airspeed decayed and the aircraft stalled with climb power to the left, due to insufficient right rudder (to offset the lower airspeed).
Power-on stalls with climb power are different ballgame than the the relatively benign power-off/approach stalls. They come by surprise, with a big startle factor. The resulting pitch change is very large, very fast.
I was taught that on recognition of the wing drop due to the power on stall, I should just let the airplane do what it wants initially and stop trying to analyze and solve the problem immediately.
Instead, the 2 things however I had to do immediately is CONTROLS NEUTRAL and POWER TO IDLE.
The aircraft will accelerate rapidly anyway, and by the time I ensured the basics, it might even have sufficient speed to get it under control and bring it back to level flight. If it went into a spin, recover from it, if it went into a diving spiral already, bring it back to level flight.
But under simulated IMC, there is a huge temptation to pull too hard and too much in a dive, or spiral diver. It takes a lot of self-control to get it to wings level, pitch attitude to level flight, despite the engine still roaring and ASI still approaching the redline Vne. Timely but gently pull, power off and level attitude will eventually avoid going into Vne and the situation calms down, power needs to be added to maintain level flight and then we can think about getting out of the cloud.
.
I am quite sure he recovered from the stall, but he probably forget to pull the power to idle and quickly accelerated towards Vne and pulled very hard to slow down, causing the inflight breakup.
This pilot had all the necessary training to recover.
But he had that training 5 years before, and haven't flown for 4 years in between at all.
Makes you think that after 4 years of absence from flying, it's really advisable to refresh some of the most important CPL exercises, such as the power-on stall recoveries and unusual attitude recoveries in IMC, especially with high-load climb operations like jump operations and the Swedish weather, which is often cloudy.
By the way, sometimes jumpers help stall even bigger aircraft...
However, he had what EASA calls nowadays the "basic instrument flying module", enabling you to climb, descent, turn in IMC / under the hood, and also recover from unusual attitudes under simulated IMC. In short, you are able to keep or recover control in IMC, but it doesn't make you capable to do any instrument departure or approach procedures yet.
I had a thorough "torturing" with power-on/departure stalls and unusual attitude recoveries in simulated IMC from my CPL instructor recently, so unfortunately I think I can see how this happened
.With low-time experience, he didn't feel having the authority to call of the drop or drop from lower altitude.
As the clouds grew taller during the day, they gave him a false horizon. As he tried to get higher with the heavy load, his airspeed decayed and the aircraft stalled with climb power to the left, due to insufficient right rudder (to offset the lower airspeed).
Power-on stalls with climb power are different ballgame than the the relatively benign power-off/approach stalls. They come by surprise, with a big startle factor. The resulting pitch change is very large, very fast.
I was taught that on recognition of the wing drop due to the power on stall, I should just let the airplane do what it wants initially and stop trying to analyze and solve the problem immediately.
Instead, the 2 things however I had to do immediately is CONTROLS NEUTRAL and POWER TO IDLE.
The aircraft will accelerate rapidly anyway, and by the time I ensured the basics, it might even have sufficient speed to get it under control and bring it back to level flight. If it went into a spin, recover from it, if it went into a diving spiral already, bring it back to level flight.
But under simulated IMC, there is a huge temptation to pull too hard and too much in a dive, or spiral diver. It takes a lot of self-control to get it to wings level, pitch attitude to level flight, despite the engine still roaring and ASI still approaching the redline Vne. Timely but gently pull, power off and level attitude will eventually avoid going into Vne and the situation calms down, power needs to be added to maintain level flight and then we can think about getting out of the cloud.
.
I am quite sure he recovered from the stall, but he probably forget to pull the power to idle and quickly accelerated towards Vne and pulled very hard to slow down, causing the inflight breakup.
This pilot had all the necessary training to recover.
But he had that training 5 years before, and haven't flown for 4 years in between at all.
Makes you think that after 4 years of absence from flying, it's really advisable to refresh some of the most important CPL exercises, such as the power-on stall recoveries and unusual attitude recoveries in IMC, especially with high-load climb operations like jump operations and the Swedish weather, which is often cloudy.
By the way, sometimes jumpers help stall even bigger aircraft...
Last edited by rnzoli; 19th Sep 2020 at 17:15.
