Crash on Labrador coast, Europe connection
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Fair question.
Just that there is more to the story than what appears in the report, but because it cannot be verified 100% it is not mentioned at all. Before you ask, I'll not be mentioning it here either (sorry).
One thing though that is perhaps useful/helpful. I believe our CRM and cockpit gradient was all wrong. Two experienced pilots. One with more handling experience of the aeroplane and the route, the other with more systems experience of the aeroplane and the owner of the aircraft, alternating PIC. What I had seen as a positive factor was in fact a poor mix, with both of us relying more on the other than had either of us been alone or with an inexperienced pilot.I'd like to again thank the SAR teams for their efforts to give both of us the best possible chance of survival.
Just that there is more to the story than what appears in the report, but because it cannot be verified 100% it is not mentioned at all. Before you ask, I'll not be mentioning it here either (sorry).
One thing though that is perhaps useful/helpful. I believe our CRM and cockpit gradient was all wrong. Two experienced pilots. One with more handling experience of the aeroplane and the route, the other with more systems experience of the aeroplane and the owner of the aircraft, alternating PIC. What I had seen as a positive factor was in fact a poor mix, with both of us relying more on the other than had either of us been alone or with an inexperienced pilot.I'd like to again thank the SAR teams for their efforts to give both of us the best possible chance of survival.
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Sam,
What I and probably a lot of other people are wondering is why were attempting to fly a 675 mm sector low level and VFR in an aircraft certified to 25,000 ft. when the conditions were marginal VMC? You were stacking the odds against yourself surely. You can quote CRM/cockpit gradient as much as you like but CRM does assume the participants have a degree of basic airmanship.
I have done that sector dozens of times in singles. It requires a great deal of detailed planning and beyond all an acceptance to wait around until conditions are correct.
it is sad that as PIC your passenger was killed. I am surprised the licensing authorities did not have more to say
What I and probably a lot of other people are wondering is why were attempting to fly a 675 mm sector low level and VFR in an aircraft certified to 25,000 ft. when the conditions were marginal VMC? You were stacking the odds against yourself surely. You can quote CRM/cockpit gradient as much as you like but CRM does assume the participants have a degree of basic airmanship.
I have done that sector dozens of times in singles. It requires a great deal of detailed planning and beyond all an acceptance to wait around until conditions are correct.
it is sad that as PIC your passenger was killed. I am surprised the licensing authorities did not have more to say
Hi H750,
The winds aloft were strong and against (at least for the first third of the leg), with cloudbase (below freezing) between 2000 and 3000amsl. The plan was to remain VMC (thus filing VFR, and staying below cloud) until approximately that 1/3 point, and then to climb. As mentioned in the report, we planned to either maintain visual contact (fly around any obstacles) or if in any doubt, to nevertheless climb (aircraft was FIKI capable) to the MSA. I do not know why it went wrong, though I have my theories (which are partly described in the report).
It's perhaps important to realise that the ground was covered in millions of small trees providing great ground reference except for/until the hill which was the only area for miles with no features whatsoever.
The winds aloft were strong and against (at least for the first third of the leg), with cloudbase (below freezing) between 2000 and 3000amsl. The plan was to remain VMC (thus filing VFR, and staying below cloud) until approximately that 1/3 point, and then to climb. As mentioned in the report, we planned to either maintain visual contact (fly around any obstacles) or if in any doubt, to nevertheless climb (aircraft was FIKI capable) to the MSA. I do not know why it went wrong, though I have my theories (which are partly described in the report).
It's perhaps important to realise that the ground was covered in millions of small trees providing great ground reference except for/until the hill which was the only area for miles with no features whatsoever.
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Assuming the facts presented are accurate(and we have been told that there is further info which will not be provided), it is a good example of the importance of being aware of nearby minimum altitudes anytime there is a possibility of terrain being obscured, either by cloud, darkness, or whiteout conditions. Snow covered terrain under cloud can visually disappear on you. Just because there are trees here(or visible rock, structures, etc) does not mean that they will continue to be visible in the future. A Malibu moves fast and new terrain features arrive quickly.
While it may not make the follow the rules crowd happy, if one has decided to press on, breaking a rule and entering cloud at a higher altitude can increase safety at the expense of a regulatory violation.
Increasing one's awareness of possible hazards in aviation(such as whiteout) can be lifesaving and not all regulatory agencies necessarily cover this during pilot training. As a general rule, one should take the initiative and learn from past accidents. A DC-10 crash in the Antarctic has similarities to this accident and should be familiar to all pilots, but in reality, is familiar mostly to those who have gone above and beyond the training they were provided.
While there are lessons to be learned here, they are not new lessons and the appropriate information is out there, although not easy to find.
While it may not make the follow the rules crowd happy, if one has decided to press on, breaking a rule and entering cloud at a higher altitude can increase safety at the expense of a regulatory violation.
Increasing one's awareness of possible hazards in aviation(such as whiteout) can be lifesaving and not all regulatory agencies necessarily cover this during pilot training. As a general rule, one should take the initiative and learn from past accidents. A DC-10 crash in the Antarctic has similarities to this accident and should be familiar to all pilots, but in reality, is familiar mostly to those who have gone above and beyond the training they were provided.
While there are lessons to be learned here, they are not new lessons and the appropriate information is out there, although not easy to find.
Last edited by tcasblue; 8th Feb 2020 at 14:02.
they are not new lessons
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The real troble, I think, is to stick to the basic rules despite all the technical innovations in modern aircraft and pilot accessories, like traffic and terrain warning systems.
Here is an interesting study from 2005 on how this creates a trap that we are all likely to fall into.
Effects of Advanced Cockpit Displays on General Aviation Pilots’ Decisions to Continue Visual Flight Rules (VFR) Flight Into Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC)
The sad irony is that all those technical advancements, which make IFR flying so much safer, are increasingly likely to kill pilots flying VFR
