Cardiff City Footballer Feared Missing after aircraft disappeared near Channel Island

[PT6Driver]

Originally Posted by patowalker

Don't be so sure. He had an FAA Second Class medical without a night flying restriction. To fly an N reg at night, he would only have needed three hours night training with a FAA instructor in his logbook. This would not show up on the 61.75 certificate, because FAA certificates are deemed to include night flying privileges, unless annoted to the contrary.

The difference between CAA and FAA colour vision standards are easy to find online.

My understanding is that the US medical relates to his US licence and the EASA medical to his EASA licence.
He could not operate the aircraft between EASA states on his US licence. Only by using the privileges of his EASA licence and medical could he operate an N registered aircraft between UK and France and the return.
Therefore in this instance his US licence and medical are irrelevant.

[excrab]

Originally Posted by PT6Driver

My understanding is that the US medical relates to his US licence and the EASA medical to his EASA licence.
He could not operate the aircraft between EASA states on his US licence. Only by using the privileges of his EASA licence and medical could he operate an N registered aircraft between UK and France and the return.
Therefore in this instance his US licence and medical are irrelevant.

Surely isn’t it the other way around? To operate an N ref aircraft between the UK and France he would have to fly it on the privileges of his FAA licence. A UK issued EASA licence would only allow him to fly an N reg aircraft within the UK, not across any international boundaries...

The sad thing for Mr Ibbotson would seem to be that for all of his 3700 hours he didn’t have the experience to realise how difficult, or even impossible, it is to fly visually over water on a dark night under a cloud layer. There is almost no visual reference, and sadly from the report of the last few moments of the flight this crash almost certainly resulted from disorientation, the idea that anyone who was in control of the situation would be descending deliberately at 7000 feet per minute in that aircraft at that level is totally unbelievable. And the sad thing for those who want to believe that an experienced PPL holder with 3700 hours would be better than a newly qualified CPL / IR holder is that this proves quite clearly that it’s not the case. Your 250 hr CPL/IR holder could have got in a Malibu or an Arrow or a Seneca and operated that flight perfectly safely on an IFR flight plan, just the way they flew their IR flight test a few days or weeks before.

[patowalker]

There is no doubt about the time the flight was to take off.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/47013474

These messages between Jack McKay and Sala were translated from French.

Friday, 18 January
8:01pm - Sala: "I want to leave tomorrow for Nantes at around 11am and come back on Monday night around 9pm to Cardiff if that is possible."
8:05pm -McKay:"Good. I'll send a message when that's sorted."

Sunday, 20 January
5:00pm - McKay: "Hi there is it possible you could come back at seven in the evening on Monday night? Just because the pilot has to get home in the north after he gets to Cardiff."
5:01pm - Sala:"Hi, Half past seven would be possible."
5:03pm - McKay:"Yes that's good."

[sycamore]

Thought MCKay didn`t know who was the pilot....?

[ShropshirePilot]

The bottom line is this - the aircraft had, I assume, an autopilot. If that's the case this flight could have been handled safely by almost anyone who could operate the AP. Regardless of legalities, or of his qualifications which seem to be the subject of much conjecture. Many people seem to know someone who knew him (I do too) and who rated his skills. But he made TERRIBLE DECISIONS at many stages of the flight, and that can happen to any human being CPL/IR or not (albeit less likely I suppose). Terrible decisions in aviation cost lives. We've seen it before and we'll see it again.
The chap flying the display at Shoreham was a CPL/IR as far I am aware and a crash happened. So CPL is not necessarily the panacea some posters on here seem to think.
My own conclusion is that the aircraft should have been operating under an AOC and I reckon the authorities need to examine why it is so expensive to get one because the processes entailed in operating under an AOC do improve safety. Safety should be priced such that more people can access it!?

[Pittsextra]

Originally Posted by ShropshirePilot

The bottom line is this - the aircraft had, I assume, an autopilot. If that's the case this flight could have been handled safely by almost anyone who could operate the AP. Regardless of legalities, or of his qualifications which seem to be the subject of much conjecture. Many people seem to know someone who knew him (I do too) and who rated his skills. But he made TERRIBLE DECISIONS at many stages of the flight, and that can happen to any human being CPL/IR or not (albeit less likely I suppose). Terrible decisions in aviation cost lives. We've seen it before and we'll see it again.
The chap flying the display at Shoreham was a CPL/IR as far I am aware and a crash happened. So CPL is not necessarily the panacea some posters on here seem to think.
My own conclusion is that the aircraft should have been operating under an AOC and I reckon the authorities need to examine why it is so expensive to get one because the processes entailed in operating under an AOC do improve safety. Safety should be priced such that more people can access it!?

What he said

[tubby linton]

Having an autopilot fitted is not necessarily safe. I used to fly a large British turboprop and the airline owner would never pay to have them made servicable, as co-pilots were paid to fly the aircraft.

[ShropshirePilot]

Originally Posted by tubby linton

Having an autopilot fitted is not necessarily safe. I used to fly a large British turboprop and the airline owner would never pay to have them made servicable, as co-pilots were paid to fly the aircraft.

I agree with you but a functioning AP doesn't usually end up in a meandering spatially disoriented descent into the sea. Personally I trust my hand flying more in the main but in a high workload IMC flight, they are safer than the alternative! (notwithstanding the earlier comments about Autopilots not dealing with icing as well as a pilot who's spotted the ice!)

[positiverate20]

Originally Posted by ShropshirePilot

The bottom line is this - the aircraft had, I assume, an autopilot. If that's the case this flight could have been handled safely by almost anyone who could operate the AP. Regardless of legalities, or of his qualifications which seem to be the subject of much conjecture. Many people seem to know someone who knew him (I do too) and who rated his skills. But he made TERRIBLE DECISIONS at many stages of the flight, and that can happen to any human being CPL/IR or not (albeit less likely I suppose). Terrible decisions in aviation cost lives. We've seen it before and we'll see it again.
The chap flying the display at Shoreham was a CPL/IR as far I am aware and a crash happened. So CPL is not necessarily the panacea some posters on here seem to think.
My own conclusion is that the aircraft should have been operating under an AOC and I reckon the authorities need to examine why it is so expensive to get one because the processes entailed in operating under an AOC do improve safety. Safety should be priced such that more people can access it!?

Entirely agree.
I think many here are stating different pieces of the same puzzle. This pilot tried to fly VFR over sea at night, most likely fully reliant on the A/P. I have little doubt A/P was fully operational up until the few minutes in question. To fly A/P takes an awful lot more knowledge and understanding than just flicking a switch and trusting it. My hypothesis, ignoring all the legal aspects for now:

- Pilot under pressure to fulfill his obligations with high valued famous passenger on board

- pilot lacked the skill and qualification to fulfill his obligations at that time and in those weather conditions

- pilot went ahead with flight based on his confidence in the A/P

- during flight A/P was disengaged. Possible reasons include:
• overspeed (AAIB state average air speed at 175, A/P on this model is set to automatic disengage at 185). Speed above 185 may have been brought on by the descent that he'd already requested from ATC.
or
• handflying around clouds without disengaging A/P, causing it to then try to counteract his inputs
or
• icing or other feedback errors from A/P sensors

- pilot was now in a situation where he was in IMC at night over the sea without A/P and became spatially disorientated.

[tescoapp]

is there a link to the report please.

[Luc Lion]

Here it is:
https://assets.publishing.service.go...64DB_Final.pdf

Note: it's an intermediary report even if it holds the word "final" in its title.

[tescoapp]

thanks

What does the AP do if the elevator gets iced up and jams and the servos run out of grunt or travel I presume the AP flies it off the elevator trim tabs?

[PDR1]

Huh? If the elevator was seized then the trim tabs would work in the opposite sense - back trim would provide down elevator trim because the tab would now be acting directly as a control surface rather than as a device to move the elevator itself.

PDR

[Luc Lion]

TescoApp, here is one of the KFC-150 manuals (there are several version depending on the associated panel instruments).
https://support.bendixking.com//HWL/...377-0001_1.pdf

The whole set is here (click "discontinued")
https://www.bendixking.com/en/downloads-and-manuals

Page 111, General Emergency Procedures, details the disengagement conditions.
I understand that "Internal Flight Control System failure" covers all the case where the electronic controlling the servos detects that they can't move or need to exercise too high a force.

[Luc Lion]

MelEagerToo,
I had mixed experiences with KFC-150.
Some worked real fine for flying heading or route, keeping altitude or making initial descent.
I remember also KFC-150 that fly a heading with a 12° error or a route with constant wobbling from -5° left to +5° right and which accept descent rates of -200 ft/min but jump to -800 fpm if I make any increment to the descent rate.
I never trusted this AP enough to use it elsewhere than cruise or initial descent, usually in heading/alt mode.

To all the contributors who investigate a complex chain of events involving the autopilot and airframe icing, I don't think all of this is necessary to explain this LOC-I accident. I wouldn't be surprised if the final report states that the airplane was perfectly fine until it hit the sea.

[Mike Flynn]

Originally Posted by Luc Lion

MelEagerToo,
I had mixed experiences with KFC-150.
Some worked real fine for flying heading or route, keeping altitude or making initial descent.
I remember also KFC-150 that fly a heading with a 12° error or a route with constant wobbling from -5° left to +5° right and which accept descent rates of -200 ft/min but jump to -800 fpm if I make any increment to the descent rate.
I never trusted this AP enough to use it elsewhere than cruise or initial descent, usually in heading/alt mode.

To all the contributors who investigate a complex chain of events involving the autopilot and airframe icing, I don't think all of this is necessary to explain this LOC-I accident. I wouldn't be surprised if the final report states that the airplane was perfectly fine until it hit the sea.

The net result of this accident was total lack of captaincy skills.

There is a lot more to just flying an aircraft or indeed being in charge of a boat or bus.

Responsibility is a word that springs to mind.

Thinking about the innocent lives that step in to your aircraft and place their future in your skills?

[A and C]

What did for the poor man was his decision to start the engine, from that point on disaster would only have been avoided by pure chance.

[tescoapp]

My experience in commercial twins of a much larger size is that they frequently do not work well if at all as repairs are so expensive

I worked for one company that they were rarely working and if they were you only ever used them for straight and level. If they could they would have stripped them all out but the mod for that was more than the airframe was worth minus engines.

doubt the a/p restriction in icing has anything to do with control surfaces freezing up, ice doesn't usually accrete far enough back on a flying surface to affect hinges

Its not the hinges that freeze up its the balance horn that goes up to the leading edge that gets an ice bridge going along the leading edge and locks it tight. Twin tps' have electric heaters on them and it gets very restrictive under the MEL if they are US.

If icing is involved which if the freezing level was 3000-4000ft he was in exactly the wet sub cooled just need something to stick to area when it all occurred. They will never find out because it will have all melted when it hit the water so the aircraft will show nothing wrong with it mainly because there is nothing wrong with it.
You can fly IFR and not see the ground from 200ft until 200ft at the other end apart from that its inside of a cloud and the only time you will pick up icing is in the first and last 5000ft and we are talking maybe 3 cm thick on the spinners and leading edge in under 5 mins sometimes. You land with lumps of ice banging off the hull from the props and you can feel the boots inflating on the tail through the controls while you flare and the reaction of the back end change as the ice comes off.

[ShropshirePilot]

Originally Posted by A and C

What did for the poor man was his decision to start the engine, from that point on disaster would only have been avoided by pure chance.

A and C I think you are being a little harsh here. He passed over the Island and airfield at Guernsey in VMC and under control at that point. The flight became problematic for him when he hit the storm cell to the WNW of Alderney. He could have and should have diverted to Guernsey and none of us would have heard of him or his passenger again. Or he could have routed via Southampton all in VMC. I don't agree that night flying over sea is especially onerous and he would have made either destination with ease. Anyway, it seems likely that he started to hand fly at precisely the wrong moment...

[Good Business Sense]

Interesting point of view from a number of people who don't think, on the face of it, that a flight under an AOC is any safer than with a PPL.

An AOC (even the smallest) where standard operating procedures are mandated, operations manuals Part A to D must be followed, a Safety Management System applies, aircraft technical ground school courses are completed at induction or when changing aircraft types, Dangerous Goods course (yearly), CRM (yearly), Route & Aerodrome competence course (yearly), Compliance/Quality system in force, where the CAA audits 2-4 times a year - one a flight check, where external auditors audit around 4 times per year, where the pilots have around three flight checks per year (instrument rating, OPC, LPC, Line), a technical exam (yearly), a class one medical, emergency training (first aid, fire and life jacket/raft*) with exam (yearly except *), insurance company mandated qualification and experience levels, and these days even in a basic aircraft a quite sophisticated FDR data acquisition (even from a G1000 fit or similar), Flight time limitations are observed etc, etc etc, or you could have the Wingly PPL with 55 hours ........... or the grey/illegal charter up from Nantes

Really ???