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Cardiff City Footballer Feared Missing after aircraft disappeared near Channel Island

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Cardiff City Footballer Feared Missing after aircraft disappeared near Channel Island

Old 25th Feb 2019, 17:27
  #1461 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Arkroyal View Post


3,700 hours or the same hour of VFR 3,700 times?

Sad story. Poor Sala.
How true, I was an engineer, and led large projects which involved hiring people. Often I encountered applicants who had 20 or 30 years of 'experience' , but who on deeper enquiry had obviously had the same years 'experience' 20 or 30 times. Airline pilots with many thousands of hours may have only actually handled the controls for a tiny fraction of that time. I am a glider pilot with over a thousand hours during which my hands were seldom off the controls for more than a minute or two. There is increasing evidence that this lack of hands on is a contributary cause of some of the accidents we see to commercial flights.
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Old 25th Feb 2019, 17:30
  #1462 (permalink)  
 
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Did he enter the sea in a spin?

Reading about the outer aspects of wings, tailane and fin off main bodies (connected by the cables running through) of wreckage, and looking at suggested rate of final descent it suggests to me that this may perhaps have resulted from a spinning entry to the water. The ascents and descents suggest to me that the pilot was disorientated and distracted in his quest to avoid weather and remain visual, and probably seriously distracted/disorientated by a heavy shower blocking his visibility. I would imagine such might result from little training or experience in night flying. He did admit, per FB, to being a little rusty on the autopilot, which would not have helped the situation. The investigation will find the likely cause, whatever it was. Even if no payment was involved, other than basic the cost of hiring the aircraft, airport fees and fuel, I should imagine any private pilot would be most enthusiastic about flying a sports or any VIP in a beautiful, and airworthy aircraft from abroad to back home, with every hope of being able to remain visual on a route which doesn’t traverse high mountains. RIP to them both.
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Old 25th Feb 2019, 18:02
  #1463 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by golfbananajam View Post
Mike Flynn are you sure that's correct, I understood the UK night rating on a PPL to be UK FIR only, same as the IMC
No, the Night rating has no restrictions. However he did not have one so its a moot point.....
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Old 25th Feb 2019, 18:27
  #1464 (permalink)  
 
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Actually being a skydive pilot myself, your stick and rudder skills improve enormously so I doubt the pilot was lacking in that regard. It's hands on flying all the way.
However I did find that others skills withered from lack of use. I sure wouldn't like to to find myself over the Channel at night in weather without recent practice and I actually held an Instrument rating with plenty of hours in actual IMC.

The possibility of spatial disorientation followed by in flight break up is what the report seems to imply. It's a common enough outcome, inadvertent entry into IMC on a VFR flight.

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Old 25th Feb 2019, 18:43
  #1465 (permalink)  
 
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The FAA issued legal interpretations in 200917 and 201418 making clear that a pilot must not pay less than the pro rata share for the flight. If the flight involves the pilot and one passenger, then the pilot must pay half the operating expenses. The ruling also made clear that the pilot must have a bona fide purpose (also known as common purpose) for making the flight and must dictate when the flight is to go. The flight must not be made for the purpose of merely transporting the passenger
So basically, whatever other information comes to light, it was not a legal flight.
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Old 25th Feb 2019, 19:18
  #1466 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Steepclimb View Post
The possibility of spatial disorientation followed by in flight break up is what the report seems to imply. It's a common enough outcome, inadvertent entry into IMC on a VFR flight.
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I am not so sure about the inflight break up. The sonar seemed to show the wings were still attached and he was pretty low, rather spatial disorientation and high speed impact with the sea, causing the engine to break off and the tail to collapse on the fuselage. Figure 7 seems to show more damage on the right, so perhaps still in a right turn, possibly a spiral dive? Not sure what to make of the outward parts of the wings having broken off, perhaps someone has an idea? Inflight breakup would likely sheer-off an entire wing?
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Old 25th Feb 2019, 19:31
  #1467 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by vanHorck View Post
I am not so sure about the inflight break up. The sonar seemed to show the wings were still attached and he was pretty low, rather spatial disorientation and high speed impact with the sea, causing the engine to break off and the tail to collapse on the fuselage
Yes I agree entirely. It's chilling in a way... the old saying, in IMC a VFR pilot has only got 3 minutes to survive. This pilot requested descent to return to VMC.

The initial radar return in the AAIB's track was at 2013:32, 3 minutes 2 seconds later at 2016:34 was the last radar return at the crash site.
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Old 25th Feb 2019, 19:43
  #1468 (permalink)  
 
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Here is an extract from the PA46 Malibu Pilots Operating Handbook.
2.34 ICING INFORMATION "WARNING" Severe icing may result from environmental conditions outside of those for which the airplane is certified. Flight in freezing rain, freezing drizzle, or mixed icing conditions (supercooled liquid water and ice crystals) may result in ice build-up on protected surfaces exceeding the capability of the ice protection system, or may result in ice forming aft of the protected surfaces. This ice may not be shed using the ice protection systems, and may seriously degrade the performance and controllability of the airplane. During flight, severe icing conditions that exceed those for which the airplane is certificated shall be determined by the following visual cues. If one or more of these visual cues exists, immediately request priority handling from Air Traffic Control to facilitate a route or an altitude change to exit the icing conditions. Unusually extensive ice accumulation on the airframe and windshield in areas not normally observed to collect ice. Accumulation of ice on the upper surface of the wing, aft of the protected area. Accumulation of ice on the engine nacelles and propeller spinners farther aft than normally observed. Since the autopilot, when installed and operating, may mask tactile cues that indicate adverse changes in handling characteristics, use of the autopilot is prohibited when any of the visual cues specified above exist, or when unusual lateral trim requirements or autopilot trim warnings are encountered while the airplane is in icing conditions. All wing icing inspection lights must be operative prior to flight into known or forecast icing conditions at night.

May be of interest to a previous post about auto pilot malfunction. AS the above reminds us more to the point is pilot`s knowledge about the use and limitations of the auto pilot.
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Old 25th Feb 2019, 20:17
  #1469 (permalink)  
 
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I am surprised by some comments here that assume that the interim report states the illegality of the flight.

I don't read any of that in the report.
It says that, if the flight was organised as a cost sharing flight, the FAA rules would apply ; i.e. pro-rata cost sharing and common purpose.

However, it is pretty obvious that the costs were neither borne by the pilot nor by the passenger.
Possibly by the operator or by a third person.
As the operator does not hold an air carrier certificate, this is a PART 91 flight.
As per FAR §61.113, in such a situation and if the aircraft transports passengers or goods, the pilot MUST hold a CPL licence.
If the aircraft were not carrying passenger or goods (eg: a ferry flight) and the pilot were not receiving any compensation, the flight would have been legal.

So the conclusion is the same : the flight was very probably illegal because the pilot was not holding a commercial licence.
However, this is inferred from other elements than just the report contents.
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Old 25th Feb 2019, 20:28
  #1470 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Luc Lion View Post
I am surprised by some comments here that assume that the interim report states the illegality of the flight.

I don't read any of that in the report.
It says that, if the flight was organised as a cost sharing flight, the FAA rules would apply ; i.e. pro-rata cost sharing and common purpose.

However, it is pretty obvious that the costs were neither borne by the pilot nor by the passenger.
Possibly by the operator or by a third person.
As the operator does not hold an air carrier certificate, this is a PART 91 flight.
As per FAR §61.113, in such a situation and if the aircraft transports passengers or goods, the pilot MUST hold a CPL licence.
If the aircraft were not carrying passenger or goods (eg: a ferry flight) and the pilot were not receiving any compensation, the flight would have been legal.

So the conclusion is the same : the flight was very probably illegal because the pilot was not holding a commercial licence.
However, this is inferred from other elements than just the report contents.
right but does the FAA also not state that the direct costs are borne by the OCCUPANTS of the craft (up to a maximum of six) on a pro-rata basis? A third party paying for the direct costs would not seem to meet the cost-sharing criteria.
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Old 25th Feb 2019, 20:39
  #1471 (permalink)  
 
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skyrangerpro,

the interim report confirms that
Originally Posted by AAIB Interim Report
...
The pilot of N264DB held an EASA PPL, issued by the CAA in the UK, and an FAA PPL, issued on the basis of his EASA PPL
...
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Old 25th Feb 2019, 20:40
  #1472 (permalink)  
 
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you're right of course, this wasn't a cost-sharing flight, but that's not to say it it wasn't being flown under the auspices of being one. The FAA state for a cost sharing flight that the direct costs are borne by the OCCUPANTS of the craft (up to a maximum of six) on a pro-rata basis. A third party paying for the direct costs would not meet the cost-sharing criteria. But then the corollary of your point is that the pilot knowingly flew a commercial flight and portrayed it as such without the necessary licence which I find extraordinary.
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Old 25th Feb 2019, 21:18
  #1473 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by korrol View Post
Granted that this is only an interim report - but it must surely be unsatisfactory that the details of Mr Ibbotson's FAA PPL and EASA PPL are still unclear and not on record somewhere. The AAIB report says they appear to have been in the aircraft and consequently lost.
I have been saying for years that the laws requiring licences and log books to be carried on board the aircraft are bonkers, precisely because this means they're likely to be unavailable when they'd be of most interest.
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Old 25th Feb 2019, 22:21
  #1474 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by runway30 View Post
More information in the Sunday papers. The aircraft owner has been named as Cool Flourish Ltd. by the Daily Mail. The name will have been known to the Daily Mail for some time (they probably read it here).

The pilot of the Eclipse which brought Sala inbound to CWL on the Friday has been named by The Telegraph as David Hayman, CEO of Aeris Aviation. Willie McKay says that the unavailability of David Henderson and David Hayman to fly the Eclipse was the reason that Dave Ibbotson was drafted in to fly the PA46 (but he took no part in that decision of course).
Presumably Bruce Dickinson the chairman of Aeris was also unavailable. Do I remember he also owns an airline of sorts?

The Mail make much of the aircraft changing hands 4 times on the same day in 2015 but this is probably quite usual in the case of a N reg going into trust. I am not sure how the Mail can be certain that Cool Flourish Ltd are the beneficial owners, company returns do not readily confirm this as likely, no great change in the asset situation in 2015 as I recall.

Last edited by Rory166; 25th Feb 2019 at 22:47.
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Old 25th Feb 2019, 23:04
  #1475 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by positiverate20 View Post
Yes I agree entirely. It's chilling in a way... the old saying, in IMC a VFR pilot has only got 3 minutes to survive. This pilot requested descent to return to VMC.
I disagree. Night VFR request good skills of instrument flying. The pilot and the aircaft had everything to cross safely the showers line level through the clouds.

Trying to keep clear of the clouds means putting A/P off, turning and banking, which increases the risk of spatial disorientation. Had the pilot be asleep with autopilot, the aircraft would probably have reached Cardiff by itself...
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Old 26th Feb 2019, 05:24
  #1476 (permalink)  
 
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What a total waste of time and energy this whole thing will become. No doubt we can spin our wheels for the next - what? 2, 3 years before a final report gets published and all for what exactly?

The AAIB and others will consume huge resource and present a lovely comprehensive report to tell us what? The Met looked marginal for his planned flight and his ratings and the cost sharing element is parallel to that. BUT to what end is all of this? Cost sharing pros/cons have been done to death, pilots are aware of the rules, the CAA are aware of the rules and even if there is some item of question in this flight so what the pilot is dead.

What would be a better use of time and resource would be free the AAIB to investigate the remainder of what is on their book in a more timely manner and any resource impact for the CAA to spend time and energy going through the rules they have to ensure they say what they think they mean, oh and maybe do the odd ramp check.
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Old 26th Feb 2019, 06:51
  #1477 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by skyrangerpro View Post
...But then the corollary of your point is that the pilot knowingly flew a commercial flight and portrayed it as such without the necessary licence which I find extraordinary.
On the contrary, in respect of the circumstances surrounding this sorry operation I suspect it’ll eventually be found to have been quite ordinary.
Originally Posted by positiverate20 View Post
Yes I agree entirely. It's chilling in a way... the old saying, in IMC a VFR pilot has only got 3 minutes to survive. This pilot requested descent to return to VMC.
Which raises the question: how do you fly in VMC over water at night under an overcast out of site of land?

From experience you have absolutely no external references, you cannot see the surface from any height, you cannot see clouds to avoid them, there’s just inky blackness in every direction and you cannot control an aircraft without total reliance on instruments. His descent might have put him clear of cloud but it wouldn’t have put him in VMC.

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Old 26th Feb 2019, 11:18
  #1478 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Pittsextra View Post
What if the cost of the aircraft was invoiced 30 days later... pilot is dead, invoice just becomes due how does he pay or how do you prove his intention to pay?? All this is irrevelant noise. Pilot porked it in poor weather for all the crazy reasons people do that same as the instructor in Glos. Reported on recently... AAIB saying same things changes nothing
Pitts, this flight operated to a schedule. Sala was always due to leave on that date at that time regardless of the circumstances. Dave Ibbotson, unless he had a crystal ball, could not have guaranteed to conduct a flight under VFR to a schedule. That made him a dangerously reckless pilot. The circumstances that turned him into a dangerously reckless pilot are just as important as the reasons why he did a spiral dive into the Channel.
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Old 26th Feb 2019, 11:34
  #1479 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Luc Lion View Post
TAF and METAR for Cardiff and Jersey were:

EGFF 211644Z 2116/2212 22012KT 9999 SCT035 TEMPO 2116/2120 7000 -RA TEMPO
2120/2124 23016G26KT 6000 RA BKN010 PROB30 TEMPO 2120/2124 27020G30KT 4000 RA
BKN006 BECMG 2121/2124 28012KT TEMPO 2208/2212 6000 SHRA BKN010 PROB30 TEMPO
2208/2210 3000 SHRA SHRASN BKN008 PROB30 TEMPO 2210/2212 SHRA TSGS BKN008

EGFF 211820Z AUTO 22011KT 9999 -RA BKN021 OVC034 07/05 Q1014
EGFF 211850Z AUTO 23012KT 9999 -RA BKN020 BKN026 OVC045 07/05 Q1013
EGFF 211920Z AUTO 22011KT 9999 BKN033 BKN044 07/05 Q1013
EGFF 211950Z AUTO 22013KT 9999 BKN033 07/05 Q1012
EGFF 212020Z AUTO 22012KT 9999 SCT026 BKN034 07/05 Q1011
EGFF 212050Z AUTO 20012KT 9999 BKN023/// BKN039/// //////TCU 07/05 Q1010
EGFF 212120Z AUTO 20012KT 9999 -RA SCT024 BKN033 BKN040 07/05 Q1009
EGFF 212150Z AUTO 21012KT 6000 -RA BKN020/// OVC026/// //////TCU 07/06 Q1008

EGJJ 211707Z 2118/2203 20010KT 9999 FEW015 BKN030 TEMPO 2118/2124 -RA BKN015
PROB30 TEMPO 2118/2121 7000 SHRA BKN012 BECMG 2121/2123 22020KT BECMG 2202/2203
31017KT NSW SCT015

EGJJ 211820Z 22010KT 9999 SCT014 SCT025 BKN040 06/04 Q1019
EGJJ 211850Z 22011KT 9999 FEW018 SCT021 07/04 Q1018
EGJJ 211920Z 22011KT 9999 FEW016 SCT018 07/04 Q1018
EGJJ 211950Z 22012KT 9999 FEW018 SCT020 06/04 Q1017
EGJJ 212020Z 22013KT 9999 R26/1400 SCT014 07/04 Q1017
EGJJ 212050Z AUTO 22015KT 9999 1200 R26/1200 BR SCT014/// SCT018/// BKN033///
07/05 Q1016
EGJJ 212120Z AUTO 22015KT 9999 1400 FEW013/// OVC028/// 07/05 Q1016 RERA
EGJJ 212150Z AUTO 21015KT 9999 1400 FEW014/// SCT017/// BKN032/// 07/05 Q1015
RERA

This set of weather data, available before the flight SCREAMS to any sane PPL, even with IMC and Night ratings, and current, and experienced etc etc "Don't Go!" Or at least it does to me. My ex CFI friend says to me that my competence exceeds my confidence and that is the way I like it! If and I say if I had been slightly tempted to do this journey at this time, I would have routed via SAM in clear air, and had a get out of jail free option there. Alas the pilot had a chance to change his mind when overflying Guernsey and didn't take it. In general I like a direct routing but in weather like this, it's best to chunk the journey into safe sectors and be prepared to abandon at any time. I have, of course, had get home-itis in my flying career but this accident reminds us that we all must have a the willingness to "just say NO".

Yes, I am all in agreement with everyone talking about the legalities or lack thereof in this journey but let's learn from this and examine ourselves whether flying privately or commercially.... If you have any nagging hesitancy about any element of a flight, stay on the ground!! And stay on the right side of the competence Vs confidence equation, it's served me well and I intend for it to continue to keep me and my friends alive a long while yet.
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Old 26th Feb 2019, 12:18
  #1480 (permalink)  

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Originally Posted by Pittsextra View Post
No they are not the pilot is dead so the person with the greatest need to learn cant. Everyone and anyone with any sense in the chain will claim to know nothing and unless commanded by a greater authority than the CAA financial transactions will stay private. You know and i know what was going on we dont need a multi year paper trail to tell us. Nor does it help the CAA to know the facts. They cant seek redress from a dead man and they have no resource or authoity for things gping forward.
Pittsextra, you appear to be missing the rationale of accident investigations by the AAIB.
Ibbotson knew exactly why the accident occurred, if only for a few brief seconds, obviously by then it was far too late for him to get a second chance.
However, others might learn from the investigation, which btw is not to apportion blame.

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