7 dead in Quebec Island crash

[Left Coaster]

TRF4EVR,

Thanks...been watching and saying that for years! I've trained enough guys who did that for a living for ages but when asked to fly a circling approach down in the "junk" they get a little behind the airplane...talented people...to be sure...but when some are faced with non standard handling and weather etc., it can lead to disaster.

Fly Safe, LC

[Yankee Whisky]

It will be part of the investigation, but no one mentioned the altimeter settings. If they were not reset to local pressure (from that of St Hubert), an incorrect height would be seen by the pilots when in bad visibility and a LP area.

[DaveReidUK]

Originally Posted by Yankee Whisky

It will be part of the investigation, but no one mentioned the altimeter settings.

See post #18.

[RIGHTSEATKC135]

To begin, my respects to the pilot, whose intentions were apparently based in kindness, and bereavement. Regards, also, to the families, and the memory of those who perished.

I peered back through my log books from the late '70s/early '80s. My best calculation shows that I had 781 hours in an MU-2J, and all in the same aircraft. Most of my hours prior to taking on the task of piloting the Mitsubishi, were spent in a PA-23 Aztec. The MU-2J's owner required that I complete training at FSI, and also acquire my ATP. Even with the amount of training which I took part in, the learning curve of turboprop versus conventional piston was not easy to overcome.

The first lesson, drilled into my thick skull by FSI, was "don't be afraid of landing (a wee bit) on the hot side", as most of the problems encountered with the aircraft by that point in time were landing-related. The MU-2 which I became accustomed to flying was an aircraft which required your constant attention to every detail; with that said, the routine of maintaining situational awareness, and piloting the aircraft left time for little else. They did not like weather, despised even minor icing conditions, and seemed to me to have the tendency to "pitch up" during the initial phase of landing, especially when encountering a decent headwind.

While the MU-2 may not be the most friendly aircraft to pilot, it is far from being the disastrous bucket of bolts portrayed by many, especially via the internet. Without having the benefit of a CVR/FDR system, I fear the true cause of the crash will never be known. I did have close calls, some of which I blamed myself for, others were due to the idiosyncrasies of the aircraft.

[twincommander]

A Delaware-registered aircraft crashed, killing a high-profile Canadian politician and family in Canada.

The question has arisen. Was Gosselin (re)current per SFAR 108? This will be a feast for plaintiff attorneys, but a personal tragedy for others. Was the captain (an FAA private pilot) current? Was the flight a friendly gesture in a time of need... or an illegal charter. What documentation exists between the U.S owner and the Canadian operator? Even if the insurance companies pay out, a heavy burden will fall on the pilot's widow and children. Most sad.

[Vc10Tail]

"To begin, my respects to the pilot, whose intentions were apparently based in kindness, and bereavement. Regards, also, to the families, and the memory of those who perished"

Being sn urgent call to duty and oressure to make the landing gor tge funeral, press-on-itis might have factored.Was there a need to circle gorvany reason,Cloud base was too low for circling wgat was reported visibility?Altimeter settings?Radio Altim equipped?

MU2 more a problem if you have Eng failure after V1 and you raise gear and flaps(conventionally) in a haste as excess drag with the gear doors in transit plus sudden reduction in lift and the roll spoilers drag if ove correcting.Were they trying to GA after eng fail?Perhaps dive and drive approach to this NPA?This method still commonly used in North America.Last r/t crew transmissions?Experience level of the single pilot or both crew and recency?Crew Fatigue from preceding roster???Time of operation? Fuel exhaustion?Icing?Plain low and slow behind drag curve scenario?

[twincommander]

Doubtful Scenarios

The wind strongly favored the approach to Runway 7. There was no incentive to circle to a downwind landing or shorter cross wind runway. Engine failure seems a remote probability, as the crew would likely have notified approach control.

Many factors will enter the investigation.... icing conditions, wind shear, turbulence, aircraft configuration, crew currency, fatigue and maintenance, among others.

[Sea Eggs]

only if they are air cooled.

[Yankee Whisky]

Alimeter setting

Originally Posted by DaveReidUK

See post #18.

Thanks Dave I missed reading it.

[Viper 7]

We had a large system with lots of freezing rain in the general area of Newfoundland at the time - can anyone find the historical TAFs and AFs?

[Yankee Whisky]

Weather

Originally Posted by Viper 7

We had a large system with lots of freezing rain in the general area of Newfoundland at the time - can anyone find the historical TAFs and AFs?

Localizer approach available. No GS.

CYGR 291700Z 03024G32KT 1 3/4SM -RA BR OVC002 00/M00 A2886 RMK FG2SF6 SLP776
CYGR 291626Z 04024G30KT 1 1/2SM -RA BR OVC002 00/M00 A2884 RMK FG2SF6 SLP770
CYGR 291600Z 04020G28KT 2SM -RA BR OVC002 00/M00 A2884 RMK FG2SF6 SLP769
CYGR 291548Z 04020G27KT 2SM -RA BR OVC002 00/M00 A2884 RMK FG2SF6 SLP768
CYGR 291517Z 05017G27KT 2SM -RA BR BKN002 OVC008 00/M00 A2884 RMK FG2SF5SC1 SLP768
CYGR 291500Z 05018G29KT 2 1/2SM -RA BR BKN002 OVC008 00/M00 A2883 RMK FG2SF5SC1 SLP765

[Willie Everlearn]

Wow!
This accident is likely tied to the altimeter setting and whether or not it was or wasn't properly reset at transition. (No one's ever missed that before) With help from x-winds and icing.
Another "can of worms" is a Canadian PIC with (presumably) an FAA licence (if in fact, both pilots held them) flying an N-registered aeroplane whose owner is listed as Wilmington, Delaware, from a Canadian airport to a Canadian airport. Under the Customs Laws in Canada, if this was the case, the flight was in violation of the customs act. Meaning, if this IS the case, insurance cover is probably Nul and Void. OMG!
Anyway, my sympathies and heart felt condolences go out to those left behind, especially Mr. Lapierre's mom. May god bless her in this, perhaps her darkest hour.

Willie

[RIGHTSEATKC135]

Willie,

The "Wilmington, Delaware" registration most likely has to do with the fact that Delaware-based corporations enjoy more favorable status with regards to ease of corporate registry, state-based taxation filings, banking practices, and a few other items too complex to be listed.

Many multinational corporations, especially those involved in transportation (cargo vessels and shipping are the most prominent) have American corporate registry based through a Delaware address. It's a "monetary thing"...

[ThreeThreeMike]

Post after post comment on the aircraft's safety record and its supposed difficulty to fly, along with repeated conjecture about a failed go around or LOC in the late stages of approach. There is also mention of a "typical" stall/spin scenario, yet there is an obvious ground scar almost a hundred meters long with a remarkably intact fuselage at its termination point.

No one seems to have noticed the crash site is several kilometers from the the runway. It's apparent the aircraft hit terrain while in level flight and flying at a speed which prevented significant destruction of the fuselage.

Given weather conditions at the time of the crash and the clues presented by the impact scar and aircraft condition, it seems reasonable to conclude CFIT is a likely cause of the incident, not some nefarious loss of control caused by the flying characteristics of the MU-2.

All of the comments about previous MU-2 crashes, SFAR requirements, Wikipedia citations and the like ignore what seems rather straightforward. Bad weather and self induced pressure seem to have more likelihood of being the cause of this unfortunate incident.

My condolences to those affected. It's a very sorrowful situation.

[PLovett]

33M, totally agree.

[bnt]

Update: the TSB investigation is ongoing, and they are posting updates to their website here. They mention a non-standard recording device in the cockpit: it appears to be a Wi-Flight, a GPS with CVR and other flight data recording facilities.

[alph2z]

N246W actual approach (onboard recorder data), compared with the standard aproach.

From lightweight onboard recorder.



http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-in...-figure-01.png

[9 lives]

Wow! I'm hardly an MU2 pilot, but that sure looks like a very rushed approach to me! A lot of final moments fixing to make that approach look good crossing the fence.

[India Four Two]

The report makes interesting reading:

At 1229, 2.7 nm from Runway 07, the aircraft landing gear was lowered and approach flaps were selected. Shortly after that, the autopilot was disconnected, and almost immediately the aircraft departed from controlled flight. It rolled quickly into a steep right bank and descended rapidly. The aircraft continued its rapid descent and impacted the ground in a near-level attitude.

• On the MU-2 instrument-approach profile, the standard speed prior to the initial approach fix is 150 knots, slowing to a final approach speed of 125 knots past the final approach fix.
• In this instance, the aircraft's speed prior to the initial approach fix was 240 knots, and past the final approach fix the speed decreased below 175 knots, only 2.7 nm from Runway 07—much later than prescribed (Figure 1). The aircraft landing gear was lowered and approach flaps were selected at this point.

So it doesn't look like an altimeter-setting related crash, but a loss of control after gear and flaps down, while manual flying 50 kts too fast

• The pilot-passenger occupying the right-hand cockpit seat was a commercial pilot and flight instructor.
• The pilot-passenger was not qualified to fly the MU-2.
• A second crew member was not required to fly the MU-2.
• The pilot-passenger was invited to come on the flight to help with some basic piloting functions.

• Although not required by regulation, the occurrence aircraft was equipped with a lightweight recording system.
• It was recovered in good condition from the wreckage.
• TSB specialists at the Lab have extracted and continue to analyze data from the recorder.
• The recorder will provide information critical to understanding the circumstances and events that led to the departure from controlled flight—information that would not have been available to the investigation if the aircraft had not been equipped with a recording system.

Clearly a recorder of some kind would be very beneficial for analysis of future crashes of aircraft not equipped with FDRs.

[India Four Two]

Final report issued

Aviation Investigation Report A16A0032 - Transportation Safety Board of Canada

2.2 Approach planning

While in cruise flight, the pilot recognized there would be a strong tailwind during the descent. The pilot developed his approach plan, which included starting a 1500-feet-per-minute (fpm) descent when prompted to do so by the aircraft's global positioning system (GPS) in order to cross the initial approach waypoint (DAVAK) at 3000 feet above sea level (ASL). The minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 620 feet ASL was set on the radio altimeter, and the missed-approach altitude of 1900 feet ASL was noted. Other than the briefing on the minimum descent and missed approach altitudes, there was no briefing of when or under what conditions a go-around would be performed.

The pilot subsequently decided to delay the descent to reduce fuel consumption and to minimize the time spent in cloud by adopting a higher airspeed and rate of descent. This led the pilot to further revise the plan to carry out the descent at 250 knots indicated airspeed and at a rate of 2000 fpm. This new plan would still have enabled the aircraft to reach DAVAK at or near 3000 feet. However, the faster and steeper descent would cause the aircraft to be in a high-energy condition, which would require more vigilant monitoring by the pilot.

The broken ceiling at 200 feet was approximately 400 feet lower than the MDA; however, there was no discussion of the potential risks associated with continuing the approach. No contingency plan, such as performing a go-around if circumstances dictated, was discussed. The pilot continued with his original plan to land at CYGR.

If pilots are not prepared to conduct a go-around on every approach, they risk not responding appropriately to situations that require one.

3.1 Findings as to causes and contributing factors

The pilot's inability to effectively manage the aircraft's energy condition led to an unstable approach.
The pilot "got behind" the aircraft by allowing events to control his actions, and cognitive biases led him to continue the unstable approach.

A loss of control occurred when the pilot rapidly added full power at low airspeed while at low altitude, which caused a power-induced upset and resulted in the aircraft rolling sharply to the right and descending rapidly.

It is likely that the pilot was not prepared for the resulting power-induced upset and, although he managed to level the wings, the aircraft was too low to recover before striking the ground.

The pilot's high workload and reduced time available resulted in a task-saturated condition, which decreased his situational awareness and impaired his decision making.

It is unlikely that the pilot's flight skills and procedures were sufficiently practised to ensure his proficiency as the pilot-in-command for single-pilot operation on the MU-2B for the conditions experienced during the occurrence flight.