Light Aircraft crash at Blackbushe.

[His dudeness]

What is the next "regulation" then Pace (+the others) when some idiot takes, say, a KingAir 200 into Blackbushe at Vref + 60 and crashes into the car park ? (the Vref of a heavy non-Raisbeck KingAir B200 is IIRC 103 KIAS. just 5 less than that of a Phenom 300. And it has no anti-skid !)

You guys are just unbelievable... "Pilots" that honestly think a 5 knots difference in Vref warrants drastic steps by "the regulator". Cruise speed - again - has NOTHING to do with this crash. At all. A/C weight has nothing to do with this crash. At all. Several dual crew aircraft have crashed on approach/landing, references/links are available in this thread. Including touchdown beyond the half of the RWY on a short airfield by an AIRLINE TP.

Is there statistic PROOF that single hand operated jets crash more often on approach ? I haven`t seen any.

This guy fukced up royally, just as the dude landing his 737 hot&high in some place in Asia and crashing down the hill off said place killing a lot people more.

Yet there was no knee jerk reaction (forbid,forbid!). 2 professional pilots screwing up versus 1. Whats the difference ? 1 less killed (one way to look at it...and sarcasm in case you did not recognize that)

[Cows getting bigger]

HD is right. Without a detailed analysis, there is little credibility to the "two is better than one" argument. A quick trawl of mishaps across commercial aviation over the last year or so implies that two+ crew ops are equally (more?) capable of screwing-up landings.

[fireflybob]

Staines, however, heralded the birth of CRM and Human Factors being taken seriously. I think at that moment in time, BEA Captains actually spent layovers in a different Hotel to the rest of the crew.

Actually I think you'll find that is was a chain of accidents with an airline in the USA (United?) that caused the birth of CRM.

Also not sure it was BEA Captains but rather BOAC Captains that stayed in a different hotel to the rest of the crew at that time. When I joined BOAC in 1970 all crew stayed in the same hotel as standard some time before I joined. The vast majority of Captains I flew with were not "god like" and indeed fostered a good working environment.

Like all accidents (Swiss cheese model) there were many factors associated with the Trident accident at Staines. It's a while since I've read the full report but I do recall BEA had a couple of near misses where the droop was retracted at too low an airspeed at low level but they got away with it. Although this was reported internally there was no legal obligation to report and indeed this accident heralded the Mandatory Occurrence Reporting scheme.

[Pace]

HD

Please explain to me why my Citations 500 550 560 all have to be flown with 2 crew ? Yes even the baby 500 I used to fly was stipulated 2 crew and the 501SP and 551SP Have to be flown below 12500 IBS making the 551SP a useless piece of junk as far as carrying anyone or going any distance.

They are easy to fly, have straight wings and are slow?

Yet this pocket rocket weighing 18000 IBS with swept wings a speed 100 KTS Faster, a cruise at FL450 and a multitude of seating capacity is SP?

There is no sense to some of the certification. Maybe I am having a gripe more at the certification process and the power certain manufactures have of getting their way. I too spent 3000 hours flying numerous twin piston single pilot in all the **** low down and found that harder than some of these slowtations
Having said that had I been in the right seat of this 300 or any other half competent pilot this accident ( sorry not accident) would have 100% not happened

[Cows getting bigger]

There are many of us who survived as single crew motoring around at Mach 1.0+

However, I agree that using an arbitrary mass as certification criteria is rather quaint.

[Above The Clouds]

Pace
Please explain to me why my Citations 500 550 560 all have to be flown with 2 crew ? Yes even the baby 500 was stipulated 2 crew and the 501SP and 551SP Have to be flown below 12500 IBS making the 551SP a useless piece of junk as far as carrying anyone or going any distance.

They are easy to fly, have straight wings and are slow?

Yet this pocket rocket weighing 18000 IBS with swept wings a speed 100 KTS Faster, a cruise at FL450 and a multitude of seating capacity is SP?

There is no sense to some of the certification

The Citation 500 series are all the same, they just identified the ones that could be flown SP without an FAA single pilot waiver by changing the designators to 501 and 551.

Speed, weight, altitude and the number of engines play no part in wether an aircraft is certified SP, it is down to pilot training and manufacture certification, if owners and insurance companies are happy with SP ops why should it be banned just because a few are not comfortable, its called having a choice.

Pace
Having said that had I been in the right seat of this 300 or any other half competent pilot this accident ( sorry not accident) would have 100% not happened

Really, you need to read your statement again because now you are saying every multi crew aircraft that has crashed is due to the guy in the RHS not being competent, quite a bold statement to make

[Niner Lima Charlie]

Single Pilot

Remember, the SR-71 (Mach 3.2, 80,000 feet) with a MTOW of 170,000 lbs. was the largest single pilot airplane flown. B-58 Hustler a close second. The Avro Lancaster was also single pilot.

Single pilot ops in many business jets and turboprops involves the systems layout, redundancy and the ability of the pilot to continue to fly after a system failure. For example, radio communications; headset, or ICS failure, ability to continue to use at least one VHF radio.

For example, by modification of the landing gear handle, the DC-3 has been approved for single pilot operations.

[nightowl727]

NLC -
.... For example, by modification of the landing gear handle, the DC-3 has been approved for single pilot operations

Hadn't heard, did the FAA approve that? IAC, the gear lever(s) could at least be easily reached from LHS, but the cowl gills were rather a stretch.

Cheers, Nightowl727 (& sorry folks, thread drift)

[deefer dog]

The C501 and C551 incorporated very slight ergonomic mods (don't recal exactly, but for sure one was PTT on left yoke, rather than hand mike only) when they were introduced as single pilot variants of the C500 and 550.

(MTOW of 551 was also, as previously stated, restricted to 12,500 lbs)

[Pace]

Really, you need to read your statement again because now you are saying every multi crew aircraft that has crashed is due to the guy in the RHS not being competent, quite a bold statement to make

ATC

That is not what I am saying on every multi crew aircraft crash.

In this particular crash the aircraft was in good VMC with conditions at landing site which were also calm.

The aircraft was fully serviceable but the pilot was not in control of the situation.
He had lost the plot earlier on.

As a proactive decisive and thinking pilot would you allow another human being to kill you? While your mind is clear his was not so I stick with my statement.
You would realise by his actions that he was incapacitated in a mental way and do what you would do if he passed out at the controls which is to take command and control

If that is what you are saying then you are basically saying that if a Captain is incapacitated by collapsing at the controls an FO is incapable of taking over the aircraft to a successful landing? Incapacitation can take many forms. It is identifying that incapacitation and acting on it

Remember this is a form of incapacitation which developed with time to sort it out and incapacitation of all kinds should be part of CRM! This was not a last minute mistake on an instrument approach in bad weather or strong wind landing but something any competent pilot should identify and handle

[His dudeness]

Please explain to me why my Citations 500 550 560 all have to be flown with 2 crew ? Yes even the baby 500 I used to fly was stipulated 2 crew and the 501SP and 551SP Have to be flown below 12500 IBS making the 551SP a useless piece of junk as far as carrying anyone or going any distance.

a) the airframe manufacturer has probably not tried to get a "recertification" for a SH 500/550 since the regulators started to learn that flying a Jet is not a miraculous wonder, but EASIER than flying a TP, let alone a piston engine airplane. When that happened, the CJ was already on the marked, why would Cessna make their own then newest airplanes live harder with used C500s doing the same for maybe even less ?

I remember being on my first jet rating, the C500/550/560 series, sitting in the sim and always asking myself " when is the complicated part to happen ? - I had been briefed by the DO how hard the transition from the B200 to 'a real jet' would be... the most stupid statement ever, I think.

b) the avionics of a Phenom 300 or CJ4 can hardly be compared to the ancient roman empire radio stack a C500 sports. Thus situational awareness, flight guidance/planning, warning (EICAS) are way better, the pilot(s) are simply better informed and have less workload. The A/Ps are better, etcetc. I flew a C500 with just a KLN90 and all the rest steam gauges, now compare that to a Proline21 equipped CJ... 9LC has made this point already...

c) actually the C500/550 IS a single pilot airplane, given the location of the important switches. A C500/550. The cojo can control the bleed air knobs for the windshield and what else ? Ah, I now remember it you can un-slew the compass system 2... (thats true for the 1 500 I flew, due to the many different equipment stages the whole series went through, this is sort of an exaggeration, I know)

If that is what you are saying then you are basically saying that if a Captain is incapacitated by collapsing at the controls an FO is incapable of taking over the aircraft to a successful landing?

One of my FIs had a heart attack right after takeoff in a C172 and collapsed onto the wheel and subsequently he and his student died in the crash...

DD: IIRC it was a boom mike, headset mandatory, and an working A/P.

[deefer dog]

The aircraft was fully serviceable but the pilot was not in control of the situation.
He had lost the plot earlier on.

Pretty bold statement considering that all we have read is the preliminary report. Perhaps the AAIB should wrap up the investigation.

[Above The Clouds]

Pace
D

It's not such a bold statement as you basically have two choices !
Either this was a suicide action by a mentally alert pilot or

The pilot lost the plot big time

An alert clear thinking pilot does not cross the numbers at 150 kts 42 Kts above vref than carry on down the runway deciding to land at 135 kts 27 over vref with hardly any runway remaining

Only other option is someone else was flying the plane
So take your choice there are no others
Pace

I think what DD was stating is nobody knows yet wether the aircraft was serviceable or not, but from your original quote you seem to imply it was serviceable, how would you know that ? Hence the bold statement remark.

Pace

ATC

That is not what I am saying on every multi crew aircraft crash.

In this particular crash the aircraft was in good VMC with conditions at landing site which were also calm.

The aircraft was fully serviceable but the pilot was not in control of the situation.

He had lost the plot earlier on.

[Chronus]

Within the information known thus far, I would think that pilot suicide is unlikely, because if he was so intended then why leave it until landing at destination. In this sense pilot incapacitation more likely than suicide.
The principal factor is the high speed landing, what besides pilot error could have caused this. Assuming just for a moment that it was not pilot error, mechanical and/or electronics malfunction must not be ruled out. The question I pose is what failure(s) could have prevented the pilot from slowing the aircraft to the correct speed and also prevent a timely go around. I am not familiar with the type so don`t know whether is equipped with any lift dumping devices and thrust reversers and as to how these are armed for landing. A/T deactivation or systems fault may also be a causal factor. The fact that on go around the a/c veered off the runway heading could point to asymmetry issues. The high speed finals, nevertheless is the only tangible piece of evidence as to the cause of this accident. As many have already commented, there was not any chance of pulling off a successful landing from the approach at that speed and runway remaining. It therefore follows that for reasons yet unknown the pilot was committed to land. A situation that confronted the pilot during the last few minutes of flight.

[Above The Clouds]

Chronus
The question I pose is what failure(s) could have prevented the pilot from slowing the aircraft to the correct speed and also prevent a timely go around.
The high speed finals, nevertheless is the only tangible piece of evidence as to the cause of this accident.

Passenger distraction at the wrong moment leading to an RA in the circuit, possible wrong flap selection due to workload/stress, or un-noticed partial flap failure due to workload/stress, late decision to go-around.

Pace
I have seen situations where vastly overloaded pilots cannot even tell you their name.

As Pace said, once overloaded for whatever reason it is difficult to even recognise a situation developing before its to late, seen it many times as a sim & a/c TRE

[Machinbird]

Lets put a different slant on an old problem.
Some modern, highly automated aircraft pilots seem to be dropping the airspeed from their scan occasionally with bad results, e.g. Asiana at SFO. In that case they were very slow.

Why couldn't a pilot be so behind the aircraft and not scanning his airspeed that he landed much faster than he appreciated? Maybe he could have stopped the aircraft if he had touched down at his usual 108 knots but as we know in this case, there was no way to stop at his actual 140+ knot approach speed.

[Sir George Cayley]

The control tower and a lot of other cues were behind him. Have you recently operated into or out of the 'bushe?

The car auction site is a massive installation and fills the screen.

Would a shot taken from the various points during the circuit help? I have the camera.

[Super VC-10]

Another example of coming in too fast and landing long, fortunately non-fatal this time.

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2013/sx-s...s130329.en.pdf

[Oakape]

Not everyone seems to be able to make the go-around decision.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-z2o0acIlm4

Admittedly a more difficult approach, however how far down the runway does one need to get before one realizes that it just isn't going to work!

They got away with this one, but it was pretty close!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJoXMcehrYo

This is how it is supposed to be done.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jw4PHhLBbrU

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iAxAso8xSo0

[Pittsextra]

How about this need for this pilot to fly an accurate circuit?? Given his circuit height should have been 1200ft, climbing from 1000ft to avoid a microlight at the end of the downwind leg (from the AAIB report) suggests it was all going wrong way before final approach.