DB - it's a dark and ****ty night, 200' cloudbase, strong winds, limited vis due to the heavy rain and there is a vessel aground on rocks (coastal location) with life seriously in danger and the conditions preclude lifeboat rescue.
It is an unfamiliar area and you are scrambled to the job - you have to get down from the cruise and get to the job - you are obviously relying heavily on the radar.
Not only do you have to let down to a safe area but then you need the radar to close to the coast until you get visual.
Would you rather have a well-trained radar operator whose ONLY job is to conduct that letdown safely, using all the skills and experience gained from training and being regularly examined in this discipline OR would you rather rely on the co-pilot who might have been up to speed when he did his type and role training but hasn't really got the best out of the radar and hasn't done a letdown in really poor weather for quite a while (for training or for real). Oh, and he is listening to 3 different radios, monitoring your flying and managing the FMS.
Tell me which one you think is safer and which you would prefer - I think my choice in the matter is self-evident.
ARAs are not SAR letdowns.
CRAB - In a modern third generation cockpit, I would rather be looking at the RADAR screen myself and not reliant on the Co-pilot or anyone else for that matter, regardless of me being PF or PNF. Most especially at 200 feet on a dark and stormy night.
In a modern MFD cockpit, the requirement for the PNF to "direct" the PF is extent. Sure the calls should come, but they are supplementary to the PFs ability and requirement to avoid red blobs on the MFD in front of him.
You cannot confuse the basic requirements of the procedure they were flying with a rescue mission.
I recognise, having done it, that in older types the scan required precludes the PF from really concentrating on the RADAR. Althopugh having flown those types I have always checked the screen as much as my scan would allow.
I agree 100% that in SAR, a rear RADAR Operator is a huge bonus when off route letting down in nager to an incident.
However, this accident has nothing whatsoever to do with that. This accident started in the planning room, when, as both pilots were "unfamiliar" with the procedure they were required to do, so evidently failed to capture the height of Blackrock and the implications of it along the route they were about to fly. Which in itself presents a wider question. If Black sod was a regular known and required refuelling stop WHY were this crew so unfamiliar with the area/procedure/hazards.
Not too long ago a good friend of mine, a TRE/LTC, decided to take a refuel in Sumburgh to familiarise the co-pilot he was Line Training with the airfield. He did not need to stop for fuel but as he was passing he took advantage to get the co-pilot familiar with an airfield which would become a regular alternate/fuel stop for the rest of his NS career.
On RTB he was torn a sizeable new one by the Pilot management for making this decision and slightly delaying a flight/causing a bit of expenditure. Policy stated was such Line Training adventures were unacceptable. And yet the regulations demand familiarisation training.
These are the insidious problems that afflict the modern commercial helicopter operation.
Looking at the Blacksod area in general, it would be placed in my view, as a "Difficult"/ "Hazardous" approach with no ground based NAVAIDS for positioning and a high reliance on GPS/RADAR and the Vertical Profile to ensure safe operations. This does not mean it cannot be done safely. It just places a premium on data, briefing and training.
In this case, the data was poor, the briefing seemed to consist of an admission of unfamiliarity and the training....well I guess that one is answered already.
In the fixed wing world they grade aerodromes in degree of difficulty and the pre-requisites to operate to/from a particular aerodrome are proportionate to that difficulty.
I watched with a degree of fascination when flying NS. co-pilots opting for SAR work. Co-pilots that I would put in the "Low Ability" category. No-one intervened. They got there. Some of them a few short years later were Commanding a SAR machine.
SAR demands high quality, reasonably experienced flight crew. Where experience is lacking, selection, quality and maturity should fill the gap. Much as how the Military machine works.
There is much to point the finger at in this accident. However, the more we become aware of what happened the harder it is not to focus on the competence and skills of that crew.
I really want there to be something wrong with the RADAR. However, the Commanders attitude to the red blobs they overflew and the RADALT warnings they were receiving paints a very poor picture of complacency and discipline. As a professional body we must not be afraid of accepting that in the end, maybe we were just not good enough!