I do think the takeoff requires further consideration, not least because of the AAIB comment on page 8 that the rotation was initiated at 112 rather than the pilots "usual" 120 knots. I have already queried the fact he raised the nose, had to lower it, before then raising it again to take off. I hear what is being said about bumps in the runway, but taken together with the lower than "usual" speed, I cant help but wonder if there was something else adrift here, affecting any, or all of, the information being provided to the pilot, his perception of his situation, and the thrust being delivered by the engine.
Since these seem to be the same factors at play during the accident, I would have expected to see more about the takeoff in the report.
Turning to the analysis of the accident manoeuvre itself, two things seem striking in relation to engine thrust (figure 15 page 53): firstly the engine rpm REDUCE during the climb phase. Even if the pilot thought he was flying a JP, he wouldn't reduce power during this phase.
Secondly, rpm increase after the apex, which would suggest that he was attempting a recovery of sorts.
The key question seems to me to be what caused the dramatic reduction in rpm during the climb.
For the sake of completeness, I am surprised also that the report did not address the Southend JP matter for any relevant clues.