Jim, I don’t know if you were bullied at school by a Sikorsky employee, but you clearly don’t like the S-92, but to comment on your post #1708 (and I stand to be corrected if wrong), I would contest your findings regarding fatal and non-fatal S-92 accidents.
No I don’t work for Sikorsky, but to be fair to all sides in the debate on platform safety by type, other than Cougar 91, I am not aware of another S-92 accident resulting in fatalities, so I suspect you are referring to the Saudi Civil Defence incident in which a civil defence officer fell out the door from around 700 feet during an air show display in Riyadh.
This incident had absolutely nothing to do with the S-92’s design or airworthiness, and unfortunate as it was for this individual who died from his injuries, it cannot be classified as an S-92 accident as you suggest, so to include this incident in your stats, is as meaningful as also attributing blame to Sir Isaac Newton.
Going back to the Cougar 91 accident and noting HeliComparator’s comment, "The S92 has had a fatal accident, only "resolved" by ensuring the pilots are fully aware of
the aircraft's failure to meet its certification requirements"
comment (if it didn’t HC, it would not have an FAA and EASA Airworthiness Certificate).
Evidently there is
more heat than light regarding this accident, as the CVR transcript reveals clearly that post the MGB oil pressure warning light illumination observed by the pilots, and having followed the Emergency Procedures check list, the co-pilot declared that they were in a "Land Immediately Situation", to which the captain agreed, but indicated his intention to stop the descent at 1000 feet, at which point the co-pilot acknowledged the pilots decision, but again repeated that they were in a "Land Immediately Situation", AND, that the Emergency Checklist was complete.
The captain levelled out at 800 feet, but did not respond to the co-pilots second declaration that they were in a "Land Immediately Situation". Tragically
11 minutes after the initial warning of indications of a MGB oil problem, 17 occupants drowned due to the very high rate of descent/impact with the water.
Looking back at the West Franklin Platform accident/incident in December and to quote a CHC statement: "We can confirm that one of S92s operating from Aberdeen experienced unexpected control responses during the final stages of a landing at an offshore platform.
The crew responded immediately in accordance with their training and the aircraft was successfully landed and shut down; there were no reported injuries amongst the passengers or the crew".
Reading the AAIB interim report suggests to me that in spite of the uncommanded high rate of turn (up to 30 degrees per second) at just 4 foot above the helideck during final approach, with the helicopter at one point pirouetting around the left-hand MLG, the crew were able to maintain enough control to land the S-92 safely with no rollover or injuries to crew and passengers, so to me it suggests a more inherently stable platform far less prone to rollover than say other models, so a positive safety point.
I would also point out that although the investigation is ongoing, the aircraft's HUMS system worked as per design and identified a problem with the tail rotor system some 4.5 hours before the accident, this being that the Tail Gearbox Bearing Energy Analysis limit had been exceeded and that this data was downloaded the previous day.
Coming back to your stats. An accident can be defined as an unintended event resulting in damage or harm. I’m not so sure the failure of a vespel spline adapter or oil pump should be defined as an "Accident", as such I would suggest most of the 18 accidents you refer to were really just engineering/crew/operational incidents.
As for S-92 flight-hours, this time last year the S-92 fleet exceeded one million flight hours, and with some 275 aircraft flying worldwide and with the 332L2/H225’s grounded in the North Sea, I’d suggest current totals are likely to be between 1.1 to 1.2 million flight hours for the S-92, so that’s twice the 225 hours, and some.
Again getting back to safety of a specific airframe model and to quote a Sikorsky press release this time last year, "Along with accomplishing this (one million flight hours) in an impressively short time of less than 12 years, the S-92 helicopter also asserts a best-in-class safety record with an accident rate of 0.20, which is 1/10th the U.S. Civil Multi-Turbine engine helicopter rate".
There you have it Jim, "Best-in-Class".
I’d have to say HeliComparator, I take heart at your strong defence of the 225 and although grandfathered up the yin-yang (which in itself is not such a bad thing), yes in general it is an excellent performing platform and so too are Eurocopter (never going to get used to AH), who make some iconic helicopters.
However, looking back at the numerous MGB incidents in the North Sea, two of which have been un-survivable due to catastrophic failure of the MGB (unlike the Cougar 91 accident, in that there was no time for the crew to manage the situation) and also the two incidents of incorrect system operation/indication of the emergency water glycol system, which resulted in the crew ditching the helicopters (this in itself may well have been a blessing in disguise for all those on-board, as would you want to be flying for 30-minutes post loss of oil pressure knowing that the oil pump drive shaft had separated and was rattling around the gearbox sump), the uprated 332L2 and 225 MGB’s clearly have design issues that I suspect will not be addressed by senior management (another problematic area) and engineers to the satisfaction of the passengers in the back.