I seem to recall an article in Flying Review International (yes, THAT many years ago!) that ran a summary of the Skoshi Tiger evaluation that basically said the USAF thought the F-5A was fine for export customers but not suitable for adoption by the USAF (especially in Vietnam) due to:
Hot and High performance
Extended take-off runs
Restricted payload
Low basic payload/range capability (Skoshi Tigers were fitted for probe-drogue In-flight refuelling to enable even a modest warload capability on take-off to offset these basic shortcomings)
Limited range capability in the base-case due to the very thirsty J85s and limited tankage requiring a centreline tank to be carried in most cases – again restricting weapons carrying capability
Lack of amour protection against small-arms ground-fire (was some plating added to the Skoshi Tigers to reduce this – but exacerbated the warload/range issues?)
Lack off survivability led to their use being restricted to south of the DMZ
Lack of a sophisticated weapons delivery system
I suspect that all the foregoing - allied to a poor thrust/weight ratio and Specific Excess Power to enable effective dog-fighting (has there ever been a F-5A vs Mig-21 engagement?) – mitigated against its use in the air superiority role over N Vietnam.
The Skoshi Tiger evaluation laid the grounds for the development of the much-improved F-5E (especially the adoption of the J85-21) that did what it could to address the results of the ‘damned by faint praise’ report, and incidentally led to the adoption of the Tiger II sobriquet for the F-5E as a ‘nod’ towards the importance of that deployment.
Now, Total Health Warning: the above may be total tosh, as it WAS many years ago – I was about 13 - and I may have got things completely wrong from my memory as, clearly, I don’t still have that copy of F R I!
