The applicable rule regarding emergency exits is FAR 25.783. I have attached the relevant excerpts from Advisory Circular 25.783-1A below. Two thoughts come to mind: first, the design and certification engineering folks are pretty thorough in their work. Ergo, they are not going to hand you an emergency exit that cannot be opened in an emergency, or one that depends solely on the pilots surviving long enough to retard the throttles. Second, anybody who thinks that regulators don't have a sense of humor need only read the second sentence in paragraph b. (1) below.
The 737 overwing exits at my operator require 3 of the 4 entry/service doors closed, at least one engine running, and air/ground logic is in the air or both throttles are advanced. If any of these conditions is not met, or if DC power fails, the overwing exits unlock.
AC 25.783 excerpt:
b. In addition, design precautions must be taken to minimize the possibility for a person to open a door intentionally during flight. If these precautions include the use of auxiliary devices, those devices and their controlling systems must be designed so that--
• no single failure will prevent more than one exit from being opened [§ 25.783(b)(1)]; and
• failures that would prevent opening of the exit after landing are improbable [§ 25.783(b)(2)].
(1) The intentional opening of a door by people on board while the airplane is in flight should be considered. This rule is intended to protect the airplane and passengers, but not necessarily the person who intentionally tries to open the door. Suitable design precautions should therefore be taken; however, the precautions should not compromise the ability to open an emergency exit in an emergency evacuation. In this context, single failures include hardware failures as well as maintenance and logical (e.g., software) errors. Note that certain maintenance or logical errors may have the potential to affect more than one door.
(2) The applicant should consider the following precautions:
(a) Doors in pressurized compartments. It should not normally be possible to open the door when the compartment differential pressure is above 2 psi. The ability to open the door will depend on the door operating mechanism and the handle design, location, and operating force. Operating forces in excess of 300 pounds should be considered sufficient to prevent the door from being opened. During approach, takeoff, and landing, when compartment differential pressure is lower, intentional opening may be possible; however, these phases are brief and all passengers are expected to be seated with seat belts fastened.
(b) Doors that cannot meet the guidance of paragraph 9b(2)(a) of this AC, and Doors in non-pressurized airplanes. The use of auxiliary devices (for example, a speed-activated or barometrically-activated means) to safeguard the door from opening should be considered. The need for such auxiliary devices should depend upon the consequences to the airplane and other occupants if the door is opened in flight.
(c) Auxiliary devices installed on emergency exits. The failure of an auxiliary device should normally result in an unsecured position of the device. Failures of the device that would prevent opening of the exit after landing should be improbable.