Clearly a Flaps 1 takeoff, however I would be completely staggered to believe a Flaps 1 takeoff would be necessary at FRA. As far as the FCTM is interpreted, Flaps 1 departures are certainly not recommendable when considering tail strike avoidance technique. Considering that it appeared to be gusty, it should probably be a no no. So, if any credit is due, the PF did pretty well to avoid the final few holes in the Swiss cheese with the technique that he or she applied. That aside, there appears to be an element of good fortune that it was FRA and not somewhere more limiting. I'll add though that I don't have -700 experience however I was under the impression that Flaps 5 is the standard takeoff setting for the 737, and certainly would be company policy if the company was flying mixed fleet.
Probably another case of incorrect application of SOP, CRM breakdown, distraction or poor checklist philosophy? Whether it be through incorrect use of OPTs or rushing through the PERF INIT page without thought (the old ZFW and GW mismatch), these type of incidents continue to crop up. Challenge, verify and respond exists as an error trap, however it's commonly disregarded when you hear what you want to hear and see what you want to see. I know I've been guilty in the past and have learned valuable lessons observing my own performance and those of others.
As for the A330 wake turbulence argument that RAM applied. No one buys it. Why would you take off, or even consider it?
Last edited by Callsign Kilo; 26th Aug 2016 at 18:09.