Coff,
Thanks for coming back. Again just my opinion here, informed by my own experience as a Fleet Manager for various types.
The fact that a maintenance activity is outsourced does not absolve what used to be called the Fleet Managers (uniformed engineers) of their basic responsibilities. These days these fall to what I understand is called the CAMO.
Nor does contractorisation or outsourcing absolve the operators (now the duty holders) of their responsibilities. The RAF was happy to advertise how bringing the ACO aircraft into the fold was going to improve things - now they have to carry the can because demonstrably it didn't.
And I come back to the key issue - the simplicity of these aircraft. This cannot have been a complex contract to set up and manage. Where in the name of all that is holy were the regular quality checks on work carried out? Where were the inspections of the engineering records? Where were the aircraft inspections on entry to the contract servicing system? And the inspections on exit?
I certainly agree that the MOD and the RAF aren't properly equipped to manage complex contracts (see the MAA's annual report on lack of 'SQEP' personnel) (incidentally, a contender there for the worst ever abbreviation). Tecumseh and others have been pointing this out some time. But I contend that even if the contract wasn't well set up, normal (and I do mean normal) service engineering practice would have caught the problems well before they led to a grounding.
Why didn't this happen? That, for me, is the question the RAF ought to be asking itself. I also believe that the MAA should be investigating, and publishing their reports. Transparently. Openly. No corners.
Best regards as ever to those who actually walk the walk,
Engines