EESDL
It's stating the obvious to say that the approach wasn't flown properly and that even in the absence of a better method of carring out the approach, it shouldn't have ended badly if either of the pilots had been alert to critical deviations. But the accident did play out as it did. And it isn't the first of it kind. So you have to look both at and beyond the failings of that crew in that situation.
Using VS rather than IAS for a single cue descent is something that I often see (where 4-axis is not available), and is in some company cultures the preferred method. I am personally leery of it because it is less intuitive with basic flying sklls (using PWR to manage ROD). Learning and culture...
Allowing yourself an approach below minima and acquiesence by the left seat? Culture? Probably not the only person on the forum who can think of examples like that.
No clear breifing and conducting the approach according to it? Culture.
Across companies it's pretty clear that rotary is still working its way towards standardisation and real MCC.
I agree with you that the accident probably wouldn't have happened if flown single pilot because the PF would not have been so complacent and taken the same risks.
Single cue descents need particular care and monitoring: It isn't an automated approach or a hands-flown approach, but a mix of both. In an age of automation, using less of the AFCS than you can, may well cause an expectation gap in the cockpit: How aware was the PM of what he should be expecting to see as the captain reduced speed? Neither pilot seemed to have any seat-of-the-pants awareness as they began to fall behind the power curve. Suggests to me that they were both off the page when the method required them to be absolutely on it.
TT