The section of the report published above is very brief. It mentions that the crew requested a 'visual' approach to RW27. It was approved subject to noise abatement procedures. This is stated as maintaining 2100' until on finals and not flying below the glideslope.
No where does it mention that the crew confirmed they had the airfield 'insight'. It mentions both pilots lost SA until the G/A was called.
How do you request/plan a visual approach without having the airfield or known surrounding terrain positively in sight? Why descend below the noise abate altitude before being on finals? Why disconnect the automatics when you do not have 100% SA? Surely, at the very least, the ILS 27 was selected; but this is not mentioned. IMHO this is a classic case of the Swiss cheese model, and has some less critical similarities to B757 in Cali. Last minute RW change causing rushed approach and inappropriate selection of a/c systems with significant loss of SA by both pilots. Step by step the holes were lining up. It is definitely not a debate about manual or automatic flying; it is about the 'management' of the approach and all that that entails. Sadly the link to the report above gives such a diluted review of events. Very good that the F/O called G.A., but I'm curious what he was thinking, as he made the visual approach to ATC, if he could not positively identify the RWY or its environment. If so, I'd be questioning the captain about his plan and if he could see the RW. It does mention the Captain, later, thought what he believed to be the RW threshold when on base leg; but what about the F/O? The start of 'endangering the a/c' came when they descended below 2100' without being established on finals, whether visual or on ILS. Does BRS not have radar? Could they not just have asked for vectors to ILS27? Unfortunately the report leave too many questions unanswered.