Spin Doctor:
One of the recommendations in the report is for the operator to implement a process for validation of the nav database. This is particularly worrying since the approach was an RNP AR APCH.
Add the Nepal aviation authority to that list. A flight inspection was required. That did not happen nor was it discussed in the report.
Approval to operate this type of procedure requires extra processes to be in place and approved by the regulator, one of which is a requirement to validate each and every version of the nav database, if necessary by flying the approaches in the sim (or VFR) prior to operational use. The fact that this process is recommended by the report suggests that this was not being done here, which means the operator should never have been approved for RNP AR as they do not meet the requirements.
Agree in this case. But, if an RNP approach has not been changed, only the database needs to be verified, the "flyability" of the unchanged approaches need not be accomplished.
Also, Nepal's design is defective in that the MAP is at the threshold rather than the DA point. That is non-compliant with PANS-OPS. Nothing mentioned about that in the accident report, either.
THY and Nepal are akin to Frick and Frack.