The report made interesting reading and does not reflect particularly well on anyone.
I would agree that the primary cause of the accident was the decision to continue below DA with no visual reference (although the crew appear to state that they did have visual reference but this is not backed up by either their actions or the CVR).
What stopped them from 'getting away with it' this time was the addition of incorrect data (offset threshold position) which meant they were not aligned with the runway centreline.
One of the recommendations in the report is for the operator to implement a process for validation of the nav database. This is particularly worrying since the approach was an RNP AR APCH. Approval to operate this type of procedure requires extra processes to be in place and approved by the regulator, one of which is a requirement to validate each and every version of the nav database, if necessary by flying the approaches in the sim (or VFR) prior to operational use. The fact that this process is recommended by the report suggests that this was not being done here, which means the operator should never have been approved for RNP AR as they do not meet the requirements.