Folks,
Perhaps I can contribute here on the ship/aircraft integration issues that have been raised.
On balance, I viewed the comments made by the Group Captain positively. From his 'air power' standpoint, yes, the ship is 'part of the F35 air system'. From the task group commander's point of view, the F35 is 'part of the task force'. I'd suggest that both of these statements can be seen as OK. I was certainly encouraged by the comments about the utility and potential of putting T45 and F35 capabilities together, which shows that the RAF part of the F35 team are approaching the future with a more open mindset. That's all good, I'm generally encouraged.
In my view (and that's all it is) the real test will come when the F35 air group are required to work up with the ship to be able to generate the flexible, reactive and usable 'maritime air power' that the country wants. That will mean building (very probably in deliberate steps) the ability to carry out bad weather day and night ops at high tempo with multiple aircraft, without shore based diversions being available. I'd stress again that this won't be available straight away, but there will need to be a detailed plan to get there. Again, just my view.
On the Walmesley/Blackham evidence to the Select Committee in 2000, I would offer the thought that it may not have been quite as Machiavellian as some would (understandably) think.
The UK went into the CVF project with a quite terrifying lack of knowledge about the details of building very large aircraft carriers. In the early days, a phrase often heard about CVF around the corridors was 'air is free and steel is cheap' - I was told that senior officers had convinced themselves that aircraft carriers were 'basically a big box'. The phrase was used here.This was, I believe, a genuinely held opinion. It was pants.
Aircraft carriers are, by some margin, one of the most complex and difficult weapon systems to design, build and bring into service. There's a reason that only a few countries have ever been able to pull it off effectively, and it's not money. You need a highly professional, experienced and well organised team of ship and aircraft engineers. Sadly, by 2000, the MoD was completing the final demolition of the last vestiges of what used to be called the Air Department (Navy) - AD(N). The science areas that used to support AD(N) had gone many years before that. Here's thought - the last time the MoD tried to build a carrier of this size was the mid 1960s. A 40 year gap will hurt, and it did.
The CVF team were left with almost no direct experience of what was 'right' or 'wrong', which gave the competing teams huge latitude to sell their concepts. That's not a criticism - the people I knew in the team were working damned hard and extremely well to plug the gaps and keep the programme on track. In the event, I think the MoD have done well to get the two ships to where they are today - the biggest delays and cost overruns were caused by overt political interference. The originally quoted price was a political 'fix', and like so many other defence programmes, wholly unrealistic.
Hope these musings help,
Best Regards as ever to all those putting the bits together
Engines