Another unnecessary "close call"?
Thank goodness for the decision to use frangible light post designs many decades ago (an idea that was once even strongly resisted by some facilities advocates due to higher costs at the time, thus precluding adding more lighting installations elsewhere).
Is this perhaps another case underscoring the need for human factors review the designs of supporting systems like EFBs? as well as the administrative aspects of denoting performance/V speed calculation methods used by flight crews?
This kind of event has happened a lot over jet transport history. Is it also time to again push for implementing readily technically addressable acceleration prediction advisory methods, giving much earlier advisories to the crew if an error in acceleration versus available runway distance is detected?? Let's hope and advocate that those efforts now may again advance?
Thank goodness for the robust damage tolerant design of recent modern jets and especially the T7. This event also may perhaps be shown to underscore the utility of a FADEC's ability to quickly and accurately re-set thrust at the max limit, if and when needed, and if commanded. It also again points out the inherent advantage of twins to have more robust runway distance remaining margin to a safe liftoff and initial climb, to accommodate either unexpected adverse met conditions, or performance calculation weight errors, ...for the all-engine takeoff case.
As to the earlier comment about wheel height versus aft fuselage height, and what part of the aircraft hits light stanchions first,...I's suggest the comment author watch the pictures of a T7 Vmu test liftoff. The wheels may not necessarily or always be the lowest point of the aircraft for some period (distance during climb away) after liftoff, depending on T/W, theta dot after liftoff as a result of the aircraft's center of rotation changing, acceleration rate, and liftoff speed above stall margin.