Reading Mary Meagher’s post reminds me of how much we pilots owe to others, in particular, those on the ground who help and guide us in the air – the ATCOs. They really are the pilot’s best friends; our other crew members, even though they are not in the aircraft with us. I guess most of us who have flown have reasons to thank them, I know I do.
But there are also times when it was necessary to be very cautious, as at Entebbe in my last post. Flying in some parts of the world one had to take the initiative regardless of the ATC clearance. Those who flew in Africa will remember the blind broadcast procedure on VHF after each position report, requiring a constant listening watch for aircraft that might be in the same place, at the same time and at the same altitude, and then having to do one’s own ATC by climbing or descending 500ft in order to maintain safe separation. This was particularly so during the Hadj, when there was undeclared east/west traffic crossing the north/south routes between Europe and the rest of Africa. I wonder how many unknown near misses there were in the middle of the night before TCAS.
And despite the excellent ATC in most parts of the world, there were times when it was necessary to disagree with the controller and refuse a clearance. Not an accident, nor even a close call, but two occasions when constant vigilance proved its worth. There was the time in Montego Bay, when following the clearance would have meant boring a hole in hills. I forget the exact safety altitude, it is all so long ago. But the take-off clearance for our departure to New York required us to take-off, turn north, and then come back south over the NDB at 3000ft because there was another aircraft inbound from the north at 4000ft. Naturally we declined and stayed on the ground until he had landed.
Then at Jeddah, bound for Abu Dhabi, we were held down below our safety altitude heading towards the mountains because an inbound aircraft was coming in above us. It was not long after ATC there had started using radar, I don’t know what the controller was doing – perhaps he was new to it all. I said we would continue on track for xx miles and then, regardless of what he wanted we would either climb or turn back to the field but we would definitely NOT be accepting the clearance to continue eastbound.
As I have said, neither of these instances were close calls, and neither was it rocket science to decide what to do. I recount them because, once again, they demonstrate the need for eternal vigilance. I am sure many other PPRuNers have had similar experiences.