MCC/upset training
Centaurus, concur with your observation, but the problem goes well beyond CASA's following of the nonsense being exported from EASA and caught by FAR 61.
On a side note, as one who is relatively frequently stalling jet transports, i assure the people assuming that the simulator has validity of the fact they are basically mistaken. At the point of a g break, being a substantial distance in front of the cg becomes much more interesting than any simulator. The control resposes are correct when the aircraft gets unloaded, but otherwise are different enough to merit thorough briefing.
The planes still recover nicely, if the finally incorporated non involvement of thrust application is adhered to. Otherwise, my large jets behave similarly to my learjet through the early stall. Stalling smaller military jets does not give much of the control issues that the swept wing transport has inherently.
Training recovery in some small/mid size jets may be reasonable training, but otherwise, the limitations are that the simulator does not accurately model the handling, dynamics, vertical and longitudinal loads, or lateral loads that are experienced at the cockpit. The intensity if the buffett in the aircraft relative to the simulator is enough to give pause.
Personally, i think that upset in a Pitts while lots of fun, has general confidence but limited direct applicability( inhave changed my view on that) but, any aircraft or device that reinforces the universal recovery technique of neutralising the controls, reducing thrust, attaining a wings level attiude and recovering from the upright or inverted dive remains valid in our B737, 777. And even Airbus aircraft if loss of control is identified.
The biggest single issue IMHO, is the failure of recognition of loss of control, which was evident very early on in 447, but not recognised. Aircraft unless impacted by a change in dynamics (National etc) want to fly, they are failing as flight crew are not recgnising the loss of control occurring, and then do not follow very simple recovery techniques. These do need to be ingrained, as in the real case, the loads can become quite a factor towards cognitive overload.
MCC itself is a bureaucratic irrelevancy to the pernicious issue of lack of fundamental flying skills. Additional issues are the trends towards prescriptive solutions towards compliance that reduce the skill ,aintenance of our flight crews. My flight crews fly mulltiple jet transports in R&D, as well as maintaining skills on various aircraft with varied configurations and handling qualities. Loss of control is a briefed item prior to every test flight, and is practiced routinely in the sim sessions we undertake for proficiency training. We do around 4 times the sim sessions the airlines do, but all training in unusual manoeuvers is prefaced by the understanding that the simulator is limited in validity.
Any program assuming that the existing and proposed standards will give solutions to issues of operational safety may be ill prepared for the realities of stochastic system behavior... Compliance is not safety per se. Loss of SA at all levels remains the primary problem, as in 447, at I, II, (and level III on occasion)
Good luck out there.