I wrote about the VC10 smoke experience for two reasons. (1) Because, although John Farley started it by describing an inexplicable feeling which made him take quick and decisive action which probably saved his life, my story also had eerie overtones. How likely was it to have a very nasty experience so soon after discussing in a bar the wish to test myself? And then having a nasty experience the very next day! (2) I will now follow it up with some lessons learned.
I think they were these. On the plus side, I had discovered I could act rationally in extremis, and that I found comforting. On the minus side, I knew we had done lots of things wrong. Our response, I believe, was a throwback to a previous type where the radio racks were in the flight deck and one of the immediate actions to stop electrical smoke was to kill all the radios. We all should have known better.
For myself, I vowed never to be found wanting again. I read avidly, I read manuals, I asked questions of instructors, I tried to find out as much as I could about flying - I wanted to know the derivation of everything. And it was probably that which propelled me towards a whole career in training and flight management.
The first lesson for me, was don’t rush into action too quickly, stop, think, analyse and only then do something. I know you can’t always just sit on your hands, but in most emergences there is usually time to pause and analyse before leaping into action. The next lesson was to know much more about the aircraft and its systems. Switching off the radio master switches not only isolated the radios but also disabled the main flight instruments and the autopilot, leaving only the ASI, VSI and turn and slip. That action, more than anything else, turned a minor incident into a near accident.
The more I continued to fly the more I became interested in why people make mistakes and what were the real causes of accidents. So much was just put down to pilot error, which at the superficial level is true, but the really interesting bit is to try to find out why human beings make mistakes. Remember, this was back in the 1960s/70s when training departments viewed mistakes as heinous crimes and not as learning opportunities. I read up on the psychology of visual perception and found out how easy it is for the human animal to misperceive and be misled by visual illusions. I read up on stress and fear to find out more about why and how humans react the way they do and how human perception narrows down as stress and workload builds up. I read the various books on human error and how we are all prone to false hypotheses – and that for me was the really interesting one. If something happens and you accept a false hypothesis, and you are under stress, it is very probable that you will continue to act upon that hypothesis and not be able to change it. You will then carry out a set of actions which may well be the right ones for the hypothesis but not appropriate for the actual situation.
So I came to accept a set of rules which I tried to inject into instructor courses and training routines, I think they are these:-
1. Modern aircraft are easy to fly, they are very reliable and have good handling characteristics, therein lies the danger. It is all too easy to be unprepared for the rare occasions when it all goes wrong and you really have to fight for your life.
2. Most events do not require instant action. The ones that do are regularly practised on the simulator so that they become routine. Such things as rejected take-off, engine out after V1 and wind shear recovery are good examples where an instant and correct response is required.
3. For all other events, there is usually time to assess the situation. This is absolutely vital because it is imperative to avoid the false hypothesis and to embark on the wrong course of action.
4. Know your aircraft. A good knowledge of the manuals, where to find information, how the aircraft works and what the systems do and how they do it saves time when you have to do things in a hurry, giving you more time to think.
5. If you are to assess the situation correctly you need to shed workload and buy time, therefore hand over control to the other pilot and make maximum use of the autopilot.
6. Be like a doctor. Observe the situation, diagnose the problem and then prescribe the correct checklist. Remember that the checklist is the best compendium of actions available to you, it has been thought out by people who really do know what they are talking about (the manufacturer, test pilots, the CAA, your own airline) and they will have done so in the peace and quiet of the office when there is plenty of time to think. Remember also that for every item in the check list someone may have died for it. So follow the checklist. It is also the means of coordinating the crew.
7. Now comes the difficult bit, when do you chuck the checklist out of the window? Well, if it is imperative to get on the ground ASAP (it is on fire and likely to fall apart at any moment) all aircraft are still like Tiger Moths. Even in a modern jet transport you only have to slow up to around 240kts and stick some flap out, slow up a bit more (say to 180kts) and stick some more flap out, put the gear down, stick down landing flap and then stick it on the runway. You won’t have gone far wrong – the other bits are not essential – EXCEPT – you must remember to de-pressurise before landing otherwise you won’t be able to open the doors and evacuate the aircraft.
8. ABOVE ALL, GUARD AGAINST THE WRONG HYPOTHESIS.