Phoney Tony
I know, I agree with you but some people just want to believe...
Also for Vmca, it is also a
de-facto handling issue:
Vmca is defined as the minimum speed, whilst in the air, that directional control can be maintained with one engine inoperative (critical engine on two engine aerolanes), operating engine(s) at takeoff power and a maximum of 5 degrees of bank towards the good engine(s)
I also saw, with my own fair eyes the pictures of flap bracket failures from the Capability Desk Officers for MRA4 in HQ 2Gp. Both were experienced MR2 captains and they also
wanted to see MRA4 into service, however, some of the horror stories coming over their desks of alleged poor engineering/manufacturing techniques at the factory (some of which was personally reported by the Senior ground engineer in HQ 2Gp and his team direct to the AOC following an eng audit of one of the first production aircraft) and also some design issues already mentioned. I remember listening with incredulity when the company allegedly wanted the RAF to accept it into service with no sonobuoy clearance and also supposedly not being able to open the bomb bay doors above 200kts (because some critical flying controls were placed at the rear of the bomb bay and a large seagull hit could prove fatal!
).
So, I'm afraid I don't know what MOA's agenda is, but from where I was working the outlook for a fully capable aircraft at ISD was pretty unlikely back in 2010/11. It appeared to be TSR2 all over again, a complete shambles; although I suspect we will have to put up with future misty eyed views of 'look what we could have won' from individuals that may well have been so blinkered (due to having a vested interest to get back to KIS) that they were falling over themselves to find fixes for things that shouldn't have needed fixing in the first place! It wasn't as if the aircraft was designed on the back of a fag packet and so finding out that the rudder was too small is unacceptable in the modern era of CAD/CAM and computer modelling.
Talking of vested interests, I was amazed when at PJHQ that the kipper mates were literally falling over themselves to get the MR2 involved in overland ISR. I could not believe that we were using a
Maritime Patrol Aircraft in the overland ISR role - putting 12 crew and a couple of LO's lives at risk to deliver something nowhere near the capabilities of Predator A (in sensor packages, weapons capability, beyond line of sight datalink capability and less of a manpower burden) was a big error in view. However, again, from my viewpoint, the forward leaning of the fleet to do this role and be a part of the action to fill an overland ISR capability gap cost us lots of money and very sadly some good people's lives. Which brings me back to MRA4, we had learned nothing in that aircraft's design by putting fuel, heat and an ignition source in critical points on the MRA4 airframe
without any fire detection/suppression systems - hence there was LOTS of work to do to get her to meet modern safety case standards (and it was that, I believe, that was the final nail in the coffin for MRA4 in my humble opinion).
Anyway, waiting for more churlish calls of 'bullsh!t' and 'troll' comments from the peanut throwers that refuse to accept some of the stories from the time.
LJ