Originally Posted by
slats11
The event itself and the consequences of the event are the key elements of the more recent definitions of terrorism.
Sorry guys, but I think a little perspective is called for here.
The Online OED in both UK/World and US English editions still defines "terrorism" as :
Originally Posted by OED (emphasis mine)
The unofficial or unauthorized use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims
Now - whatever one may think about how the term "terrorism" was used and abused by politicians/arms manufacturers/security corporations in order to feather their own nests, it makes no sense to widen the definition further.
If a person succeeds in an attempt to take their own life, then that's suicide - not a crime, but nevertheless a tragic and painful experience for those that knew the person. However if a person in doing so takes the lives of others along with theirs, then that's murder - and it is a criminal act.
But the whole point of terror tactics is that in doing so, there is an organised group with a distinct aim in mind, and the group is implicitly threatening further acts if those aims aren't met. Unless there's an organised group of depressed and suicidal pilots out there with a coherent set of goals which, when satisfied, will prevent them taking their own lives and those of others, then this alleged type of incident, while criminal, is categorically *not* a terrorist act.
I do think it's fair to say that the FAA flight deck door locking/strengthening regs later adopted by others (and IMO in common with a lot of political/industry reaction to the 11th September attacks) were rushed in definition and implementation, and as such, not properly thought through.
I've said many, many times (particularly in the many Tech Log AF447 threads) that as an engineer, one must always be cognizant of the bigger picture - specifically that when developing a technical solution to a problem scenario, it is invariably a bad idea to concentrate exclusively on that single scenario without taking into consideration the knock-on effect it will have on other scenarios. The post-9/11 flight deck door modifications and procedures fell right into this particular trap because they were tailored to fit a single scenario only - namely an attempt to endanger an aircraft from an individual outside the flight deck. The consequence of that narrow vision was that the solution and procedures not only failed to take into account a scenario where an individual attempting to endanger the aircraft is already in there, but that aspects such as the impossible to override timelock switch within the flight deck could work in favour of the individual wishing to cause harm if that were the case. The requirement for the flight crew needing a working fail-safe aspect on both sides of the door seems to have been overlooked in the haste to reassure the travelling public that "something was being done".
Finally, I feel compelled to note that some of the knee-jerk responses on here regarding mental illness (and draconian measures against those who have suffered from it) are presumptuous and cruel. At this point, the only reference to the FO's mental health refer to an incident of "depression and burnout" which occurred during his training process six years ago. Until more is known on the subject, I reckon the powder should be kept dry.