If pushing autopilot disconnect does not instantly enable PF to manualy and directly fly the aircraft to regain an attitude of his choosing then it should never have been certified IMHO.
The problem to date has not been as you say, but when the Airbus
does allow PF to fly an attitude of his choosing
This accident is not worth discussing yet in regard to this item. AF447 and Perpignan both occurred because, for various reasons, protections did not
prevent PF essentially leading to unrecoverable situations.
Until recently there was no FCOM technique to "force" the aircraft to a "basic law" - albeit much debate here and in cockpits about "how" to. The recent OEB alters this, and covers an unlikely (but not impossible) scenario where protections inappropriately kick in. It requires 2 PBs pressed to cause the required downgrade. IIRC in the incident triggering this the downgrade happened anyway, but presumably the boffins have now found a scenario that might not. The actions required are to turn off 2 of 3 ADRs.
I would much prefer to fly a "basic" stick and throttles aircraft, but I do not make the big $$ decisions. The accidents to date show a mismatch between pilots' interpretations and the technology - but ironically it is not the pilots misunderstanding the "complex" part of the technology, but the basic flying aspects
2 routes we can go down: either further the technology, try and really make the aircraft uncrashable, and take the pilot further out of the loop (and eventually the cockpit).
Or alter pilot training and practices such that they still have basic skills, and realise the technology is there to help most of the time, but is not infallible. I know which route I prefer, but many here seem to favour the former
