Top post "K" that perfectly highlights the bureaucratic disconnect between the theory and operational reality for many owners, private pilots and GA operators operating out of our essential secondary airports.
Kharon - It's bollocks, Wazza. Go hard AACCI. Put the fear of insurance litigation into the buggers.
Maybe just maybe that will be the only thing these bureaucrats will truly understand; i.e. the fear of litigation if something (God forbid) goes horribly wrong and an avoidable accident can be traced back to unimpeded urban development in the vicinity of a secondary (GA) airport...
The AACCI put out a
media release back in May calling for urgent action from the miniscule and to endorse the establishment of an Airports Review Tribunal:
...
The Chamber reminded Minister Truss that “The Parliament enacted a Bill which, with the benefit of hind sight, had many short comings. That said, it has never been properly implemented. The interpretation of the Airports Act 1996 has been left entirely in the hands of the bureaucrats, an unelected and unaccountable body answerable to no one, whose members are technically ignorant both of the needs of the aviation industry and of commercial reality.”
The Chamber complained that “When any member of the aviation world has written to the various Ministers of Transport the reply always comes back from a public servant who invariably states that any dispute with a lease holder is a commercial matter and should be decided in the court room, irrespective of how blatantly the Act has been breached. Departmental policy has always been to support and promote the interests of the airport lease holders. In short the interpretation and implementation of the Act has been left entirely to the bureaucracy who developed the policy of ‘LIGHT HANDS” as justification for their actions, a policy which lacks a statutory base.”
The Chamber reminded Minister Truss that “It is not within the power of any government to turn a blind eye and fail to implement what is on the statute books. Some of the significant economic problems the industry faces in General Aviation can be ameliorated by resolute implementation of the Act.”
The Chamber Stated “the secondary airports in Australia form the nodal points, the very heart of general aviation in this country being the advanced centres of aviation technology and knowhow and the gateway to the regions. They must be allowed to function efficiently as public utilities not private fiefdoms of property developers.
The aviation industry is impatient for these impediments to be addressed and fails to see why some of the readily apparent and easily tackled failings have not been dealt with.
The Minister therefore should as a matter of great urgency abandon the Light hands policy and endorse the establishment of an Airports Review Tribunal.
Given the Federal Attorney General’s 13th May 2014 media announcement to merge all the Federal Review Tribunals, now is the time to implement it.
Archerfield Airport Chamber of Commerce Inc.
Lindsay Snell
President
It is also well worth the time to read the AACCI ART proposal
-
Download Airport Review Tribunal Proposal (
137kb)
In Senate Estimates we all know that Senator Fawcett is a strong advocate for the issues faced by aircraft owners/operators from Secondary Airports.
Trolling through previous Estimates Hansard/QONs etc. I came across a disturbing chain of two-way correspondence between the RRAT committee and the department aided & abetted by Beaker, which further highlights the issues as presented in the above Kharon post.
This chain first started with an exchange between Senator Fawcett & Beaker in the 2012 May Budget Estimates:
Senator FAWCETT: I am very heartened to hear about the role that you said you play in following up on issues. I congratulate you on, for example, the report that you issued on single-engine failures and reduced power situations after take-off and exploring that whole issue. Going back to previous estimates, I asked about the number of examples of aircraft that had these sorts of failures. I noticed there was a figure of around 21 that had been highlighted in a short time frame. Your report goes to a much larger number. Can I confirm that they are only talking about GA aircraft and that if RAA aircraft were included that would be a larger number?
Mr Dolan : I need to confirm that with Mr Walsh but my understanding is that we were focused on VH registered aircraft. So the number of 242 partial power loss on take-off events over a 10-year period relates to single-engine aircraft with VH registration.
Senator FAWCETT: In terms of your tracking of safety issues and monitoring developments, your report goes to the heart of the fact that, following a partial power loss or a complete engine failure, the pilot essentially has three options, which is to do a forced landing outside the airfield, on the airfield but not on the runway, or on the runway if they are very skilful or have the appropriate height et cetera.
Two of those situations require that clear space be available. Are you concerned by the encroachment of residential and non-aviation facilities, whether that be Bella Vista at Caloundra, the old folks home that has just been approved at Evans Head, or things like the Toll building at Bankstown in the undershoot of the approach to the helipad? Do you have concerns from a safety perspective, given that your excellent report highlights the need for survivability for the pilot to be able to conduct a forced landing in and around the vicinity of the aerodrome, that this encroachment of non-aviation related infrastructure is actually elevating the risk, given the relatively high occurrence of those power loss situations?
Mr Dolan : The short answer is that, in accordance with the risk analysis that we undertake, I am not at the point where I share the concern, or not to the extent that you clearly do. The number is, say, 242 occurrences over a 10-year period, which is 24 a year—
Senator FAWCETT: For GA. If you include RAA—
Mr Dolan : for single-engine GA. I would have to confirm the figures on that, but it is something like 1.6 million movements each year. Once we look at the likelihood as well as the consequence in our risk assessment, we do not see this as a significant safety issue.
Beaker conflict of interest??
Since that exchange we have now discovered that Beaker in the early part of the century till 2004 was in a different role within the department i.e. Airports division; where his primary role was the architect of many of the airport lease agreements that were at the time being drawn up under the
Airports Act 1996...
Ok so back to the chain...
On 6 September 2012 as Chair of the RRAT Legislative Committee Senator Sterle sent the following missive to Beaker:
6 September 2012
Mr Martin Dolan
Chief Commissioner
Australian Transport Safety Bureau
CANBERRA ACT 2601
Dear Mr Dolan,
You will be aware that the committee has asked for details on risk assessments conducted by the ATSB on previous occasions at Senate Estimates. At Budget Estimates in May 2012, you were asked about the encroachment of non-aviation related infrastructure, and whether or not that elevated any risk, in the occurrence of power-loss situations.
Your response was as follows:
Mr Dolan: The short answer is that, in accordance with the risk analysis that we undertake, I am not at the point where I share the concern, or not to the extent that you clearly do. The number is, say, 242 occurrences over a 10-year period, which is 24 a year—
Senator FAWCETT: For GA. If you include RAA—
Mr Dolan: for single-engine GA. I would have to confirm the figures on that, but it is something like 1.6 million movements each year. Once we look at the likelihood as well as the consequence in our risk assessment, we do not see this as a significant safety issue.
The committee would like the ATSB to provide the committee with the protocol, methodology or model underpinning the risk analysis taken in these circumstances and the empirical basis of that approach including the decision theory on which it is based. It would be appreciated if you could provide a response by Thursday 20 September 2012.
If you require any further information, the contact officer is:
Cassimah Mackay
Research Officer
Ph. 6277 3514
cassimah.mackay @aph.gov.au
Yours sincerely,
Senator Glenn Sterle
Chair
The following is Beaker's response (note the date of the weasel worded reply..
)
21 September 2012
Senator Glenn Sterle
Chair
Legislation Committee
Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport
PO Box 6100
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600
Dear Senator Sterle
Thank you for your letter of 6 September 2012 asking for information on the ATSB's approach to risk analysis. You wished to know the protocol, methodology or model underpinning the risk analysis we use to determine the significance of a safety issue. You also wished to know the empirical basis of our approach, including the decision theory on which it is based.
As a starting point, it may be helpful to describe some of the key components of our overall approach to safety investigation and analysis. We take safety to be the state in which the probability of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at, a level which is as low as reasonably practicable. Both our investigations and our safety research work are directed to the identification of safety factors: events or conditions that increase safety risk (that is, if they occurred in the future, they would increase the likelihood of an occurrence, and/or the severity of the adverse consequences associated with an occurrence).
Some of the safety factors we identify are classified as safety issues: that is, they are assessed as having the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations, and as being systemic and ongoing. When we identify a safety issue, we assess its risk level. The process of assessing risk level is in four parts:
determining scenario, assessing likelihood, assessing consequence and applying the results.
For scenario, we assess first what is the worst possible scenario that would result from an identified safety issue. Then, having assessed that in the light of existing risk controls, we determine the worst credible scenario. That scenario is then assessed for its consequence (minimal, moderate, major or catastrophic) and its likelihood (very rare, rare, occasional or frequent). For each of the classes of consequence and likelihood, we have indicative standards to guide the assessment. Application of the severity and consequence assessment results informs a decision about the level associated with risk of the safety issue as:
• Critical: associated with an intolerable level of risk, or
• Significant: associated with a risk level regarded as acceptable only if it is kept as low as reasonably practicable, or
• Minor: associated with a broadly acceptable level of risk.
Our approach to risk assessment of safety issues is based on the current international and Australian standard AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009- Risk management- Principles and guidelines and associated material. That standard, however, is principally directed at proactive risk management by organisations, while the business ofthe ATSB as a safety investigation organisation focuses on understanding the potential significance of safety issues and assessing whether others might need to take action. For that reason, we have focused particularly on the risk analysis and evaluation components of the standard. We have also drawn on approaches and techniques used by major transport organisations.
The ATSB's risk analysis approach is not intended or required to be a complete analysis such as may be required for the purposes of a developing a safety case or as part of a formal cost-benefit analysis. lt is intended to be a structured, objective and efficient approach to determining whether a safety issue has a risk level which appears to warrant corrective action or, in some cases, further ATSB investigation. Our analysis will often be qualitative rather than quantitative in nature and is based on the evidence available to us through investigation, reports of safety occurrences and our research and analysis.
To support our approach to determining risk level and the possible need for corrective action, we have documented our safety analysis methodology and process as part of our
Safety Investigation Quality System (SIQS). SIQS is supported by structured safety analysis training for all our investigators and by elements of our supporting Safety Investigation Information Management System (SliMS- our inhouse information technology system).
At Budget Estimates in May 2012, I was asked for my views about the encroachment of non-aviation related infrastructure in the vicinity or aerodromes, and whether or not it elevated the risk arising from the occurrence of power-loss situations. I answered that, in accordance with the risk analysis that we undertake (which I have outlined in this letter), I did not see the associated safety issue as significant.
In terms of the methodology I have outlined, the most credible scenario arising from an interaction between partial engine failure and the development of non-aviation infrastructure would be a collision with a building resulting in injuries or fatalities to people on the ground.
In terms of our indicative standards, such a scenario would be assessed as having a moderate consequence.
Our best evidence for likelihood is our database of aviation safety occurrences. During the last ten years, we have records showing two occasions where there have been minor injuries on the ground as a result of accidents in the vicinity of an aerodrome. We have no records of fatality or serious injury. This is in a context where there are about 14 accidents in the vicinity of aerodromes for each million departures, with no significant variation in trend. Based on this and the longer-term information in our database, we would assess the likelihood of on-ground injury or fatality as rare. A safety issue that is assessed as of moderate consequence and rare likelihood generally given a risk rating of minor.
I trust that this provides sufficient context for understanding my remarks.
Yours sincerely
Martin Dolan
Even the man at the back of the room can see the disturbing disconnect that the Chief of
our so called aviation safety watchdog has when placing the EFATO risk as minor in regards to small GA/RAA aircraft coming to grief at our secondary/training ground airports.
That is why IMO the AACCI AAT case is so crucial to the survival of GA and should be openly supported by all IOS members...
MTF...
