To be fair there are a large number of US studies on how things go wrong on major programs (but very few UK ones
)
Yea I mentioned that sort of thing in regards to major industrial projects and there over runs. Functionally from a project management theory side of things It would have some sort of root cause.
The F-18A is a benchmark in taking the "all things to all people" idea to a curious conclusion, what with the "high/low" mix originally envisioned between it and the Tomcat. When the F-18E/F became the final follow on, no small criticism was levied in it keeping the same basic Type/Model/Series designation given the magnitude of the upgrade.
Osprey is of course legendary in that regard (much covered on the Rotorhead forums), as is that "littoral combat ship" thing.
I think this all touches on a well known problem, that we keep forgetting, or just choose to ignore. You could probably map your project with some risk variables. Things such as technology change gradient, or some other related various issues. These could all then result in the probability of a balls up.
In short trying to do huge jumps in capability, or technology in a single step is a bad thing. Trying to do to many things with one item dito. We know this from various previous examples, the space shuttle is a classic.