Pace asked several insightful questions about the doctrine being taught about the use of the Cirrus parachute. Here’s a stream of consciousness from my perspective.
Originally Posted by Pace
The recommendations from many here is to use the chute for every engine failure as standard practice regardless of being over built up areas or otherwise.
Sadly one day a Cirrus will pull over built up areas rather than gliding clear and will cause a multiple road collision or injury/death to someone on the ground.
Actually, the doctrine recommends the use of the CAPS parachute in preference to an off-airport landing whenever a landing on a runway is not assured. (Recall that Adrian researched this for Bonanza and Mooney accidents and found about 20% of their most recent 100 fatal accidents were off-airport landings.)
As for a CAPS pull over built-up areas, been there, done that — no significant bad outcomes to date. Note: past results do not guarantee future performance — but it is interesting to review.
Indianapolis, Indiana, USA — passenger deployed parachute (late, just 4 seconds prior to impact) and plane crashed into a retention pond in the midst of a residential neighborhood. People witnessed the parachute opening but not fully opened. No injuries to anyone on ground.
Gaithersburg, Maryland, USA — pilot deployed the parachute in IMC while disoriented and not trusting that the autopilot LVL button would regain level flight given the low altitude available. Plane landed in a residential neighborhood on a street after breaking tree limbs and with the wingtip striking a parked cargo truck. No injuries to pilot or ground personnel. No damage to truck.
Birmingham, Alabama, USA — pilot deployed parachute after disorientation on approach in IMC; plane landed in a downtown open field (how did it find the only open space in town, eh?!), right across from a gentleman’s club. No injuries to people on the ground.
Danbury, Connecticut, USA — pilot deployed at night over urban area 3 miles from airport and plane draped parachute over power lines. No injuries to people on ground. In fact, law enforcement officials told news media that people aboard plane were a bit shocked, just like typical accidents they investigate. That is, no big deal.
Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, UK — pilot deployed over urban area. At least three people made video recordings of the descent, which indicates that people on the ground notice a parachute pull. Plane clipped tall trees and landed in a garden. No injuries to people on the ground.
Buckhannon, West Virginia, USA — pilot deployed over suburban area and plane came down on top of a pickup truck on the road below. Officially, the local law enforcement considered it a traffic accident! Neither the pilot nor truck driver were injured.
Lawson, NSW, Australia — plane descended under canopy over small town in Blue Mountain region west of Sydney. At least two people recorded the descent on video and at least one other photographed the plane under canopy. People on the ground notice. Plane landed in front yard of a residence, broke tree branches, draped the parachute over power lines. No one on the ground was injured, although they posted a sign on a nearby tree: “Lawson Airport Now Open”
Think about the energy of a vertical descent under canopy. At 17 knots under parachute, compare to gliding clear and hitting something at near stall speed of 60 knots or glide speed of 88 knots. How much less energy is there to contend with under canopy? At least 1/12 the energy of a stall or 1/26 the energy of a glide and 1/112 of a spiral dive!
BTW, there has never been a post-impact fire after a descent under canopy (notwithstanding the fiery mid-air collision at Boulder that deployed the parachute by impact forces).
Consequently, we share these results to awaken people to the actual history of successful landings under canopy.
Pace also asked:
Originally Posted by Pace
Also consider an engine failure is more likely to happen soon after takeoff when the engine is most stressed has consideration been made regarding pulling at below recommended safe chute altitudes.
Doctrine for use of Cirrus parachute on departure now includes a structured departure briefing:
- runway heading
- field elevation
- 500’ AGL altitude as MSL for “CAPS and FLAPS” call out
- 2000’ AGL altitude as MSL for troubleshooting
- hard-deck altitude at which pilot will deploy CAPS before descending without runway landing assured
For loss of power events on departure, first recommendation is to abort the takeoff — better to overrun the runway at 30 knots than impact the ground at 90 knots.
Next, below 500’ AGL, pilots plan to land straight ahead.
At 500’ AGL, pilots call out CAPS and FLAPS, meaning that CAPS is viable at this altitude above the ground if deployed immediately without further hesitation (or expect a loss of altitude below which CAPS may not be viable)
At 2000’ AGL, pilots now have sufficient altitude to troubleshoot the situation and determine the best course of action. However, the hard-deck altitude provides a threshold for action, below which the pilot will not descend without deploying CAPS, unless landing on a runway is assured.
Finallly, Pace asked about deploying CAPS under strong wind conditions:
Originally Posted by Pace
finally what are COPA and Cirrus recommendations in strong wind conditions? We all know the damage caused to a car in a 30mph crash into a solid object a car has far better crash protection than an aircraft with a large lump of engine in front of the pilots.
what is the COPA attitude regarding a descending aircraft moving not just vertically but horizontally at 30 to 40 KTS?
Surely that 30 to 40 KTS would suit an in control FL into wind better than under a chute?
Tough call, for which guidance necessarily involves pilot judgement of the situation.
As for the crunch of a Cirrus at 30 knots intro something solid, recall that the ergonomics were designed to handle this situation. Seats are certified for 26G horizontal impact. Restraints are four-point seat belts. Airbags are equipped on many Cirrus aircraft. Side yoke removes the frontal impact of a steering wheel or yoke, that often impales the front-seat people. Seats are equipped with crush zones for vertical impacts. The cockpit structure involves carbon fibre and very strong cage pillars. Several Cirrus have run off the runways at 30+ knots and people survived.
Interestingly, at least four Cirrus have landed under canopy in strong winds, between 25 and 40 knots. Once people exited the airplane, the parachute reinflated and the aircraft flipped over. At least one involved a dangerous situation, which was captured on video, where the empty plane was dragged by the parachute over a frozen field until the parachute hung up on a power line. No one was injured in those accidents, either on the ground or aboard the aircraft.
As for a better outcome in a forced landing in strong winds conditions, that depends upon the skill of the pilot under duress. Most of us hope to be that skillful, but many of us realize that do not practice that, have not formed a habit of doing that, and would not trust we could successfully execute that. Also, it takes a bit of skill to maneuver into the winds at the surface that are often different than the winds aloft.
When flying a Cirrus with a parachute recovery device, we have the option of not executing a forced landing. In other aircraft, no such choice.
So, the training doctrine on the use of CAPS seeks to emphasize that the pilot must make their own determination of when they will pull the red handle.
Fortunately, recent outcomes are favorable — in the past 12 months, 8 fatal accidents and 11 CAPS deployments with 15 fatalities and 21 survivors. And the trend is accelerating — fewer fatalities and more survivors — in the past 6 months, 1 fatal accident and 7 CAPS deployments with 1 fatality and 13 survivors.
Good. But we are not done yet.
Cheers
Rick