Back at the dawn of the commercial jet age, when piston pilots were transitioning to jets, there was a rather horrific accident caused by a poorly planned approach and failure to allow sufficient time to spool the engines up.
United Airlines Flight 227 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The Captain had 334 hours of jet time at the time of the accident having transitioned from the DC-6. Again, this was early in the jet age, and many of the safety initiatives that you might consider standard had not yet been developed.
Since I was then undergoing basic jet training and was soon to go to the boat, I understood the reasons for the accident and it made an impression on me that still remains. You do not ever want to be caught near the ground on the wrong side of the jet engine acceleration curve. Too bad that lesson was forgotten/not known by the Habsheim crew.
More recently we have had a couple of accidents that resulted from pilots expecting A/T to manage their thrust while they flew the nose of their aircraft. When the A/T did something unexpected, they were caught with insufficient time to spool up before smiting the ground.
By this point in the jet age, pilots should universally understand that jet engines have a significant spool up time from idle (although it is much better now than when I was carrier qualifying in aircraft powered by a centrifugal flow jet engines and early axial flow engines.)
Since we seem to design modern cockpits where you must stare at a PFD to get your critical flight data, do we need some simple thrust indications on the PFD? Do we need a "bitching Betty" when your thrust vs altitude doesn't make sense? (Something that would not be disabled by the Radalt locking on zero as happened in Amsterdam.) I think we still have room for improvements in thrust awareness.