Although the Senate Estimate AQONs were still overdue (10 January), the release yesterday would still have to be close to an all-time record for the DoIRD (formally DoIT)…
DoIRD AQONs (Supplementary Estimates November 2013)
On a cursory review it would appear that most of the DIPs answers contain the usual (SOP) spin & obfuscation (i.e. taking the mickey of the Senators QONs).
However there are one or two notable exceptions…
In particular, Hoody’s adopted mob, the ASA take out the golden cheroot award for most directly answering the bloody questions.. : ASA AQONs & attachments for QON 160
Moving right along it would appear that the ATsBeaker are still in denial over the PelAir report….
(my bold):
Senator Xenophon asked:
It is now over four years since the ditching of VH-NGA off Norfolk Island, and nearly seven months since the committee issued its report on aviation accident investigations. Has the ATSB formulated a response to this report?
a. If so, please provide a copy of the response provided to the Minister or department.
b. Will the ATSB be implementing any of the report’s recommendations? If so, when?
c. In particular, will the ATSB be withdrawing its report into the Pel-Air incident and conducting a further investigation?
d. Does the Chief Commissioner still maintain the ditching was the fault of the pilot, and that there were no systemic issues involved?
Answer:
Yes.
a. The ATSB provided advice to the Department on 31 July 2013, to assist it in briefing the Minister on a proposed government response. The various agency contributions, including the ATSB’s, to assist in the preparation of the Government’s response to the Senate Inquiry, are internal working documents provided to the Department as part of a deliberative Government process.
Each Government aviation agency cleared parts, pertaining to their organisation, of the proposed Government response to the Senate Inquiry before the response was provided to the Government. Accordingly agency views on the Senate Inquiry’s report will be reflected in the final Government response, which will be provided to the Committee as soon as it is approved by the Government.
b. The ATSB will implement those elements of the government response which are relevant to it and are consistent with the provisions of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003. The timeframe for implementation will depend on the publication of the government’s response as well as the outcomes of the review of aviation safety regulation announced by the Deputy Prime Minister on 14 November 2013. The review team is expected to report to the government in May 2014.
c. The ATSB has no power to withdraw the Pel-Air report or plans to conduct a further investigation.
d. The ATSB stands by the findings of its report. Neither the Chief Commissioner nor the ATSB have apportioned blame for the ditching.The report identified systemic issues against which action has been taken by the relevant organisations.
And on Nick’s QONs in regards to the Canuck’s review etc of ATsBeaker:
Senator Xenophon asked:
I note that the Canadian TSB has been commissioned to undertake an independent review of the ATSB’s reporting processes.
a. Who commissioned the review?
b. Why was the TSB chosen, and who made that choice?
c. What is the process for the review?
Answer:
a. The ATSB Commission agreed to enter into an MOU with the TSB of Canada to facilitate the review, on 24 July 2013. The MOU was executed by the ATSB Chief Commissioner and the Chair of the TSB on 29 July 2013.
b. The TSB was identified by the Chief Commissioner as well placed to conduct the review because the TSB has a similar legislative framework to the ATSB and a long-standing commitment to systemic investigation to improve safety.
c. The review will involve the TSB conducting a comparative analysis of ATSB and TSB investigation methodologies, including a comparison against ICAO Annex 13.
As part of the review, the TSB will analyse a selection of ATSB investigations,including the Pel-Air investigation, to assess how the investigation methodology was applied.
The review will also assess the ATSB’s approach to the management and governance of the investigation process, the investigation reporting process and external communications.
The TSB expects to publish its report by May 2014.
Also of interest (& somewhat more informative 
) was the AQON to Nick’s QON on Loss of separation occurrences and Pel-Air:
Senator Xenophon asked:
The ATSB recently completed a review of loss of separation incidents in Australia, and concluded that issues with military ATS were primarily to blame.
a. How does this compare with the CASA review of Airservices Australia, which found serious regulatory breaches and resulted in CASA revoking ASA’s ongoing approval? Isn’t this in contrast to the ATSB’s findings?
b. Given the findings of the Pel-Air report, what confidence can the Australian public have that the ATSB was thorough and rigorous in its investigation, and did not seek to mitigate any impact the investigation may have on CASA or Airservices Australia?
c. Does the ATSB acknowledge that the significant failings of the Pel-Air report, and the lack of response to those failings, puts the ATSB’s reputation at risk?
Answer:
The ATSB’s review did not conclude that issues with military ATS were primarily to blame for loss of separation incidents in Australian airspace.
a. The CASA Part 172 audit solely looked at Airservices Australia and used an audit methodology concerned specifically with regulatory compliance.
In contrast, the ATSB’s Loss of separation (LOS) between aircraft in Australian airspace, January 2008 to June 2012 research report analysed safety data in relation to reported incidents and associated ATSB investigations. Using an evidence-based approach, it aimed to document the level of safety in relation to aircraft separation across all controlled airspace. In doing so, the ATSB examined CASA’s involvement in aircraft separation as well as that of Airservices Australia and the Department of Defence.
The ATSB research report found that most (80%) LOS incidents involved aircraft under the control of Airservices. The report highlights areas of concern relating to Airservices in relation to these occurrences; it also identified a safety issue relating to Airservices not actively monitoring or investigating LOS occurrences deemed attributable to pilots. This resulted in a recommendation to CASA, who currently do not require Airservices to report on pilot-attributable LOS occurrences. The research report also makes reference to other safety issues involving Airservices that were concurrently identified in ongoing ATSB occurrence investigations, two of which were released on the same day and identified a range of safety issues relating to Airservices and included recommendations to Airservices (AO-2011-144, AO-2012-012).
The research report also noted that:
While a number of the above investigations are ongoing at the time of writing this report, and more detailed findings and associated safety actions will be included in those reports when published, most of the issues are consistent with some of those identified in the Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s Review of CASR Part 172 Air Traffic Service Approval of Airservices Australia, which was finalised in January 2013.
The ATSB research report also examined LOS occurrences involving military air traffic control, which is currently not regulated or overseen by CASA. Analysis found that there was a disproportionate rate of LOS incidents in military terminal area airspace, and that these occurrences involved contributing air traffic controller actions more often than for equivalent civil airspace occurrences. The ATSB considers that, although small in terms of the volume of aircraft controlled, military airspace currently carries a higher risk of a separation loss than civil airspace and attention should be directed to reducing this risk. Two recommendations were made in relation to this, one to the Department of Defence, and the other to CASA.
b. Consistent with international conventions, legislative obligations and the expectations of government,the ATSB operates independently of regulators and other safety agencies.The ATSB has negotiated Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with these safety agencies that recognise their separate and independent roles but confirm a shared commitment to achieving the best possible outcome for transport safety.
Noting the concerns of the Senate References Committee Inquiry, the government has announced a review of aviation safety regulation which will consider the relationships between safety agencies.
Not withstanding the Reference Committee’s concerns, the ATSB makes a significant contribution to the safety of the Australian aviation industry through investigation, analysis, open reporting and education on civil aviation safety matters, free of any conflict of interest and without fear or favour.
c. The government is considering its response to the Senate References Committee report into Aviation Accident Investigations. Separately, the ATSB has invited the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada to review the ATSB’s investigation methodologies.The Australian public should have every confidence in the ATSB’s ability and commitment to carry out its functions fully. The ATSB looks forward to the outcomes of both the government review and the TSB review as an opportunity to further improve the ATSB’s contribution to transport safety.
Hmm..I get the impression that the clock is well and truly ticking..
..for poor old Beaker and the Miniscule response to the AAI report is (finally) imminent…..TICK TOCK! 
PS Forgot to mention the FF AQON on the Barrier embuggerance.
..for those interested here you go
:
Senator Fawcett asked:
Senator FAWCETT: Do CASA hold any records of what the content of those verbal outbriefs are?
Mr Campbell: I think you are talking about an exit meeting. I believe that we still have an exit meeting under our current processes and our current surveillance manual, and I believe there would be records of that meeting.
Senator FAWCETT: Are you able to provide those to the committee? Again, I am only getting one side of the story at the moment, and my understanding is that the exit meeting did not indicate any serious problems that would indicate a show cause notice forthcoming.
Mr Campbell: I would not expect our inspectors to be talking about show cause at an exit meeting, quite frankly. I think that is a decision that we make as part of our coordinated enforcement process, and it requires input from more people than just the inspectors to start talking about things like a show cause notice. I would expect them to say, 'We found this and this and this,' and we will be in touch with them.
Senator FAWCETT: I believe Horn Island was the area where the most concern was. I think there was an audit done—I think Twin Otter was the aircraft that was of concern. Can you tell me how many defects were found on that aircraft when you did the audit?
Mr Campbell: I do not recall the Twin Otter. I will have to take that one on notice.
Senator FAWCETT: My understanding is that it was less than a handful of things like landing lights. Again, there is no AAT process we can look at to understand the balance of this argument. Are you able to provide me—even if it is in confidence—with a record of what the deficiencies were that caused the concern in CASA, because I am certainly not seeing the same story from the other side that would lend weight to a grounding situation, which is essentially what has occurred?
Mr McCormick: Yes, we will take that on notice and provide you with all the documentation we can. I am cognizant that the committee had a discussion earlier today with Mr Mrdak about FOI versus committee requests, and we acknowledge that anything we give to you will be in confidence. We will do our utmost to give you anything we have available on that, and we will certainly find the reports you refer to and the recommendation paperwork that came to me which led to the serious and imminent risk decision. Is it satisfactory that we go up to that decision point?
Senator FAWCETT: Yes, that would be good.
Mr McCormick: We will do that. We will take that on notice.
Answer:
CASA is not aware of any Twin Otters operating in the Torres Strait/Horn Island area and have not carried out any audit or aircraft inspection on any Twin Otters in that region in recent years. It is possible that the question may be referring to another aircraft type, the Britten Norman BN2 (Islander), which was operated by Barrier Aviation (Barrier) at their Horn Island base.
A number of aircraft including the Britten Norman BN2 were found to have defects during CASA audits and subsequent investigations, and details of those matters were considered with regard to CASA’s serious and imminent risk decision.
As a result of a special audit of Barrier from 29 October 2012 to 12 November 2012, a total of eleven Aircraft Survey Reports (ASRs) were issued in relation to aircraft operated by Barrier. ASRs are directions relating to the maintenance of Australian aircraft for the purposes of ensuring the safety of air navigation. Of significant concern was that four of the ASRs were issued under Code A which requires the serious maintenance issues identified to be rectified before any further flight of the aircraft.
It should be noted however that it was not simply the identification of aircraft defects which led CASA to decide to suspend Barrier Aviation’s Air Operators Certificate (AOC). Barrier’s practice of preventing its pilots from complying, or directing them not to comply, with their legislative obligations, and flying aircraft on numerous occasions in charter passenger carrying operations with known airworthiness defects, many of which were major defects, gave rise to a serious and imminent risk to air safety.
The view was reinforced by the systemic deficiencies identified during CASA’s audit activities, the serious aircraft defects identified and Barrier’s poor safety record as evidenced by numerous safety incidents. This was also corroborated by the contents of the diary which was seized on 18 December 2012 when a search warrant was executed on Barrier’s Horn Island offices.
Justice Rares of the Federal Court of Australia on 22 February 2013 delivered a judgement stating he was satisfied that Barrier Aviation had engaged in conduct that either constituted, or contributed to, or resulted in, a serious and imminent risk to air safety, and as such the Court made an order that prohibited the holder from doing anything that was authorised by the AOC. Barrier Aviation did not oppose Justice Rares making such an order.
The results of further investigation and analysis were considered in relation to subsequent actions, including the cancellation of Barrier Aviation’s AOC on 13 March 2013 and the refusal to re-issue an AOC on 31 July 2013.
All clear as mud now??
