A reprieve on the fourth: “K”, ignoring the meandering dogleg where the rest of us mere mortals had all decided to lay up, again smashed the fanny out of his ball and drove it straight at the flag.
However (somewhat ironically) his ball again smacked the flagpole but this time ricocheted on a 45 and ended up on the fifth tee. In true Ferryman style, “K” has been forced to use his Texas wedge to backtrack to the 4th..IOS sigh of relief..
The embuggerance of DJ under r265 is still firmly on the fairway and in the field of play, perhaps this provides the WLR panel the perfect reference point to assess the effectiveness of the Fort Fumble (DAS sanctioned) black ops enforcement action:
Post
#234 quote -
“Most of the regulatory decisions CASA makes are such that conformity with authoritative policy and established procedures will be conducive to the achievement of these outcomes. From time to time, however, decision-makers will encounter situations in which the strict application of policy, in the making of a decision involving the exercise of discretion, would not be appropriate. Indeed, in some cases, the inflexible application of policy may itself be unlawful.”
Many on here were critical of DJ’s actions pre..post..ditching and especially in the Senate Inquiry, where most critics thought he was just trying to abrogate his responsibilities as the PIC. The following is his statement from the 22nd October public hearing:
Mr James : I was the captain of the jet that ditched of Norfolk Island on 18 November 2009 without the loss of life. As the pilot in command, I wish to make it clear that on that night I was not operating by myself in a vacuum. I was licenced by CASA, trained by structures that CASA created and worked for a company using procedures CASA had approved, and yet CASA found I was the problem.
My employer, Pel-Air, found me skilled enough to make me a captain and never had cause to discipline me at any time. After the accident, they did not find that I had violated any of the company procedures and they too found that I was the problem. The truth of the matter is that I was a convenient solution to the problem both organisations faced—that is, that they had failed to do their jobs properly.
Then there is the ATSB report—a report which blames me solely for the accident and apologises for everyone else involved. It fails to detail the deficiencies that existed at Pel-Air and CASA at the time of the accident but discussed in detail the improvements Pel-Air has made and CASA intends to make.
The ATSB then addresses what they believe were my deficiencies on the night but then never discusses the steps I have taken since the accident to demonstrate my competence as a pilot. Why am I judged to a different standard? Where is the ATSB's own no-blame policy in this approach? If both Pel-Air and CASA have made improvements as the report admits, then logically something was inadequate to begin with that required these improvements, so therefore why doesn't the report discuss any of these deficiencies?
Before the accident had even occurred, many of the elements that created the accident were already known. To the misfortune of all those on board, although these elements were known, nothing was done to prevent their influence or remove them altogether. Norfolk Island was known to the ATSB as a problem destination for unforecasted weather, and recommendations were put forward to improve the situation but nothing was done about it.
Pel-Air was known to CASA for particular deficiencies in its operation, but that too was not acted upon. Then, after the accident, there was more inaction, this time in the form of the ATSB not disclosing in the accident report the findings of the Pel-Air special audit, amongst other things.
Why have the problems that created this accident been ignored and overlooked? Don't the two government agencies responsible for aviation safety—the ATSB and CASA—want to preserve the safety of the travelling public? As things stand today, nothing has been improved since the accident and most of the issues that caused the accident still exist unchanged. The ATSB report needs to be withdrawn, as it is full of pointless accounts of nothing worthwhile and it serves my industry and those who travel by air no benefit whatsoever. With so much to learn from what happened and the strong desire of those involved to share their experiences, there is a far better result available if the ATSB accepts its shortcomings and rewrites this report.
Finally, I wish to say that considering all the criticisms in the report as to the quality of the job I did on the night of the accident, and given the limited time and resources I had available to me, it strikes me as astoundingly hypocritical of the ATSB to have made these criticisms when the ATSB has failed to do its job after nearly three years and with almost unlimited resources.
My thanks to the committee for allowing me the chance to speak today and share a little of my story from the last three years. I hope that what I have to say helps the committee in its role of understanding better what has happened since November 2009. Following my public discussion with the committee, I wish to go in camera to discuss some other issues related to the accident.
{Note: IMO that statement still stands the test of time and almost perfectly summarises the case as we know it}
Again knowing what we now know, would those same critics be so dismissive of DJ’s statement??
The worst part is that his original statement is yet to be adequately refuted or addressed by the
“powers to be” and he is still living with the implications of an executively sanctioned black letter ops enforcement action and an apparent embuggerance of the original intent of the NOS & r265…
Quote from CAsA official (at the time):
“…DAS is obviously interested in this issue”…???