I'm just wondering whether anyone has taken into account the topography and location of the crash regarding the weather?
I lost the will to live reading up to page 80 odd by the 'I'm prettier than you!' posts.
It doesn't take a genius to work out that Sumburgh Head is right in the way of their planned approach and the wind will be doing all sorts even if it's only 140/17K at AD level. those of you who have flown Shetland and flown SAR must know what occurs to a non IAS coupled AC when entering turbulent or dead air.
My theory, and I'm just a co-jo...is as they approached they set the holds (VOR localiser+V/S) and as they were above Sumburgh head everything seemed settled (ie:correct IAS) until the last stages where according to the AAIB.
They had a 500fpm ROD reducing to 68KTS, reducing to 30 odd KTS...splash.
Does no one else consider that the wind at AD level, especially coming from 140/17 AT AD around Sumburgh Head has nothing to do with a 09 approach?
The pilot's set his ROD with collective, as Sumburgh Head's winds come into play (it's a mere 300ft), the aircraft tries to maintain ROD levels created within parameters of a much lower collective setting, the pilots don't notice because they're desperate to get in, it's Shetland and there's very few places to go bar Wick, Inverness or Aberdeen and Scatsta's as much use as a chocolate teapot in these conditions.
Admittedly it's poor monitoring/flying..but how many of you haven't had your own 'moments'? Which fortunately for all involved, meant you and the pacs all lived to tell the tale?
As for the training element, you train specialists for a specific task, when things get ****ty and they fail because they've never 'seen it before', you've only yourselves to blame. Time to wake up Governing bodies and those controlling the purse strings...