26500lbs,
Any change in culture would have to embrace a level of knowledge of the automation that is not being demonstrated at the moment - that in itself requires a change in our training practices away from number of hours to one of demonstration of competence. Perhaps the level of knowledge should associated with a mental map of the working of automation and not necessarily with a mechanical function of keystroke provision. If a situation is observed that is out of the normal, it is far more likely that it can be addressed if the overall logic is understood.
The Cougar 851 incident was complex because the report appears to throw doubt on: the competence of the P1; his level of understanding of the automation; and the confidence/competence level of the P2. Not exactly a happy state of affairs. (Unfortunately a similar situation obtained when the oil filter studs failed in a previous accident.)
With respect to your points on the logic of my argument: it has long been accepted by the airlines that a monitored approach always sees the less experience crew member as the PF. Thus, any required action following an inadequate response to a challenge would always be taken by the more experienced PM.
As for offshore landings; yes, we are in a situation where, because we need to have risk-assessed landing profiles (which does not apply equally to take-off) the PM on an approach cannot see the helideck cues. However, the same logic applies; all crew members must demonstrate competence for deck landings - this might be achieved (as it is) by limiting the scope of inexperienced crew members to those situations where skills have been seen to be adequate. If one of the limits of the landing profile are exceeded, or it can be seen that it might be exceeded, the PM should (gently) challenge; if the inexperience crew member is not in a position to correct the exceedence, then there is little alternative to the PM calling for a go-around and returning to base. This is also a cultural issue but one that has to be adopted if it is considered that we have to have continuation training on the job (as we probably do).
The issue of an inexperienced crew member not being in a position, mentally or physically, to take control following subtle incapacitation is one of training and/or culture and has to be thought through in detail.
We can only operate safely if we adopt the correct stance to all of these issues. The first barrier that we face is to convince the regulator, operator, pilot and customer that we have to have cultural change. My view is that we are in a unique position to do this.
If one thing is becoming clearer to us each day it is that without a change of culture from the top, we will not be able to address the HF issues and put in place a ‘change management’ process that not only could have dealt with the immediate problem, but would also be able to see the next one coming – they are not exactly ‘black swan’ events.
Mars