In the meanwhile, we will keep pressing for a change that recognises the differences in AP capability such that the CAA, and or the Helicopter Operator, mandate use of the coupler from and to, defined pints in the flight envelope.
We must not forget how this thread started. With the L2 Sumburgh accident. At face value, the AAIB interim report states that L2 was descending in 3 Axis mode (Mixed Mode). There is little doubt in my mind this is likely to be the prime causal factor in this accident. If that L2 had been fully coupled this accident could never have occurred.
We do not know at this stage WHY the approach was flown in mixed mode BUT if the PF self elected to operate in this manner it is because he operates within a culture and OM that has allowed him to do so.
Hopefully the HSSG, the Government enquiry into helicopter safety and the AAIB will identify these cultural obstacles and force the Operates to properly and adequately mandate the use of Automation in sufficient detail, for each type, such that the loss of life, caused by these completely avoidable accidents, ends forever.
In addition we must now surely all recognise the enormous safety benefits of a DAFCS with in built flight envelope protections.
The last few pages of this thread have really made some interesting reading and some very good points highlighted. I hope some from the AAIB are dropping by from time to time!
Again a very relevant point from DB. There are so many questions to be answered here and it will not be a single simple answer. What we do know is that a helicopter ended up in the drink with both engines operative. We assume that there was no other major technical issue with the aircraft. If this assumption is correct, then we are right in asking why and how. This why and how should be far reaching and most certainly not stop at the crew.
We have gone back and forward on the hand flying debate, and this is in my view an over simplistic argument. As already argued, this is not a hand flying issue, it is a poor use of coupler issue. It is a CRM issue. It is a supervision issue. Lack of SOPs. A company not fully supporting their operation and crew with appropriate supervision and support perhaps? Why? Why and how has this
culture developed? Is it widespread across the NS? Is it developing? How has it managed to develop? Have we really lost our basic understanding of aviation safety culture due to commercial pressure? Why are our operators not pushing for better technology to be mandated from the manufacturers and authorities? This should be wide ranging from autopilots to safety equipment. I am still often astonished at how basic the S92 autopilot system is and how sloppy it can be. Why are we still not all flying P2E across the NS after so many years since its incarnation? Why do we not have STASS and proper survival suits? Why do we fly at night when the sea-state is above 6 and aircraft have only SS6 floats, basically condemning a ditching to be fatal to all or most on board? Why do we have inadequate and poorly used reporting systems? I would be willing to bet that a large number of incidents pass unreported.
Ok - not entirely relevant to this particular case, but all an indication of the culture we work in. We accept a lot of questionable risks that could easily be mitigated given the will, and still get the job done. That is the big picture. Why is it the case? That is the real question to ask in my view. Is it just money? Is it leadership? Do we want to accept a situation whereby we do the maximum possible with the minimum amount of money and resources to maximise profit? Only when it falls down will we know we went too far and by then we have gone way too far. I would suggest that is where we are now. We are taking people to and from work. We should not be trying to save their lives in the process.
I agree with Al-bert and Crab in that more training would be a godsend. I really hope this can be a reality. It was always a luxury we had in the military that training hours and aircraft without pax on board were available. Now we only have the sim. Al-bert mentioned the autopilot culture and said should we just go all the way, with pilots really just monitoring? This is the direction we are heading. With the introduction of the new rig-approach into the S92 autopilot system the pilot will effectively only need to take control once committed to landing. With the introduction of all these fantastic levels of automation we must be even more cautious as to how to implement them and how to support our pilots through training. We must also use them completely and thoroughly to reap their benefit. This has to develop. Basic flying skill MUST not be lost. Otherwise we might as well sit in Mumbai with a non-alcoholic cocktail. Sounds nice to me on a dark winter night but not sure it will sell!