Hi Crab. Nice summary, lets hope you are wrong and some progress is made in all the issues you raise. There does seem to be a determination to make change by all stakeholders involved. They talk the talk. Whether they walk the walk will remain to be seen.
In this case, it may be the the accident may never have happened had the IAS hold button been pressed before MDA. AAIB and time will tell. If this is the case then this prime causal factor actually sits in our lap. The Trainers and the crews. One thing that has struck me throughout is the difficulty I have encountered explaining how these APs work to all types of management, they have no idea and probably nor should they. That's our job and we need to get much better at it, very quickly.
Attitudes, culture and procedure must change. Too often I have seen risk, in automation, managed to the lowest common denominator. Yet we know that automation is entirely type specific. It follows therefore that the procedures and requirements should also be type specific.
A passenger has asked if we brief specifically on how the approach will be flown between the AP and the Pilot Flying. In my 20 years offshore experience I would say we do not cover this in enough depth. Yet the response from crews is borderline hysterical that seems to centre on the checks being too long already. It is this that has to change. Our culture and our attitudes.
The other issues such as egress, seating and survival are vital because the passengers who post on this thread all seem to accept that fatalistic approach that it might still all go wrong. All they ask, and deserve, is a fighting chance when it does.
DB