Tom Imrich:
All things considered:
1. It is completely inappropriate and unnecessary to still be flying "Non-Precision" approaches in 2013 with big jets. There are vastly better ways to land, using means via FMS, RNP, and GLS (while ILS is OK in many places as an interim aid, it is far too expensive and technically difficult and electronically sensitive to put ILS everywhere, and be sustained for the indefinite future).
RNP AR does a nice job of getting around difficult terrain to a given runway end. But, it doesn't provide low minimums essentially because the vertical guidance is not very good, and the lateral containment area is much wider than ILS or GLS. Plus, the cost of entry into the "RNP AR Club" is too high and very difficult unless it is a giant airline. The benefit of RNP AR is for terrain avoidance more than a mile or so from the runway. Many locations, including BHM, do not have such terrain issues, thus RNP AR is being greatly and unnecessarily overused.
2. Properly implemented RNP, FMS, VNAV (and especially GLS) can fix this decades long chronic issue, virtually 100% of the time.
But, not nearly 100% of the runway ends meet the glideslope qualification surface (FAA) requirements (GQS.) Runway 18 at BHM cannot meet GQS requirements, thus it cannot have any FAA sanctioned vertically guided procedure.
3. No pilot (short of a willful act) wants to end up where this crew ended up. Hence, to varying degrees, a lot of other people, including authorities (flawed or obsolete policies and criteria), OEMs (lack of adopting and updating better methods and techniques), ANSPs (failure to implement modern SIAP types and systems), and even the airline itself (using less than modern or optimum policies, training, and equipment) perhaps helped them get where they ended up.
In the case of BHM the ill-fated crew's best solution was to insist on the ILS runway. Perhaps better training about the issues and limitations of a Runway like 18 would help. Even more so, with the high MDA for either of the two instrument approaches to Runway 18, the mere sighting and use of the PAPI once descending below MDA would have easily avoided the accident. The pertinent procedural data note implied that was a legal requirement for either Runway 18 IAP at night.
4. Let's just see where the NTSB ends up on this one now.
Indeed, let's.