PA,
I would have liked for the AAIB to include the CVR data....a couple more days would not make a difference one way or the other as to the future of the SP on the North Sea. It would have made a huge difference in the ability of the Operators and others to provide a better explanation of what happened and why. It could still be well short of a full report but the inclusion of the CVR data would remove a lot of speculation yet to come.
One thing I noticed in the Sim was when things started going wrong....one of the first reactions of a lot of Pilots was to de-select the Autopilot and revert to hand flying.
Part of that stemmed from the newness of both Sim Training and Autopilots. I would think as Automation and one's experience/familiarity with modern Autopilots this tendency would decrease.
The single most glaring mistake I saw was the failure to increase power upon executing a Missed Approach.....and when that happened....we saw a slow motion crash. The Crew would decide to go Missed....hit the G/A button....make their Radio Call....start looking for charts, maps, changing radio frequencies or whatever.....and the Autopilot would do its best to comply but at some point the climb rate could not be produced by the decrease in Airspeed and then the loss of control happened.
Generally, Unusual Attitude Recovery training is done with lots of airspeed and at higher altitudes. Low Airspeed events close to the ground are where helicopters are the most at risk.
What is the system in the UK for such training and testing on Base Checks?
Do you practice low or zero airspeed upsets?
Last edited by SASless; 5th Sep 2013 at 20:12.