PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
Old 5th Sep 2013, 19:07
  #1234 (permalink)  
pilot and apprentice
 
Join Date: Oct 2012
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Pitts
the industry has the system it deserves.
The industry has the system forced upon it by the same people who conduct witch-hunts based on scant evidence, chase scapegoats as early in the process as possible, and then sue if a mistake is made. Add in the fact that aviation has a much higher profile than, for instance, road accidents or boats.

HC
They have said what happened in detail, but it takes time to work out why (since at first glance I suspect it defies logic).
italics added

Defies logic? I doubt it. But finding the root cause, separating the wheat from the chaff, will take more time than just stating the facts.

I can think of several very plausible and different sequences of events that may or may not have led to this result. Most are AP related but not all. We recently had an intermittent 26VAC bus Inverter issue on a 76C+. The result was seemingly random decoupling of the upper modes with minimal indication to the crew.

FFF
My posting a couple of pages back got trampled in a handbagging incident between Pitts and HC (Ladies, please!). Any thought on this as a theory?
http://flightsafety.org/hs/hs_may_june97.pdf
It certainly sounds like a good place to start.

These are the things the AAIB must now determine. They have a significant amount of data to sift through, including the CVR, to determine what the crew intended, what really happened, and how the difference between the 2 came about.

SAS
I shall take a bit of a Contrarian view on this Special AAIB Report.

My view is this report should not have been released.

The AAIB should have waited until they had digested the CVR data and decided what it meant....then released a Special Report that would go much further in describing the sequence of events and the time line of the CVR.

The Report as it reads now...tells very little and only generates more conjecture than it would otherwise had they waited to put out the CVR information.

Far too little information to justify a Report at this time.
Sorry SAS, I have to disagree here too. Given the anti-Super Puma/225 witch-hunt that was going on, it was inevitable and, SADLY, necessary to tell the world that there was not an obvious design issue.

HC
Because the L2 doesn't have the same power limiting functionality, its not normal to fly the L2 in 4-axis in the cruise or climb, but no reason not to for an approach. However much of the time the L2 will be being flown in 3 axis and perhaps that makes the fleet culture a bit different.

We are presuming of course that the collective axis was functional at the time, but that the crew chose not to use it.

As I mentioned earlier, I suspect that after this, there will be a tightening up of SOPs for use of automation, something which has mostly been at pilot's discretion up to now.
Finally, something to discuss. OUR 76C+ also lacks some of the power limiting functionality I hear about in the 225. As result, in the highly compressed sim sessions we are now being given (bean counters pay attention with shame!) one can expect nearly every approach to end OEI. The standard I have seen is a consequent discouragement to use 4-axis to prevent troubles related to power limiting. We tend to fight the way we train, which is to then avoid 4-axis.

I personally dislike rigid automation SOP's. I prefer to 'mix it up' from flight to flight in order to explore the capabilities and limitations of both the system, and my knowledge of it. I therefore am comfortable choosing the modes that will best help me when things get busy or difficult, but not surprised when the system is degraded.

HC
there should be an aural warning anytime autopilot functionality was lost to the point the pilot had to take manual control, but so far that hasn't been implemented.
As mentioned above a couple times, easy to miss on many types.

I won't quote you again, HC, on automation philosophy and how it has changed. As I have changed employers, continents, types, and years have passed I agree things changed from all hand flown rides, to all coupled, to something else. Inevitably there is an incident that highlights another chink in the armour and the world rushes to fix it. All this to say you are correct as to the progression.

-----------------
Again, my own personal defense is to, when allowed within the SOP's, use the various modes, in different combinations, and see how it reacts. This way I avoid, as much as possible, having to ask on a dark and stormy night: "what is it doing now?"
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