PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Senate Inquiry, Hearing Program 4th Nov 2011
Old 15th May 2013, 06:23
  #1734 (permalink)  
Sarcs
 
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Down the ICAO barrel and…beyond???

Kharon said:
The BRB thought it worth mentioning that Barrier needs industry support and in it's own defence, the industry needs to support Barrier. It is an ugly story and no matter what your stance on "Barrier" is, it is unacceptable that any operator should be subjected to the full CASA "treatment"; and Barrier is getting it – big time.
Couldn’t agree more “K” it is indeed an ugly tale and one of many that seems to be stuck on an endless loop of sorry tales. However if you are lucky enough to reside in the middle to big end of town (like a Pel-Air), then it would appear you can just about get away with anything!

However if the SSP were to be properly implemented, in accordance with Annex 19, then it is highly unlikely that the Barrier’s of this world would ever occur.

Why you might ask? Ok if we assume the SSP to be the State’s SMS, then the SSP will have to provide a high level strategy, and not only a detailed ‘in the weeds’ set of procedures so much loved by the “Wodgers” of Fort Fumble’s inspectorate (refer the 'Chamber Report').

The existence of a proper SSP policy and strategy means that you or I can ask ‘Yes, but do your procedures align with the documented strategy? If you cannot convince me of that, then your argument has no merit.’

Clear as mud? No? Well perhaps ‘3-1 Safety Oversight’ section might better explain (my bold):
SSP Element 3.1 Safety oversight - The State has established mechanisms to ensure effective monitoring of the eight critical elements of the safety oversight function. The State has also established mechanisms to ensure that the identification of hazards and the management of safety risks by service providers follow established regulatory controls (requirements, specific operating regulations and implementation policies). These mechanisms include inspections, audits and surveys to ensure that regulatory safety risk controls are appropriately integrated into the service provider’s SMS, that they are being practised as designed, and that the regulatory controls have the intended effect on safety risks.
This would mean that some of the ugliest, dubious, and legally questionable cases like Barrier and the ones “K” alludes to … “ the James tale, the case of the psychic damp test, the adventure of fast and loose use of Reg 265 (or anything else which may fit),” ...would have to be justified and in accordance with the SSP, the State’s legislative requirements, the ICAO SARPs and would required to be transparent to review by the administrators (not Fort Fumble) of the SSP.

As an example if we refer to Karon’s earlier post:
One of the major stumbling blocks towards nirvana Annexe 19 would be that not only would James have been exonerated, but the whole motley judgement panel would be knee deep in their own pony pooh. Look at the flogging Mick Quinn got when he quite rightly stated in the Senate, (my paraphrasing) - the ATSB report’s substitution test showed that the unsafe procedure that nearly killed everyone on NGA, is endemic across Australian Civil Aviation. Therefore everyone didn’t realise the risk, not just Dom.
If we then refer to part of the last paragraph of '1-4 Enforcement policy':
At the same time, the State may need to formalize the need for its service providers to have internal disciplinary procedures that incorporate an equivalent enhancement. This would imply that service providers are expected to have an acceptable process in place to manage their own routine safety/ quality deviations through internal disciplinary policies and procedures.
If applied properly, it would have exonerated Dom James because he was complying with his ops manual, unaware that compliance made him unsafe. Implicit from this argument, the regulator must realise that they’re not God, only a ‘defence in depth’.

As Mick Quinn stated (above), the ATSB report’s substitution test showed that the unsafe procedure that nearly killed everyone on NGA, is endemic across Australian Civil Aviation. Therefore everyone didn’t realise the risk, not just Dom.

And that is the importance of Annex 19 and the proper compliant implementation of an Aviation SSP….the question is does the current status quo have the necessary testicular fortitude to see a proper SSP put in place? Or, coupled with all those other NCNs, SARP differences, etc…etc, are we doomed to a long stint bumped back to level 2?

Last edited by Sarcs; 15th May 2013 at 06:36. Reason: "K" you were looking a bit lonely at the top of the page...
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