I have followed this topic for some days now and was hoping it would show up here. The one angle that seems to be lost on many IT bodies, and too many flying staff focusing on technical details, is this: it isn't all about what you can make the various systems do or not do.
The easiest interface to "use" is the angle of denying the people in 0A and 0B of trust in the system.
It will in all likelyhood turn out to be simpler to find ways of making the various components act in undefined, unexplicable and incoherent ways, rather than trying to make the system automate and perform certain task on their own.
Once you erode trust enough in the electronics of the airplane, then the conservative nature of the airline industry will kick in: head for a suitable airfield and figure out what's going on.
What you have here is the basic ingredients for DoS/DDoS attacks.
The one thing the industry in general wants to do is to retain trust in the safety provided (not actual security, that's a whole different discussion and done to death already).
-A
Last edited by ph-ndr; 14th Apr 2013 at 02:47.