Dozy, the human interaction in complex dynamic systems is critical.
Understood, sir. I may not be a pilot, but I like to think that neither am I a complete idiot (most of the time at any rate...). I can't live it the way you guys do, but I do my homework in order to understand the issues at hand as well as I can.
With experience, we learn to assess our colleagues in terms of how well we can work with them, and I think that one of the big differences in how colleague interaction works in earthbound professions like my own versus yours is that we can use that experience to avoid or keep to a minimum working with those we have trouble with. Pilots, on the other hand, are at the mercy of the crew roster and don't have that luxury.
The early renditions were related to dealing with communications more or less a rehash of signal theory and an awareness of Gert Hofsteade's treatise, thereafter we went towards organisational causation per James Reason, expansion of team dynamics with Dan Maurino, HMI/automation by Asaf Degani & Earl Weiner, and thereafter towards SA, Mica Endsley & Co, Threat and Error Management etc, with additional research from Neil Johnson and Co, Gary Klein NDM, RPDM etc.
Sure, and I bet that when the essence of all those theories and research papers is boiled down, what you ultimately end up with is a variant of PJ2's beautifully concise precis of being able to fly, communicate - and manage, in the case of being Captain - successfully at the same time.
In a well-run and organised flight deck environment staffed with people who are professionals first and foremost (e.g. those of Capts. Haynes, Sullenberger and Burkill, to name but a few), then the fundamental underpinnings of CRM are almost an afterthought because they happen instinctively. Yourself and PJ2 are of the opinion that because it is an instinctive and natural progression it is not therefore CRM. I'm not so sure myself, but as it's ultimately a philosophical difference I'm not going to argue.
EDIT : PJ2 - I actually wrote the above paragraph prior to seeing your reply. I think we're by-and-large on the same page here.
PS. I never said CRM "saved" 1549 or 232 - I paraphrased Bob McIntosh's assertion that the 232 CVR demonstrated the principles that underpin CRM in action. 
Conversely when things go wrong, more often than not at least some of the factors can be traced to poor application of CRM fundamentals. Not just in cases such as BEA548 and Tenerife where the autocratic tendencies of the flight commander rendered the rest of the crew's input moot, but also cases like Palm 90, where the FO was in fact more experienced in jet operations than his Captain (who was far from autocratic in this case) and yet provided only token protests at a situation he knew was becoming unsafe; and EAL401 in which the whole crew allowed a minor technical problem to distract them - to the extent that no-one was monitoring the aircraft. Most if not all of these pre-date the initial heyday of CRM, but would you not say the principles still apply?
it cannot be a replacement for the fundamental skill sets of dealing with an aircraft as a simple physical tool.
Agreed, however I think we're talking about a separate issue from CRM at this point. If you know of an operation where CRM or similar HF training is being performed at the expense of flight training, then that needs to be reported.
Being unable to recognise a stall, or recover from a stall is an unacceptable point to have achieved.
Agreed, and we'll get back to that shortly.
A320/330's etc stall quite well, just needs a dynamic change to exceed the program envelope and you are on your way to a fun ride. Don't even need a system failure
I'm pretty sure you do. The incidents you mention all show the aircraft dropping out of Normal Law prior to stalling. By definition this means that a systems failure was involved.
but they apparently happen routinely
Could you provide me a link to the third example? Working on the assumption you're right, I'd hardly call 3 incidents in nearly a quarter-century of service "routine".
I believe in education and increased self awareness, as it assists in understanding the environment we work in.
As do I.
It is not a replacement for core skills, and that is what is currently killing us.
I think we need to look at a few things here. Firstly the advent of CRM occurred roughly in the same time period as the widespread introduction of powerful digital FMS and automation, but I suspect this is a coincidence - please correct me if you know differently but I can't help but doubt that the two were intended to complement each other.
In that same time period, business practices (particularly in the west) started moving towards managerialism. PJ2 wrote a wonderful post a while back -detailing the encroachment of the MBA generation on airline management and ops. I won't try to paraphrase it here, but the core of it related to how, prior to this shift, senior management tended to have been aviation people first and foremost. MBA training on the other hand tends to focus on finance, manufacturing and retail, and to adapt the methods suited to those sectors to fit everything else.
Now for example, in manufacturing you train an employee to perform a role - that training can be bolstered by the education and training that employee previously had. Putting that aside for a second, as the employee gains experience with the company they may be required to undergo further training when new tools and methods are adopted, and sometimes refresher training is required to brush up on specifics. The manager can usually assume quite safely that said employee will never have to revisit the basics that they learned either prior to or on joining the company because it becomes second nature - in fact to do so would be an arguably unnecessary expense.
I'm sure you don't need me to point out the potential for danger in applying this mentality to pilots, but a manager whose MBA bought them a place in an airline without having to understand the shop floor will be completely clueless. As such they do not comprehend how practicing stall recovery in CAVOK conditions in a Cessna is in no way, shape or form sufficient preparation for dealing with a stall in an airliner over water at night. All they know is that the pilot came to them with a bunch of certificates that tick the "trained in stall recovery" box.
It is this mentality above all else that I believe is the crux of the problem. Everything else - including CRM, automation, SOP practice etc. - is a sideshow by comparison. Believe me, it's a problem across industry as a whole - aviation is not alone.
Now - circuitously getting back to the subject, I see a failure to apply PJ2's principles in the Turkish accident case. But I do not see sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that these systemic issues were at the heart of the loss of SA.
Phew! Sorry for the ramble, all...