Squib66
If you want to follow this up, consider the Tornado ZG710/Patriot shootdown of March 2003 (2 killed). The recently released complete BoI report has Sir Brian Burridge stating that a properly integrated IFF system WOULD have prevented the crash (despite other contributory factors, this was the critical one).
Where are the (hitherto) mandated instructions on how to conduct systems integration and the Trials Installation (thus ensuring functional safety), which is a pre-requisite to the (hitherto) mandatory update of the Safety Case? Answer - Def Stan 05-125/2. (But not 05-123, which is a bit thin on such practical detail).
Then ask why MoD(PE)'s DGAS2 ruled in 1998 that implementing these (hitherto) mandated instructions was now optional. And that the contract could be paid off while making the false declaration that the regs HAD been implemented. And why CDP upheld this ruling, even though Boscombe had highlighted the friendly fire risk of ignoring this regulation.
In 1998 DGAS2 (later XD1 in DPA) was advised to order a fleet inspection of Tornado IFF failure warning designs. He refused. Similarly, XD5 in 2002. He walked away laughing.
Then ask if anything the MAA is doing would have prevented this behaviour. To put it crudely, would the MAA boss pin a 4 Star to the wall and tell him he was ****** insane to encourage staff to render aircraft functionally unsafe and vulnerable to friendly fire? I doubt it. Career suicide. But an independent MAA would have that authority without having to worry about his next promotion.
Last edited by tucumseh; 3rd Oct 2012 at 06:31.